FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1971

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

JOHN V. LINDSAY, Mayor of the City of New York; member of the House of Representatives, 1959–65; a founder of the National Urban Coalition * * * *MICHEL OKSENBERG,* Associate Professor of Political Science, Columbia University; International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; now in Hong Kong preparing a book on the politics of water conservancy in China * * * *JEROME ALAN COHEN,* Professor of East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; author of "The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1963" and other works * * * *EARL C. RAVENAL,* member of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington; Director, Asian Division (Systems Analysis) in the office of the Secretary of Defense, 1967–69; editor of "Peace with China? U. S. Decisions for Asia" * * * *CHARLES W. YOST,* Distinguished Lecturer in Foreign Policy, School of International Affairs, Columbia University; U. S. Representative to the United Nations, 1968–71; author of "The Insecurity of Nations" and other works * * * *FRANCOIS DUCHENE,* Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, London; editorial writer, *The Economist,* London, 1963–67 * * * *EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA,* President of Chile, 1964–70; former President of the Christian Democratic Party; author of many works, including "Truth Has Its Hour" * * * *FRANK GIBNEY,* Executive Vice President, Encyclopaedia Britannica, with headquarters in Tokyo; author, among other works, of "Five Gentlemen of Japan" and editor of "The Penkovskiy Papers" * * * *JAMES P. GRANT,* President, Overseas Development Council; Assistant Administrator of AID for Vietnam, 1967–69; Director, AID Mission to Turkey, 1964–67 * * * *SIDNEY H. SCHANBERG,* Bureau Chief, *The New York Times,* New Delhi * * * *ELIZABETH YOUNG (LADY KENNET)* has written frequently on disarmament topics, including the volume "Nations and Nuclear Weapons" * * * *ANTON VRATUSA,* member of the Jugoslav Federal Executive Council; Deputy Foreign Minister, 1969–71; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1967–69 * * * *PHILIP C. JESSUP,* Visiting Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Judge of the International Court of Justice, 1961–70; Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University, 1946–61; Ambassador at Large, 1949–53; U. S. Representative to the United Nations General Assembly, 1948–52.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FOR A NEW POLICY BALANCE

By John V. Lindsay

AMONG the many traumas inflicted by the nightmare of Vietnam has been the realization—for many Americans the shock of recognition—that foreign and domestic policy have merged into a seamless web of interlocking concerns. It is now almost impossible to identify any issue, condition or interest of national significance which is not affected by international trends and circumstances, and which does not in turn affect some aspect of the foreign policy of the United States. For students of public affairs long concerned with both elements of our national posture this may be a truism which hardly bears repeating. However, I regret to observe that most citizens, including most specialists in foreign or domestic affairs, have not yet adapted their insights and prognostications to this integrated view of the world; nor have those of us in public service been effective in foreseeing and planning to deal with the domestic implications of foreign policies, some of them already now in effect.

As a result, much of what is called domestic policy in this country reduces in the main to feverish counterpunching by Federal, state, and local governments reeling under the effects of some foreign initiative whose domestic implications were unforeseen or weighed lightly in the policy balance. This is not to say that many of our problems are not home-grown. Crime, pollution, racial tension, and many other elements of our national malaise would be with us even if the rest of the world disappeared. I would assert, however, that many of our most intractable problems—particularly in the economic sphere—and, even more, our heretofore feeble capacity to deal with the full range of our difficulties, are traceable in large part to a chronic blind spot with respect to the link between foreign and domestic

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affairs. Until we move to correct it, neither our foreign nor our domestic policies are likely to be commensurate with our potential. We will continue to suffer, particularly on the domestic front, from the disease Tocqueville diagnosed as the most dangerous flaw in great democracies, the inability "to persevere in a fixed design." Without this ability we stand little chance of completing the renovation of domestic and foreign policies vital to our survival as a great and enlightened world power.

II

It is ironic that the United States, the world's leading innovator in so many fields, should be so late to address itself to the fundamental identity between foreign and domestic policy. However, the reasons for our tardiness are clear enough. We were born in a time of determination to avoid the foreign "entanglements"—a euphemism for almost constant warfare—which had so long dominated our European forebears. We were preoccupied for well over a century with the intensely domestic business of exploring, settling and exploiting an unknown continent. The sheer scale of our economic success shielded us from the overwhelming dependence on international trade characteristic of most European countries, and permitted us to take a more aloof attitude toward the political squabbles which arose in large part from European economic interdependence. In addition, of course, we benefited from geographic isolation and from the fact that in Europe the hundred years beginning in 1815 were significantly less plagued with international strife than any previous century since the dawn of the nation-state.

The First World War and its aftermath ushered in a period of new American activism in foreign affairs, but the decision to reject a role in the League of Nations and the blanket of isolationism which the nation drew over itself in succeeding years served only to reinforce the standard American view that domestic and foreign matters were not to be confused in immediacy, importance or even in moral tone. The role of domestic governance was to govern as little as possible. The role of foreign policy was to keep us out of war. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act symbolized the extension of this attitude to the economic sphere, despite the obvious opportunities for growth in international commerce as the Industrial Revolution matured throughout the North Atlantic community. This autarchic stance was relaxed

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somewhat under the harsh imperatives of worldwide Depression, but the strength of the suggestion that the United States could avoid involvement in World War II demonstrates the power of this national instinct.

With respect to American governmental procedures, there was nothing to shake the proposition—enshrined in the Constitution—that domestic policy was the only fit pursuit for the representative bodies of a democracy, while foreign policy was an entirely separate endeavor, in the charge of the President, shrouded in mystery, and maintained as a segregated preserve for those few high priests anointed for the purpose. For these luminaries such problems as farm subsidies or urban strikes were as remote and inexplicable as a Mars landing.

The revolution in American perceptions of the relation between foreign and domestic policy did not begin in earnest until the Korean conflict. World War II had been the most searing foreign experience in the nation's history and totally transformed the popular conception of national security and its protection, but it did little to change the citizen's understanding of the domestic stake in international decisions short of total war. It sustained the traditional idea of war as an all-out struggle between uniformed forces for national survival, the support of which had a valid first claim on all national resources. As such, war was totally distinguishable from peace, and the concept of extended periods in which the two would coexist was not plausible. Even the wave of internationalism which swept over the country at war's end did not severely shake the domestic-foreign distinction. The political and economic power of the United States, greatly expanded by the war effort and seemingly infinite when contrasted with the devastation elsewhere, dominated the negotiations in that fertile postwar period of international institution-building. Accordingly, the institutions which emerged were very largely directed toward maintaining collective security by national action in international causes, and toward rebuilding national economies so that the world of nation-states could proceed as before. Whenever the slightest hint arose of an international role in domestic policy—as in the case of the issue which produced the Connally Amendment on the jurisdiction of the World Court—the United States was quick to repel the intrusion.

It was in Korea that the American notion of war came into

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dramatic conflict with reality and the wall between foreign and domestic policy began to crumble. The country found itself engaged in an extended struggle in a relatively remote corner of the world in which its total fighting capacity was not mobilized, its most destructive weapons were not used, and it was prohibited by its own policy from invading the territory of its principal adversary. In short, for the first time we were engaged in a limited war for limited objectives and employing limited means. War had been transformed from an all-embracing national imperative into a selective instrument of foreign policy, to be applied in regulated doses to one small geographic area while the rest of the world remained at fitful peace. Collaterally, domestic life went on, but with some sacrifices in the form of higher taxes and minor scarcities in some consumer goods.

Still, Korea did not provoke the debate on national priorities which seems to me the healthiest product of Vietnam. The reason was simple: there was no widespread conviction that the Federal government should be making large investments in the domestic well-being of the country. It is sometimes difficult for us to remember that even ten years after Korea the Kennedy administration pointed with pride to the fact that the only significant discretionary budget increases it had proposed had been in the area of national defense. It was not until the Democratic landslide of 1964, after 20 years of the cold war had dulled our appetite for overkill, that the pent-up demands of a society disgusted with the quality of its own existence began to be expressed in a new conception of the role of government—a conception which authorized about 180 new Federal domestic programs in the next two years.

At the same time, and after two decades of mindless escalation of our involvement, the President decided upon forcible entry into a kind of war foreign in all respects to American history and understanding. To all the ambiguities of Korea, Vietnam added the even more unsettling uncertainties of guerrilla warfare. The moral and political questions of American involvement were not immediately at issue. Most Americans—true to our tradition that foreign policy initiatives are handed down from authority rather than borne upward by popular demand—trusted their government to determine where it was right and necessary to use force. The few of us who spoke out against the war in those early days were largely ignored.

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It soon became apparent, however, that Vietnam deprived both citizenry and leadership of even the minor compensations of wartime. Despite the most complete news coverage in history, it was impossible to keep track of the military situation according to any conventional standard of measurement. The political coherence of our South Vietnamese allies was quickly exposed as a sham, and each successor régime was confirmed as being more backward and repressive than the last. And as time passed the war that had begun with a cause of dubious justice proceeded through a series of unsound military and para-military strategies, which proved disastrously inconsistent with the nature of the problem and the capacities of the local government, and evolved into a seemingly endless nightmare of death, destruction and regularly televised national failure.

It is pointless to recount the simultaneous upheavals which beset our body politic during those years. The multiple assassinations, the riots which laid waste our great cities, the racial and communal strife, the deposing of a President, the rending of a great political party—all these were integrally related to the Vietnam disaster, but all were more broadly tied to the struggle over priorities, particularly over the balance between investment of national time and treasure in foreign and domestic endeavors. Much has since been written about the domestic forces which bear on foreign policy. I will try in what follows to pose some of the issues raised for domestic policy by present and prospective foreign policies.

III

For the average American the phrase "foreign policy" still means Vietnam. His attention is diverted from time to time by events in the Middle East, in China or in the Soviet Union, but his attitude toward the world and toward his national government is largely shaped by what happens in that tormented corner of Southeast Asia which has so long suffered the violence first of French and then of American protection. Most of us know the terrible toll in lives and treasure which lies behind this notoriety. And most of us are tempted to believe that, if the war ends, so too will the damage it has done.

But the corrosive influences of Vietnam will outlast even the Paris Peace Talks. Some are apparent already, more ominous and perhaps more visible to those of us with domestic responsi-

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bilities. Most important has been the impact on the generation spawned by Vietnam: it is a generation united by disillusion and not only by age, which cannot believe that *any* government is capable of *any* act motivated by genuine desire to improve the lot of the people. The reader who feels this is overdrawn is invited to walk, as I have, through the neighborhoods of our great cities. He will find that this disillusion pervades all ages, income classes, philosophies and occupations. Conspiracy theories abound and gain widespread credence no matter how ludicrous or implausible. Wholesomeness and trustworthiness are defined in terms of distance from governmental influence. Contrary evidence in the form of hopeful domestic achievements—more schools, more health care, clearer air, etc.—is smothered by the dead weight of doubt and guilt induced by Vietnam. Until we are free of this albatross it is highly unlikely that any transformation of the American domestic scene is possible even if the financial resources could be found. What remains to be seen is whether credible and committed leadership can restore the self-respect of a people so sorely diminished in their own eyes. This is the most fateful and challenging legacy of Vietnam.

But there are, of course, many other measurable legacies with respect to the *capacity* of government. Most obvious is the inflationary recession which has multiplied the misery in our cities at the same time that it has sapped our capacity to cope with it. Here again, the original failure was rooted in inability or unwillingness to anticipate the domestic consequences of a foreign policy decision. In 1966, President Johnson determined to try to finance both the explosion in Federal domestic programs and the Vietnam war without an increase in taxes. The Congress accepted and helped to implement this strategy. The calamitous nature of the foreign policy decision is obvious, and the long slide of the domestic economy—through super-heating, rampant inflation, super-cooling, stagnation, and limping recovery with continued high inflation—has been widely documented.

However, even the most perceptive analysts have not yet commented upon the loss of confidence in the efficacy of a government which launches a "War on Poverty" in 1965 but finds the number of people with poverty-level incomes rising in 1971 after investment of more than $4 billion in anti-poverty funds. And this loss has not been limited to confidence in the Federal government alone. It extends to the states and the cities and

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beyond them to the community and neighborhood institutions which were consciously and so hopefully created as vehicles and vanguards of the effort. Those of us in cities can report first-hand the frustrations of operating manpower training programs only to have the unemployment rate nearly double in two years; encouraging housing construction while interest rates soar out of sight; raising the level of social services while economic conditions double the welfare rolls and triple the costs in less than five years; or struggling against the scourge of heroin and drug-based crime while the horrors of Vietnam transform thousands of returning veterans into unwilling carriers of today's most dreaded social disease.

Too often, the lesson drawn by both public and government is that the error lies in the effort to eliminate poverty. The truth is that no such effort on the domestic front could have been successful while this nation pursued the foreign policy of the past six years—and this truth penetrates far beyond the question of Vietnam to the most basic principles of international ends and means. Indeed, it is probably true that the domestic ambitions implicit in the 1965–68 wave of social legislation are inconsistent with current concepts of baseline general purpose forces even if the Vietnam struggle ended today, since that struggle will probably account for only about $9 billion of the $79 billion in defense authorizations requested by the President for fiscal year 1972. My point is not that the current baseline posture is necessarily all wrong—though I have serious reservations about many aspects. It is that the merits of this posture are inseparable from our domestic economic and social strategy. Hard choices will flow from recognition of this relationship, but they are unavoidable if we are to rebuild the credibility and capacity of government from the ashes in which we now find them.

This point is dramatically illustrated by the gathering crisis posed by Vietnam withdrawal. We are beginning to awaken to the special problems created by the fact that the number of military discharges has doubled in the last five years—to more than one million in 1970. Unemployment among returning veterans runs well above the national average, and hopes for solid employment, though harder to measure, are probably similarly elevated and therefore more cruelly dashed. Especially for our cities, this flood of deserving, ambitious, usually skilled manpower represents an enormous opportunity—and one we are

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attempting to use through special counseling, job placement, training and other programs. So far, the most persuasive evidence of Federal awareness and willingness to help is the new Emergency Employment Act, revived after last year's presidential veto, which provides for 90 percent Federal funding of 200,000 public sector jobs across the country, with special consideration to be given to Vietnam veterans.

It is worrisome, however, despite this hopeful legislation, to see so little attention paid to the wider question of which this is a part—the question of conversion to a peacetime economy. Defense-related employment in this country has already dropped by more than two million jobs in three years. The portion of our labor force in such employment has fallen from ten percent in 1968 to about 7.4 percent. Yet the Federal government spends its time trying to shore up Lockheed, not to transform it into an engine of domestic change. We have neither the innovative foreign policy thinking which would provide an intellectual basis for limiting defense-related employment to, say, five percent in future years, nor do we have the economic and social planning needed to divert national resources to domestic ends while maintaining overall growth and softening the effects on those businesses and workers who will bear the brunt of the transition. This is more than a failure of vision. It is a failure of national will. Until we correct it, we will go on patching and mending until our national fabric gives way.

IV

Beyond Vietnam there are countless foreign issues likely to have major domestic effects. Of most immediate importance are probably the SALT negotiations which, as I write, seem poised between torpor and glacial advance. The resulting suspense is attributable to the fact that the rate of advance in the technology of nuclear weapons is anything but glacial. Some experts are dubious about the possibility of reliable limitation agreements in an age of Multiple Independently-Targetable Reëntry Vehicles (MIRVs), but none would venture that limitation will become easier in the next wave of weapons and few would counsel delay. Such limitations would, of course, free resources for other uses, since we will be spending about $20 billion for strategic defense in 1972 under the President's recommendations. However, the more important effect of limitations would be

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psychological, and it would pervade every aspect of our national life. Simply put, limitations would offer an opportunity for a cleansing and rededication of the national spirit, so long committed to the balance of terror which was and is the heart of the cold war. They would provide hope that the most basic and troubling paradox of life in postwar America—the nuclear sword of Damocles suspended in the name of peace—might slowly disappear. No prudent man believes that the threat of nuclear holocaust can be removed overnight, but it is difficult to overestimate the salutary effect of any reversal in the trend toward more menacing weapons more menacingly displayed.

The extent of national yearning for a lessening of tensions among great powers was revealed in the reaction to the President's announcement of his impending visit to mainland China. Admirable as it was, it was long delayed by the conventional political wisdom which held that it would be political suicide for the party and the man who did it. I suspect that the truth is just the reverse. It should be a substantial political plus. Already there are signs that the gesture has let light and air into corners of the national consciousness too long shrouded in darkness. What is being asked of the President now, and rightly so, is what do we have to say to the Chinese? What is our vision? What are our intentions and priorities in the world? How far are we prepared to go to ensure a just peace?

The same questions, in somewhat more technical form, are stimulated by our foreign economic policies, all of which have direct and immediate domestic consequences. After more than 30 years of championing a movement toward free trade which has revolutionized world commerce, we have become frightened and insecure about our ability to compete in world markets. Rather than devise innovative incentives and new forms of adjustment assistance to ease dislocations, we have turned our back on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; imposed restrictions on numerous goods and a general tax on imports which may encourage the formation of hostile trading blocs; imposed restrictive non-tariff barriers; and generally lost the initiative toward mutual tariff reductions which had been so successfully maintained by the Kennedy Round. The domestic results are clear: higher consumer prices, fewer improvements in quality, unrealistic wage demands, and—despite futile attempts to repeal world trade—greater and greater consumption of foreign goods.

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As this is written, it is too early to tell how the President's new economic policy announced August 15 will affect these trends. However, the fact that the new policy was considered necessary is dramatic evidence of the problem.

The situation on the international monetary front is even less tidy. The introduction of Special Drawing Rights in 1968 clearly had a large and useful effect on the management of international reserves. The momentous decision to discontinue conversions of dollars to gold is too recent for the long-term effects to be clear. Nevertheless, the summer reversal in the downward trend in interest rates, traceable in large part to exchange fluctuations in Europe, had a disruptive effect on our domestic economy only recently and tentatively awakened from the long night of 1969–71. Surely the travail of the past three years must have taught the wealthy nations of the West how interrelated their currencies and economic potentials are and must be. It has become the essence of good domestic monetary policy to develop joint and reliable mechanisms for making and sustaining sensible international monetary policy. Both the stimulus which produced the President's abrupt announcement that gold conversion would be suspended and the unilateral nature of that decision reflect the current absence of such mechanisms.

IV

To understand the extent of the challenge before us, we must look briefly at the domestic side of the national equation. The most important single vehicle for mutually consistent foreign and domestic strategies, as well as the best barometer of commitment to various choices, is the Federal Budget. Money alone solves nothing, of course, and money wrongly applied can be worse than nothing. However, few serious students of domestic affairs would argue that any genuine progress can be made toward solution of the massive problems facing us at home without a very substantial increase in the allocation of public funds to this end. Many authorities would argue that discernible progress in the cities alone carries a price tag which would grow quickly to $20 billion per year.

It is less immediately apparent why this money must come from Washington. The basic reasons are three. First, we are long past the notion that the normal workings of the private economy will produce the levels of concentrations of invest-

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ment necessary to make a major improvement in the general quality of life. Such improvements depend upon the ingenuity and capacity of the private sector, but we know that they will be applied in full measure only with substantial stimulus, incentive, and even risk capital from the government. This has been true of every major social advance in our history—from the Erie Canal to the communications satellite—and there is no reason to expect the contrary now. Second, it is very clear that states and localities are without the engines of revenue growth necessary even to keep up with the costs of rendering present levels of service, let alone to finance innovations. Cities in particular, shackled to slow-growing taxes on narrowing tax bases, and forced to deal with soaring workloads born of national social dislocation as well as with the demands of increasingly militant employee unions, will be fortunate to avoid chaos as they piece together patchwork compromises to deal with annual budget crises caused by the mismatch between slowly rising revenues and rapidly rising expenditures. Finally, the scale of effort required to redirect a substantial segment of our national research and development effort as well as our productive capacity to these domestic priorities will require a focal point with national scope and vision. Strong as the state and local role in that process must be, it will not have the coherence necessary to gain shape and momentum in the absence of a strong Federal role.

The short-run economic realities further dictate that new funds for domestic purposes come largely through reallocation of current and projected Federal expenditures. We now collect a total of about 31 percent of our gross national product in national, state and local taxes and fees. It is true that some other highly developed nations collect substantially more. However, we are only slowly coming to grips with an economic malaise which has already raised unemployment to unacceptable levels, subjected our citizenry to the double-edged horror of inflationary recession and nearly drowned virtually every unit of government in the nation in a flood of red ink only partly assuaged by a rash of increases in state and local taxation. A Federal tax increase at this time would jeopardize recovery, as the President implicitly confirmed when he proposed substantial tax relief in his August 15 package. Neither is it realistic to pin our immediate hopes on what economists call the "fiscal dividend"—the margin of revenues produced by economic growth over and above those

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required to meet mandatory increases in levels of expenditure under current programs. A careful analysis by Charles Schultz and his associates suggests that, even without the President's proposed new tax credits, there is little hope for any such margin through fiscal year 1974, and that only a relatively small margin appears possible by fiscal year 1976. In the real world, therefore, immediate increases in domestic expenditures probably must come largely from cutting the present Federal financial pie rather differently.

Traditionally—and symptomatic of our past priorities—domestic expenditures, other than veterans' benefits and self-financing income-maintenance payments, have been treated as a residual in the Federal Budget. That is, they have been limited by the difference between what is regarded as a tolerable Budget total and the financial requirements of defense and related policies which were seen as a prior claim. A look at the current Federal Budget shows the result. The President proposes therein to devote about $86 billion to defense and other international expenditures; about 38 percent of the $222 billion he proposes to spend during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972. However, a further $99 billion is earmarked for income-maintenance payments and interest on the national debt. Thus, about 80 percent of the Budget is spoken for before a single discretionary domestic program has been considered. Furthermore, in domestic as well as defense-related programs there is a natural tendency to finance traditional priorities, such as farm subsidies, which consume the bulk of what is left.

There is no great mystery about the most workable vehicles for financing the reconstruction of domestic America. The most pressing needs are three:

(1) Federal takeover of those activities—the most critical of which is welfare—which are national in scope and origin and beyond the capacity of any state or locality to meet.

(2) A prompt, reliable, and permanent link between state and local governments on the one hand and the Federal income tax—the most effective equitable means of raising public revenue—on the other.

(3) Federal support of a nationwide health insurance program to protect all Americans from the overwhelming costs of modern medical care.

Much more is needed of course—physical reconstruction,

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advances in educational techniques, national research on addiction, and many more—but these three instruments would go a long way toward providing resources on a scale commensurate with the task.

There is no question that all these will be fearfully expensive. And it is true that financial management will not allow their adoption without basic changes in the pattern of Federal Budget allocations. Thus, new investments on the scale of $20 to $30 billion will require very hard choices, not only between military and domestic expenditure, but also among such areas of domestic concern as health, education, housing, agriculture and urban aid. This means new national policies, foreign and domestic. Most of all, this means final recognition that there is no longer any real separation between those policies.

V

The rhetoric of "domestic priorities" could become just as misleading and dangerous as our earlier preoccupation with foreign requirements. Suggestions that the United States somehow resign from the world are just as short-sighted and indefensible as the most paranoid obsession with threats from abroad. Both positions are totally inconsistent with a world of great and growing interdependence. The mere statistics reporting growth in international trade, travel and communications are ample refutation of the childish thought that we can renounce worldly things and retire to refurbish our own corner of the planet.

What we must realize is that isolationism is no longer a viable option. Quite apart from moral objections, it simply will not work as a policy unless we are willing to give up the full range of political and economic objectives, foreign and domestic, which we have striven so long to achieve. The only real nuclear power in the West cannot withdraw from that role without the gravest possible risk of political dislocations which could engender anything from nuclear conflict to massive new waste of resources on nuclear arms. The greatest trading nation in the world cannot choose autarchy without creating chaos in the world economy. The staunchest supporter of the United Nations and other international organizations cannot weaken that support and expect the system to continue to contribute to the process of peaceful change in the world which is so much in the

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common interest. There is no acceptable statement of our basic national interests at home which is consistent with wholesale abdication abroad. No amount of concern for our domestic dilemmas should be allowed to disguise this fact.

The challenge, then, is to develop policies which address both foreign and domestic needs, and, even more important, which take into account the effects of action in one area upon the other. This does not imply any lessening in the depth and importance of our foreign policy concerns. We must continue the search for arms control while maintaining a strategic posture adequate to deter possible adversaries and to reassure friends. We must maintain sufficient general purpose forces to protect our interests around the world. We must settle on foreign economic policies which expand rather than shrink international trade, stabilize rather than disrupt the international monetary system, increase rather than handicap access to foreign markets for American goods, and cushion the impact of economic dislocations at home. These pressing international concerns will continue to demand substantial investments of time, energy, and money.

However, these investments must be made in a new context of conscious concern for competing domestic priorities and for the domestic effects of foreign initiatives. Ideally, the debate on military appropriations should contain an element of discussion of the domestic costs and benefits. Similarly, domestic policies toward, for example, wages, prices and interest rates should be examined from the point of view of foreign effects and implications. Until it seems natural that we address foreign problems with full and immediate attention to their domestic implications, we will continue the awkward, groping conflicts which so often characterize our domestic policy.

However, the national agenda must contain much more than a change in the style and content of debate. The principles of foreign policy which have sustained us for 25 years are in severe disrepair. The mid-sixties wave of domestic innovations has fallen far short of its grandiose goals. Not only are these ideas in question, but the entire business of active government is in disrepute. Until we can mend the citizen's conception of the relevance of national policies and the effectiveness of the structures responsible for applying them, we will lack the element of popular commitment necessary for success in any field. Until then, we will be evidence of the truth of Tocqueville's prophecy.

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THE STRATEGIES OF PEKING

By Michel Oksenberg

AFTER a period of studied withdrawal from the world scene from 1966 to 1969, the People's Republic of China has returned to the international diplomatic and trading arenas with vigor and imagination. President Nixon's projected visit to Peking symbolizes the rapid turnabout. Three years ago U.S. bombs were falling within miles of the Chinese border and fears of a Sino-American war were rampant in the two countries. Indeed, in 1967–68, when China had only one ambassador abroad, its trade had dropped and its relations with its neighbors had reached all-time lows, many students of Chinese foreign policy (this author included) thought it entirely possible that Chinese leaders had become overwhelmed by domestic problems of an enduring nature. As a result, it was thought that China was turning inward and was unlikely to play an active role on the world scene in the early 1970s.

That view was wrong. Ambassadors have returned to their posts. China's trade has resumed its upward growth. Peking has embarked upon its largest aid program to date, the construction of the railroad from Tanzania to the Zambian copper fields. Limited tourism to China has resumed, with Japanese visitors particularly again flocking to the mainland. Following the armed clashes in April 1969 over the disputed islands in the Ussuri River in Manchuria, Sino-Soviet relations have improved somewhat; Peking and Moscow plan increases in their trade and are engaging in border talks.

A major development has been the surge of international recognition that it is the People's Republic of China and not the rival Republic of China on Taiwan which is the legitimate government of China. Beginning with Canada in October 1970 a variegated group of nations have established diplomatic relations with Peking: Equatorial Guinea, Italy, Ethiopia, Chile, Nigeria, Kuwait, Cameroon, San Marino and Austria. Announcement of the Nixon visit dramatically strengthens the trend. In the fall of 1970, for the first time, a majority in the General Assembly voted that the Peking government was entitled to the Chinese seat in the United Nations; the motion failed because earlier in the session a majority had voted that this

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was an "important" one, requiring a two-thirds vote for passage. Now that the United States has announced support for the seating of China, while attempting to preserve a seat for Taiwan, it seems certain that Peking will be voted a seat in the United Nations this year.

The most significant change is in Sino-American relations. Since 1960 the United States has made halting efforts to improve relations with China. Washington's relationship with Taipei and its involvement in the Vietnam war—particularly the rationale that it was being fought to stop alleged Chinese expansionism—made improvement difficult. But as the influence of Taipei in American domestic affairs ebbed and the Vietnam war began to "wind down," the Nixon administration was able to change its China policy. By early 1971, it had largely eliminated restrictions on American travel to China, relaxed the trade embargo on the sale of selected goods and allowed limited tourist purchases of Chinese products. Perhaps most significantly, the Seventh Fleet terminated its regular patrolling of the Formosa Strait. And the Nixon administration indicated that it believed the Peking government, not Taipei, was the effective, long-term ruler of the mainland. Peking responded to these gestures by purchasing machinery with American-made parts and by toning down the vehemence of its anti-American statements.

Then came the developments of late March and April, 1971. The United States removed all travel restrictions to the People's Republic, and soon thereafter Peking invited the U.S. table tennis team to tour the mainland. Two U.S. pressmen accompanied the group, and invitations to other journalists followed. With the exception of Edgar Snow's visits in 1960, 1964 and 1970, these were the first visits by American journalists to territory under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since its Yenan days. To underline Peking's intent, Huang Hua was announced as the first ambassador to Canada. Huang has had extensive dealings with Americans before and is one of the most senior of the Chinese diplomatic corps. China apparently envisions its Canadian Embassy as more than that and is preparing for wider contacts with the American people and government. Also during this time, plans proceeded for Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking, which culminated in the invitation to President Nixon.

Clearly, a new phase in Chinese foreign policy has begun,

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including, as Chou En-lai has stated, a new page in Sino-American relations. How might the characteristics of this foreign policy be summarized? The Chinese operate on three levels of relations: state-to-state, party-to-party, and "people-to-people." Unlike its approach in the late 1950s or mid-1960s, Peking is not stressing party-to-party relations, nor is it currently seeking to establish a world organization of revolutionary movements. With a few exceptions—such as a March 1971 statement commemorating the Paris Commune—it has muted its direct Party polemics aimed at other communist states. Concomitantly, China has emphasized normal state relations in its dealings with all sorts of governments around the world. But this emphasis on state relations has not lessened the emphasis on peoples' diplomacy. Large numbers of "friendly personages" currently are visiting China. The Chinese continue to present Mao's thoughts as an answer to the intellectual questioning of people around the world, although less exuberantly than they did during the peak of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, a distinctive aspect of current Chinese foreign policy is the attempt to combine both state relations and peoples' diplomacy.

The Chinese are paying proportionately more attention to the developed capitalist world than probably has ever been the case in their 22 years of rule. They continue, of course, to give primacy to neighboring countries, and of the developing areas they take a particularly keen interest in the Middle East. As to their techniques of influence, the new phase appears to involve an increased use of trade and aid as a way of influencing world events. Possibly the best example of this is that China has ceased to purchase Australian wheat in order to put pressure on Canberra to change its China policy. (This move was coupled with the extension of an invitation to a group of opposing Labor Party parliamentarians to visit the mainland.) The extension of aid to Tanzania and Pakistan are other examples of the use of aid to enhance Chinese influence.

The current phase of China's foreign policy involves building a broad united front to alter its strategic position. The invitation to President Nixon signals the beginning of China's diplomatic efforts toward not only the United States but perhaps eventually the U.S.S.R. and Japan to reduce the military threats directed at it. The Chinese also hope to isolate and permanently rid China of one set of adversaries: the groups that have denied its legit-

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imacy and perpetuated the existence of the Republic of China on Taiwan. These enemies are Chiang Kai-shek and his principal supporters in Japan and the United States. At the same time, now that this broad front of support has begun to be mobilized, the Chinese are using it to gain entry into the United Nations and to support their claim to a voice in the shaping of world affairs.

After 22 years of unyielding enmity, the improvements in Sino-American relations have produced a sense of relief and optimism about the future. After all, prior to the ping-pong visit, Americans were more familiar with the moon than the People's Republic; the moon has received wider TV coverage and more Americans had been there with government permission. The euphoria of the moment is to be welcomed. Yet, over-optimism would be tragic. For the history of Sino-American relations is the story of high hopes on both sides dashed by misunderstandings and conflicts of interest, leaving legacies of mutual recriminations. It is better to greet and advocate improvements in relations with a sense of the problems ahead, so that when and if they arise they will not end in another era of hostility.

II

How is one to interpret current Chinese foreign policy? Does it really represent a departure from the past? Or are the Chinese employing the same strategies in an altered context? Students of contemporary Chinese foreign policy, disagreeing among themselves, basically offer four explanations: (1) that it represents no change in Chinese policy but is a response to changed policies on the part of the U.S.S.R., United States and others; (2) that it involves a fundamental change in Chinese intentions and strategies in world affairs; (3) that it manifests the latest swing in a foreign policy characterized by oscillations between periods of fervor and periods of moderation; and (4) that after the aberrations of the Cultural Revolution, it is a return to an earlier trend toward increasing moderation and willingness to conduct diplomacy along Western lines. Let us examine each interpretation.

One wing of the "no change" school argues that Chinese policy now, as in the past, has largely been reactive. China has neither the economic resources nor the military might to underwrite an assertive foreign policy. Peking lives in a world which it has not shaped. Thus, Chinese foreign policy responds to the initiatives of others. And the Chinese tend to react in kind. They responded

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militarily to the advancing U.N. forces in Korea in the fall of 1950 and to the advancing Indian military positions on the Sino-Indian border in 1962. On the other hand, when approached in a conciliatory manner, as in the attempts to achieve a compromise settlement over Indochina problems in the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1961–62, the Chinese played a constructive role in the pursuit of peace.

According to this line of reasoning, current Chinese foreign policy is a response to a number of friendly overtures. The Nixon administration has changed its China policy. The Soviet Union has adopted a less militant posture, following the war scares of the spring of 1969 and Kosygin's September 1969 visit to Peking. And the United Nations opens up prospects for China that had never existed before. Always eager to have state-to-state relations with nations that recognize it as the legitimate government of all of China, Peking is responding to opportunities it simply never had before. There has been no change in foreign policy; there has only been a change in the way others perceive and deal with Peking.

Others conclude "no change," but for totally different reasons. They view Chinese manœuvrings as mere tactics to camouflage China's aims. The wolf has temporarily donned sheep's clothing to enter the United Nations and wreak havoc once it gets in. They note that in spite of the changes in posture, Peking has yet to make any overt, major concessions, such as on the Taiwan issue or apparently on the Sino-Soviet border conflict.

Others, however, suggest that a fundamental change has occurred in China's approach to the world. They note shifts away from what they characterize as the hallmarks of Peking's policy during the late 1950s and most of the 1960s: the open encouragement of many revolutionary movements around the world; the attempts to create a new world revolutionary movement under Peking's leadership; the energetic pursuit of the Sino-Soviet dispute; the severance of meaningful cultural exchanges with developed countries. To these analysts, current Chinese foreign policy, with its emphasis on state-to-state relations, its quest for membership in the United Nations and its willingness to host the leader of the "imperialist powers" represents considerable movement, although to be sure not a total abandonment of the old policies.

People who subscribe to this view differ among themselves

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concerning the reasons for the fundamental change. Some argue that the Chinese have learned from past policies which basically ended in failure. And indeed, a plausible case can be made that the policies pursued from the late 1950s through the late 1960s yielded few tangible rewards. By the end of this time, China was encircled by enemies who were strengthening their military positions on China's periphery. China had made little headway in gaining recognition in the developing world; indeed, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese suffered serious reversals in Indonesia, in Africa and in Afro-Asian organizations. In 1968–69 Peking came frighteningly close to nuclear war with Moscow. China faces a potentially threatening Japan. The Cultural Revolution left China more isolated in world affairs than ever before. Recognizing their deteriorating position, Chinese leaders have altered their approach to world affairs.

On the other hand, equally plausibly, it could be argued that the current phase is based on strength and optimism rather than on necessity and adversity. The Cultural Revolution may have made the leaders of China more willing to take part in world activities, confident that their people, now more ideologically prepared, could deal with foreigners without being corrupted and losing their revolutionary commitment. Moreover, as a result of the Cultural Revolution, the leaders of China may feel that they now have more to offer the world, in terms of their bold and often innovative experiments in public health, education, industrial management, bureaucratic controls, penology and so on. Hence they may feel that any participation in world affairs would be truly reciprocal in the flow of ideas. In sum, after putting their own revolutionary house in order, the leaders of China may be more prepared to risk state-to-state relations and participation in "bourgeois" organizations.

A third interpretation is that current policy represents neither continuity with the past phase nor a fundamental change, but a swing back to moderation after the ideological militance of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, this view concentrates upon a distinctive characteristic of Chinese foreign policy; its marked fluctuations over the past 22 years between the periods of fervor and the periods of moderation. (China's domestic politics evidence similar oscillations between the periods of maximum mobilization and revolutionary advance and the periods of consolidation.) The current phase represents a return roughly to the kinds of

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policies pursued during the Bandung phase of Chinese foreign policy in the mid-1950s or the policies of the early 1960s. With the exception of 1955 and early 1956, these periods of external moderation have tended to correspond to periods of internal moderation in policies. Similarly, periods of internal revolutionary militancy tend to be reflected soon in greater fervor and rigidity abroad. According to this cyclical interpretation of China's foreign relations, coupled with the close relationship it sees between domestic and foreign policies, current Peking actions abroad flow from the more moderate domestic policies intended to consolidate the gains of the Cultural Revolution.

Finally, some people emphasize that the current policies fit into a long-term trend of China's involvement in world affairs. They see an historical process unfolding in China as in the Soviet Union before it. The revolutionary régime is in the process of gradually losing its commitment to violence and radical change, with its leadership increasingly technically proficient and aware of the complexities of the world. Moreover, with the passage of time, it increasingly acquires acceptance in the world at large. And the recent phase in Chinese foreign policy merely testifies to the strengths of those trends—the triumph of "reasonableness" and "pragmatism."

What is so striking about these varying interpretations is how they are rooted in more basic assumptions about American domestic and foreign affairs, the consequences of the Cultural Revolution, the relationship between domestic and foreign policies, and the long-term intentions and capabilities of the Chinese in world affairs. For example, people who are convinced of the essential rationality of American policies and who consider radical ideologies ill-suited to the modern world are inclined also to believe in a long-run moderating trend in Chinese foreign policy. Militant anti-communists have proclivities toward the "wolf in sheep's clothing" interpretation of present Chinese policies; and people who are deeply disturbed by American military activities in East Asia tend to interpret Chinese foreign policy as essentially reactive.

Actually, the search for a single interpretation is misdirected. The interpretations outlined above focus upon different aspects of Chinese policy. All are partially correct. Peking's approach to world affairs is the most recent of several swings toward moderation, but it is not exactly like earlier ones. In this sense, Chinese

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foreign policy has fundamentally changed, for the current policies contain elements that have not come together before. Not all can be interpreted in terms of new departures and oscillations, however. Certain long-run trends are also evident in terms of China's increasing capabilities and role in world affairs. Finally, there is no clear sign of a basic change in China's international goals and strategies.

III

The foreign policies of all countries appear to fluctuate between periods of zealousness and periods of moderation or quiescence. Certainly the United States has been more willing at some times than at others to become engaged militarily abroad and to use its economic resources to shape the course of world events. The Chinese fluctuations, however, appear to be more extreme than elsewhere.

Certainly one reason for the oscillations is Mao Tse-tung himself. He seeks to take advantage of possibilities for forward movement, but recognizes that when inevitable restraints are encountered, consolidation must begin. Mao advocates mass mobilization, struggle and militancy during the periods of advance, and emphasizes unity, to a certain extent harmony, and an effort to build institutions during the consolidation periods.

The reasons go deeper than Maoist theory. Although Western observers do not yet clearly understand the precise relationship, the fluctuations appear to be connected to Chinese economic conditions. A large portion of China's sales abroad are derived from agricultural production, so that a bad harvest leads to decreases in China's exporting capacity and changes in the composition and direction of trade. Further, government revenue and hence expenditures in this "balanced budget-minded" régime drop when the economy falters. As in capitalist countries, the Chinese economic performance over the past 22 years has been unsteady, cycling between periods of maximum productivity and recessions of varying degrees. Indeed, some scholars believe China's economic cycle is an inherent part of this régime, the result of its pursuit of both rapid social change and economic growth.

Yet another reason for the oscillating nature of Chinese foreign policy may be the existence of different opinion groups among the leadership, and fluctuations in their relative power. Indeed one detects the continued presence of three approaches which

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have existed since the late 1800s to the basic question: how to respond to the Western challenge? That is, how much "Chineseness" to preserve in order to retain the essence of China and to make a distinctive contribution to the world? And how much to accept from abroad in order to defend and transform China? (Of course, another deep difference is over what the "essence" of China is.) One response could be labelled "ideological militancy." This is the nativistic response, inflexible and unyielding, which seeks to preserve ideological purity even at the risk of temporary military defeat. It places utmost confidence in the long-run capabilities of the Chinese people to outlast any adversary as long as they remain armed ideologically. To be sure, the ideological militants of today differ from their forebears over the values to be guarded—Maoism rather than Confucianism. A second position is to accept Western technology and Western strategies, and even to accept a Western presence in China, but primarily for the purpose of controlling, manipulating and perhaps eventually defeating the West. It is an attempt to use the West against itself. Seemingly compromising and flexible, this approach none the less seeks to preserve a distinctive Chinese identity. A third approach advocates the pursuit of national greatness as a Westernized country. It urges participation in world affairs on Western terms, confident that eventually China would emerge as a wealthy and powerful country.[1] This latter group has always been a distinct minority. Since 1949, the major line of contention has been over the two other positions.

Why has not one of these approaches remained dominant? This question probes the limits of our knowledge about the dynamics of this vast society. It may well be, however, that the advocates of the differing approaches to China's foreign policy problems, in an imprecise and subtle way, are embodiments or representatives of various social interests in China. That is, the available evidence suggests that the "ideological militants" find their greatest appeal among some of the young, perhaps a large portion of the peasantry, and perhaps more in the interior regions than on the coast. On the other hand, scientists, commercial personnel, and in general the urban dwellers along the coast may be more receptive to Western influence. (The fact that the present leaders of Shanghai are among the most vociferous supporters of "ideological militancy," to be sure, detracts from the

[1] These same three groupings of opinion, interestingly enough, are visible in Taiwan.

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force of the argument.) Thus fluctuations in policy lines in China may to a certain extent reflect changes in the political strength of the various constituencies which these spokesmen indirectly represent or whom they consider to be their "referent groups."

This situation probably is not unlike the American scene. The foreign policy of Republican presidents must reflect, to some extent, the mood of the major sources of Republican strength in the country, particularly in the Middle West, while the Democratic Party must be more responsive in its foreign policy to its constituencies, such as the intellectuals and labor. As a nation undergoing rapid change, Chinese society is riven by many cleavages between the young and the old, between the privileged and the deprived, between the urban and rural dwellers, between people in different bureaucracies and in different geographical areas, and so on. Now the leaders of any country must rest their rule upon the strong support of certain segments of society, but the leaders of China apparently have had difficulty forging a supportive coalition of different social groups that can endure. The coalitions that have been formed thus far are subject to sharp tensions. The oscillations in Chinese foreign policy, then, reflect to some extent the continually shifting social basis of the régime and the differing foreign policy predilections of the coalitions that have been put together. Admittedly, it is difficult to provide the hard evidence to sustain this interpretation, but it grows out of a long historical perspective of Chinese foreign policy, where it seems to hold.

Whether considered from an economic, political or sociological perspective, the forces that produce the fluctuations appear deeply embedded. For the foreseeable future, therefore, Chinese policy is likely to continue its gyrations between periods of fervor and moderation. In the past, Chinese and American policies have been out of phase. Chinese moderation in the mid-1950s confronted U.S. assertiveness, while American accommodations of the late 1960s encountered Chinese militance. For the first time, the two are in phase, which may help explain the rapidity of the progress. And the task for Washington in the future, in the current idiom, will be to swing with the Chinese.

IV

Chinese foreign policy also has exhibited certain underlying

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continuities over the past 22 years. In the broadest terms, the goals have remained the same. The leaders of China have searched for national security, for dignity and for the ability to make a contribution to world affairs. As the French and Russian Revolutions, the Chinese Revolution faced a largely hostile world; for understandable reasons the established countries feared what its consequences might be. Since the Chinese face military might deployed at their very doorstep, they have made the quest for security fundamental.

But even more fundamental has been the concern with their dignity. Interstate relations as we know them today grew out of the Western experience, and were brought to the rest of the world during the past 300 years by Western military men, adventurers, traders and missionaries. Except for the third opinion group mentioned above, most Chinese believe this to be inequitable. China seems quite willing to join the world, but not on dictated terms. That solution would entail a loss of dignity. In many areas of interstate relations, the Chinese are dissatisfied with current international practices—how borders have been delineated, what the limits of territorial waters are, how trade should be conducted, how shipping insurance should be set, and so on. In sum, a world in which China will feel it has a dignified role will be one in which China helps write some of the rules of interstate intercourse. China is the last great cultural area to hold out on this point. This is what makes the bringing together of China and the rest of the world so difficult, for the Chinese, more than any other nation, raise profound questions about the present structure of interstate relations.

Related to the search for dignity is China's desire to assist the impoverished peoples of the world, and to be the spokesman for the smaller countries. Certainly these efforts seek to expand its influence and control. But American aid programs can be seen in a similar light. In both instances, though, the aid programs also spring from the belief that they can truly benefit the recipients. However, the American and the Chinese views of what constitutes an improved life and how to achieve it usually come into direct conflict. None the less, this impulse of the Chinese to assist the downtrodden probably will remain strong, because of their pride in their domestic achievements and because of the belief that they are relevant to the plight of others.

There are also continuities in Chinese strategy. The Chinese

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do not divide the world into the strong and the weak. That is a static view of power. Rather, perhaps because of their long history, they consider power as something dynamic, ever-changing. Thus, they see a world divided into the "powerful-becoming-weaker" and the "weaker-becoming-stronger." The Chinese leaders believe themselves to be in the latter category and their task is to hasten the process. They adopt strategies which they perceive appropriate to this condition: (1) garbing actions in the cloak of virtue (to become the "aggrieved" party in a dispute, to make sure the stronger party appears as a bully); (2) hiding their weakness through secrecy and dissimulation; (3) employing stratagems to provoke conflict among their rivals; (4) playing upon the internal tensions and weaknesses of the enemy; (5) maximizing their leverage by becoming a balancer (to become an object of a bidding game between stronger and competing powers); (6) depriving stronger powers of threatening options through prolonged negotiations or temporary agreements that do not surrender their own flexibility; and (7) when possible, luring the stronger power into untenable positions and then vanquishing him. These are the strategies of protracted struggles.

Indeed, traditional Chinese strategic thinking is rich with analysis concerning the conditions favorable to the use of each of these stratagems, the range of problems and opportunities involved in employing them, and so on. But one lesson above all others emerges from this literature: to employ any of these strategies, a nation must retain its independence. Mao Tse-tung is in keeping with this tradition when he asserts, "We must keep the initiative in our own hands." A weak nation can not hasten its growth if it is enmeshed in a net of entangling alliances and mutual obligations that deprive it of flexibility in manipulating its environment.

V

Against this background, what are the principles upon which American policy must be based? A number of essential characteristics immediately come to mind: self-awareness, realism, flexibility, imagination and sensitivity.

Washington's approach toward Peking must be based on an awareness of self. While Vietnam has demonstrated the limits and dangers of U.S. capabilities, Washington none the less is still

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fond of saying: "We are still the greatest, richest and most powerful nation on earth." But this view of the world—that there is a clear hierarchy of nations—is simplistic and outmoded. To be sure, the United States is the greatest power, in that it believes it has interests in every area of the globe; no other nation makes this claim. On the nuclear level, admittedly there are but two giants—the United States and the U.S.S.R. But it is foolish to rank nations according to a single dimension. One must consider many dimensions—a nation's quality of life, the strength of its currency in international markets, its conventional military capability, the vitality of its intellectual activity, the extent of social equity and so on. America is not on top in all of these, and probably is surpassed by China in some of them. A balanced view of the world provides the basis for a more successful relationship with China, encouraging neither arrogance nor servility, but a recognition that each can benefit from the other's strengths.

Nor should American policy stem from a paternalistic desire to draw China out of its isolation. It is not clear that the leaders of China are more isolated from the world than their American counterparts. Rather, the leaders of the two countries have contact with different aspects of the world. While China's leaders are unacquainted with the offices of the multinational corporation, America's leaders have demonstrated that they are isolated from the lives of an aroused, impoverished peasantry. Moreover, the plain fact is that the Chinese have had wider contacts with Western nations than is often believed. We should pursue improvements in Sino-American relations, then, in order to end our isolation from an important current in the world.

Our search for self-awareness also requires that we understand the Chinese view of America. Remarkably little is known about what the Chinese leaders truly think about U.S. policies. But as contacts multiply, they must be encouraged to speak to this point. Their undue fears should be allayed; our past misunderstood actions must be explained; our current actions—such as at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—must be interpreted. Washington must strive to establish the validity of U.S. policies in terms understandable to the Chinese.

A sense of realism must also pervade U.S. policies. Nothing could be more detrimental at this stage than believing that the 22-year legacy of mutual bitterness and distrust could disappear

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swiftly or that the Taiwan issue is all that separates Washington from friendship with Peking. In short, improving Sino-American relations involves the bringing of two different social systems and cultures together. No countries in the world—including those which recognize Peking's claim to Taiwan—have enjoyed easy relations with China. The Chinese are developing nuclear weapons. The need for a military balance of power in the region remains. While the long-run goal should be to develop a close relationship, Washington's minimal goal should be to remove the rancor from, and introduce mutual respect into, what probably will remain an adversary relationship. The outbursts and setbacks which undoubtedly will occur during periods of ideological militancy must be endured. We also must recognize China's legitimate security interests around its periphery. We must cease rewarding states for their hostility toward China. And the various intelligence-gathering operations aimed at China should be closely scrutinized in order to balance the hostility generated against the value of information acquired.

In addition, the American public and the Chinese must be made aware of the constraints within which the United States currently operates. Improvements in Sino-American relations should be sought in ways that would not unduly harm U.S.-Japanese relations, U.S.-Soviet relations (especially with regard to SALT), or Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, any U.S. military disengagement from the Western Pacific—especially from Taiwan—must be done in such a way as to maintain Japan's confidence in its own security. Sino-American hostility must not be replaced by a new era of Sino-Japanese enmity. Nor should the motivation for improving Sino-American relations be to manipulate Sino-Soviet tensions.

In a number of areas Chinese and American interests coincide. Both long for a reduction in the American military presence in East Asia; Washington should specify to China what Chinese actions might hasten the process of withdrawal to acceptable levels. Neither side desires a nuclear-armed Japan; perhaps Tokyo should be included in quiet trilateral talks to allay Chinese fears of revived Japanese militarism. While Chinese science is advanced in some areas, it lags in other nonstrategic fields; for our government to encourage the inclusion of Chinese scientists in international gatherings would have mutual benefit. Both parties could profit from Chinese purchase of American capital

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equipment, financed by U.S. extensions of credit. Each might be interested in opening permanent news and trade offices in the other's capital. Finally, as previously noted, the Chinese on two occasions have participated constructively in conferences on Indochina. Perhaps they may be interested in doing so again.

Setbacks should be expected and endured. The first American journalists who visited the mainland wrote glowing reports of the achievements of the past 22 years, and indeed those achievements have occurred. But the day will come when journalists begin to inquire into the fate of imprisoned intellectuals, and report a seamier side of Chinese life. If tourism increases and trade increases, some Americans are bound to transgress Chinese law. American journalists may be expelled and other Americans arrested. A more serious reversal will occur when the pendulum swings toward the ideological militants who even now give evidence of opposing the overtures toward Washington.

Above all, we must learn to be more sensitive to the Chinese than we have heretofore. Words are extremely important. The President's reference to the "People's Republic of China" is important, as is his reference to "Peking" rather than "Peiping." Crucial in this regard, obviously, is our handling of the Taiwan issue, where misunderstandings could arise not only out of substance but out of the choice of words—such as whether there is only "one China."

Historic opportunities are now present to involve China more fully in world affairs. We should welcome the challenge which previous generations have shunned, to build with a unified China the institutions which would draw China and the rest of the world closer together. This course must be pursued with no illusions that old problems will be solved. The new problems, however, will be more worthy of our attention than those faced in Asia in the past decade.

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RECOGNIZING CHINA

By Jerome Alan Cohen

PRESIDENT Nixon's dramatic revelation that he will soon visit Peking ended two decades of public debate about the wisdom of establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The joint communiqué announcing this watershed in American foreign policy stated that "The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries. . . ." Thus the question is no longer whether to establish diplomatic relations with China, but how to do so. Heaven may be wonderful—the problem is to get there.

Getting there will not be easy. At the background briefing that Henry Kissinger conducted for the press the day after the President's announcement, "a White House official" was careful to point out that his secret negotiation with Premier Chou En-lai was merely "the first tentative step along the road that the President started two and one-half years ago through indirect communication." The official emphasized that "at this stage we don't have even the beginning of an agreement."

There may not even be any common understanding of what the problems are upon which agreement must be reached. A few days after the Kissinger briefing, Premier Chou, in an interview with visiting American graduate students, not only restated his government's long-standing demand that resolution of the problem of Taiwan precede the normalization of relations, but also introduced new complications extrinsic to the China tangle itself. There could be no normalization, the Premier said, until the United States withdrew—from all of Indochina—"not only troops but all military forces and all military installations." He also referred to the continuing presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, the lack of a Korean peace treaty and the revival of Japanese militarism as "obstacles" to be overcome.

Chou En-lai may have suggested these new obstacles in order to reassure China's Asian communist friends that a Sino-American rapprochement will not sacrifice their interests. He may have sought to provide himself with "bargaining chips" for an extremely difficult negotiation. Perhaps this represented an initial effort to exploit the tactical disadvantage at which the Presi-

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dent placed himself in an election year by leading the American people to expect the prompt establishment of diplomatic relations. Whatever the Premier's motives and precise meaning, if he insists on linking normalization to these extrinsic problems, the negotiations will be long indeed.

The intrinsic obstacles to establishment of diplomatic relations will be difficult enough to overcome, for they raise delicate questions of timing and cost. As illustrated by the recent China hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on these questions, wide divisions of opinion now exist—within the Congress, the public and specialists in Chinese affairs.

II

Will the President succeed in normalizing relations with Mao's China? Much depends upon what he has in mind concerning the Republic of China on Taiwan. Even Alf Landon came out for "recognition" of the communist government a few years ago, but, of course, he didn't mean that the United States should withdraw recognition from the nationalist government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Is that the position which the President implicitly endorsed when, after reciting the Kissinger-Chou communiqué, he stated that "Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends"? Apparently it is, for, according to the nationalist Chinese Ambassador, the President subsequently reassured the Generalissimo that the United States intended "to honor its defense treaty commitments to the Republic of China and to maintain the continuing friendship with her." If the President persists in this position, his "journey for peace" will, in Shakespeare's famous phrase, "keep the word of promise to our ear, and break it to our hope." Such an offer to establish relations with the People's Republic would be fatuous in Peking's view and in that of many other capitals, including Taipei.

The consistent practice of 22 years leaves no doubt that Peking and Taipei regard themselves as competing, mutually exclusive representatives of the same territorial community, the state of China, and that is the way they have been treated by the rest of the world. No country has simultaneously maintained diplomatic relations with both régimes, although some have tried. The British consulate on Taiwan is merely accredited to the pro-

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vincial government, and even that local representation has been a recurring source of friction between London and Peking that has been partially responsible for their contacts being confined to the chargé d'affaires level. The very recent experience of Turkey suggests that, as Taipei's situation deteriorates, it may be forced to show increasing flexibility toward the idea of retaining diplomatic relations with countries that are establishing diplomatic relations with Peking, but that Peking will continue to insist upon withdrawal of recognition from Taipei as the sine qua non of normalization.

If we indicate that we are prepared to withdraw recognition from Taipei as well as to confer it upon Peking, Peking will surely regard the discussions as serious. For even if such negotiations were to establish diplomatic relations without declaring whether the island of Taiwan is Chinese territory, Peking would have important incentives to attain this result. It would strike a heavy blow against the nationalist government, because many of the countries that have retained diplomatic relations with the nationalists would follow our lead. Moreover, withdrawal of our recognition from the nationalists would terminate our defense commitment to the Chiang régime and our military assistance to it, although the United States could, of course, maintain a military umbrella over Taiwan in some other form.

There are various formulae that Washington and Peking could use to announce their establishment of diplomatic relations without determining the status of Taiwan. Recent precedents are worth noting. Peking's joint communiqué with Canada of October 13, 1970 stated:

> The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.

Two days later, however, a joint communiqué establishing relations between the People's Republic and Equatorial Guinea made no mention of Taiwan. But Equatorial Guinea recognized Peking as the "sole legal Government representing the entire Chinese people," a phrase that did not appear in the Canadian communiqué. Although this phrase was probably meant to include the people on Taiwan, technically—at least for a state that has not acknowledged Taiwan to be Chinese territory—it leaves open the question whether the people on Taiwan are to be regarded as Chinese. It is interesting that when Austria established

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relations with Peking in May 1971 nothing was said about Taiwan, nor was "the entire Chinese people" formula invoked. Austria simply recognized Peking "as the sole legal Government of China."

Yet, as Chou En-lai's June 21 interview with American newsmen reminds us, we should not delude ourselves into believing that Peking will readily agree to establish diplomatic relations until Washington at least tacitly concedes that Taiwan is Chinese territory. The relation of the United States to the problem of Taiwan is far different from that of Canada, Equatorial Guinea, Austria or any other country. To understand this we should briefly examine the background of the dispute over Taiwan.

III

Taiwan is populated almost entirely by people who are ethnically, linguistically and culturally Chinese. Although Taiwan had been Chinese territory since 1683, the Imperial Chinese Government did not pay a great deal of attention to its affairs until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when efforts by Japan, and then France, to take the island by force led China to appreciate the importance of Taiwan to China's national defense. As part of a series of governmental reforms on the island, Taiwan became a regular province of China in 1885. Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, however, China was forced to cede the island to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

During World War II, in the Cairo declaration of 1943, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of China issued a joint declaration that "[i]t is their purpose . . . that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." In the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation the heads of the three governments agreed that "[t]he terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. . . ." Just before the end of the war against Japan, the Soviet and French Governments formally adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation.

The Japanese Instrument of Surrender accepted the terms of the Potsdam declaration, and Japanese forces on Taiwan carried out instructions to surrender to the Chinese army. On October 25, 1945, China announced to the world that it had resumed sovereignty over Taiwan and the neighboring Pescadores

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islands, which were "again incorporated into the territory of China." Shortly thereafter, China informed foreign governments that the people on Taiwan as well as overseas Taiwanese had resumed Chinese nationality and were to enjoy the same legal status as other Chinese nationals. Taiwan once more became a province of China. None of these public acts by China elicited protests from other governments.

From 1945 until the Korean War, Taiwan was plainly regarded as having again become Chinese territory, a fact that was eventually expected to be confirmed in the peace treaties that would formally conclude World War II. Following Chiang Kai-shek's defeat on the mainland and flight to Taiwan in late 1949, a great debate occurred in this country over whether it would be wise, legal and moral for the United States to intervene to protect Taiwan against the anticipated Chinese communist effort to "liberate" the island. This debate culminated on January 5, 1950, when President Truman, in keeping with the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, solemnly announced that for the previous four years the United States and the other Allied Powers had accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over Taiwan, that the island was Chinese territory, and that we would "not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China." The President stated:

> The United States Government has always stood for good faith in international relations. Traditional United States policy toward China, as exemplified in the Open Door policy, called for respect for the territorial integrity of China.

That afternoon Secretary Acheson elaborated on the President's policy statement in a press conference that is well worth quoting. He said:

> The Chinese have administered Formosa for four years. Neither the United States nor any other ally ever questioned that authority and that occupation. When Formosa was made a province of China nobody raised any lawyer's doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments.
>
> Now, in the opinion of some, the situation is changed. They believe that the forces now in control of the mainland of China, the forces which undoubtedly will soon be recognized by some other countries, are not friendly to us, and therefore they want to say, "Well, we have to wait for a treaty." We did not wait for a treaty on Korea. We did not wait for a treaty on the Kuriles. We did not wait for a treaty on the islands over which we have trusteeship.

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> Whatever may be the legal situation, the United States of America, Mr. Truman said this morning, is not going to quibble on any lawyer's words about the integrity of its position. That is where we stand.
>
> Therefore, the President says, we are not going to use our forces in connection with the present situation in Formosa. We are not going to attempt to seize the island. We are not going to get involved militarily in any way on the island of Formosa. So far as I know, no responsible person in the Government, no military man has ever believed that we should involve our forces in the island.

The Department of State subsequently informed the House of Representatives that "the Allied Powers including the United States have for the past four years treated Formosa as part of China." It specifically rejected the possibility of holding a plebiscite on Taiwan under United Nations or other auspices, stating:

> For the United States Government at this date to seek to establish a non-Chinese administration on Formosa . . . would be almost universally interpreted in mainland China and widely interpreted throughout Asia as an attempt by this Government to separate Formosa from China in violation of its pledges and contrary to its long-standing policy of respecting the territorial integrity of China. The important point from the standpoint of our interests in Asia, including mainland China, is not the technical justifications which we might urge for taking such steps but rather the way such action on our part would be viewed by the people of Asia. In this connection we do not wish to create a Formosa *irredenta* issue about which the Chinese Communists could rally support within China and with which they could divert attention from Soviet actions in the North. We must not place ourselves in the unenviable position of the U.S.S.R. with regard to the integrity of China and must remain free to take the position that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interests.

This clear-cut view of the United States and the other Allied Powers suddenly changed upon the outbreak of the Korean War. Without any public warning whatever, on June 27, 1950, President Truman dramatically reversed our policy. He did not refer to the Korean conflict as an attack by North Korea upon South Korea but as an attack by "communism." Therefore, he concluded—in one of the most momentous leaps of logic of the century—the occupation of Taiwan by "communist forces" would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and American forces. "Accordingly," the President ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any communist attack on Taiwan and any nationalist attack on the mainland.

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The President did not seek to justify American intervention as action taken during a civil war at the request of what we regarded as the legitimate government of China, nor did he even claim that Generalissimo Chiang had agreed to our action; he simply announced that "The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done." The last sentence of his statement provided a different legal rationalization of our surprising conduct: "The determination of the future status of Formosa," the President said, "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

This unanticipated announcement that the status of Taiwan was yet to be determined came as a rude shock to both the communist and nationalist régimes. Overnight, what had been Chinese territory became territory that was still subject to the Allied Powers, what had been the binding commitment of the Cairo Declaration became merely a "statement of intention," what had been a civil war became an international conflict.

The United States then sought to erect a legal superstructure for postwar relations in East Asia that reflected its new legal position. The 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan merely stated that "Japan renounces all rights, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores," and did not prescribe the de jure status of these territories. Although the 1952 Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan "recognized" that all pre-1941 treaties between China and Japan had become void as a result of the war, it also simply "recognized" Japan's renunciation of Taiwan and the Pescadores without clarifying the question of sovereignty. The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China only defined Taiwan and the Pescadores as territory of China for purposes of the treaty, and the contemporaneous Exchange of Notes described the islands as territory that the Republic of China "effectively controls."

Thus the United States for the past 21 years has been in the anomalous, but little-understood position of recognizing as the government of China a régime whose almost exclusive territorial base it refuses to acknowledge to be Chinese territory. The tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu are the only territory occupied by the nationalists that is undisputably Chinese.

The nationalist régime has had to tolerate this humiliation because the United States insisted that only by "freezing" the

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status of Taiwan could it justify dispatching the Seventh Fleet to protect the island and taking steps at the United Nations to keep the island out of hostile hands. The communist government, however, has had no reason to tolerate what it has understandably regarded as cynical legal legerdemain. Indeed, it has consistently complained that American intervention in the Taiwan Strait constitutes infringement of China's territorial integrity.

Both Chinese governments claim that the outbreak of war in 1941 abrogated the Treaty of Shimonoseki and restored Taiwan to China. They also claim that China's unprotested reintegration of Taiwan at the close of the war in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam declarations completed the transfer of territory and that no peace treaty was needed. A strong argument has also been made by the nationalist government that Japan's renunciation of Taiwan in the 1951 and 1952 peace treaties constituted implicit acquiescence in the claims of the de facto occupant, the Republic of China. On the other hand, one can also argue, as have the United States, some of its wartime allies and spokesmen for the Taiwan independence movement, that the status of Taiwan is undetermined. Thanks to what one scholar has called the Allied Powers' policy of deliberately contrived ambiguity, students of international law have had a field day with the problem and expressed a variety of opinions.

The critical question, of course, is not whether Taiwan should be deemed to have been legally restored to China. The critical question is one of American good faith, as President Truman and Secretary Acheson recognized prior to the Korean War. Is the United States going to renege on its solemn pledge to restore Taiwan to China and thereby repudiate its oft-proclaimed respect for China's territorial integrity? We have heard a great deal in recent years about the importance of preserving the credibility of American commitments. Have we conveniently forgotten this commitment? The People's Republic has not, nor have Chinese of other political persuasions.

IV

For these reasons we cannot be sanguine about prospects for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking unless Washington is prepared to confirm, if only tacitly, that Taiwan is Chinese territory. It is one thing for the People's Republic to establish relations with certain other states

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without obtaining their acquiescence, but the United States has been responsible for the political, legal and military actions that have kept Taiwan separated from the mainland. Peking may well fear that if it establishes relations without at least obtaining Washington's implicit agreement in principle on the territorial question, it will have forfeited its chance to achieve national unification —the goal of every Chinese government since the onslaught of imperialism in the nineteenth century.

What would be the implications of Peking's insistence upon settling the status of Taiwan at the time of establishing diplomatic relations? I have already pointed out that by withdrawing recognition from the nationalist régime the United States would terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty to defend Taiwan, a treaty that in any event provides for its termination by either party upon one year's notice. So long as we do not acknowledge Taiwan to be Chinese territory, however, there would be the legal possibility of maintaining our protection of the island in some other form. Should we couple establishment of relations with tacit recognition that Taiwan is Chinese territory, we would, of course, no longer have any basis for our intervention.

Peking's insistence that we recognize Taiwan as part of China does not necessarily mean that the People's Republic intends to take Taiwan by force or that it insists upon gaining actual control over the island in the near future by other means. We cannot expect Peking formally to renounce the use of force against the nationalist régime, just as we have not expected the nationalists to do so against their communist rivals, for such a renunciation would imply that Taiwan is not part of China. Governments sometimes renounce the use of force in international affairs but not in domestic matters.

Peking plainly has not built up the military capability required to launch an invasion across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the nationalist government has a substantial military capacity for defending Taiwan for the foreseeable future. Chinese statesmen are not naïve. The leaders in Peking are well aware that the United States is unlikely to establish relations at the price of stimulating another major bloodletting in Asia. They also know that a costly military expedition against Taiwan would leave Peking badly exposed on its vast northern frontier, would galvanize Taiwanese nationalism and would quicken the pace of Japan's rearmament.

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Given the political momentum that would be developed by entry into the United Nations and by establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, and given the opportunities that Peking would then enjoy for political and economic manœuvres to "heighten the consciousness" of the people on Taiwan, understandably Peking might feel confident that it eventually would be able to achieve the peaceful integration of Taiwan. What it insists upon for the immediate future is the defeat of Chiang diplomatically, an end to American intervention in the Chinese civil war, and recognition of China's territorial integrity in principle. Once the principle is acknowledged, if only tacitly, Peking can be expected to behave in a flexible manner toward Taiwan, just as it has toward Hong Kong and Macao.

What, after all, might be the precise outcome of the long and arduous negotiations over Taiwan? It is impossible to predict the terminology upon which the parties might eventually agree. Clearly the People's Republic will accept no limitations upon Chinese sovereignty. One can envisage a joint communiqué that explicitly or implicitly acknowledges Taiwan to be Chinese territory but that takes note of Taiwan's distinctive development, its autonomous characteristics and the lack of any necessity to reintegrate it into China through warfare or in the immediate future. More probable would be a tacit or perhaps even secret understanding that at least for a substantial period, such as 20 years, there would be no resort to force against Taiwan; in this case, there need be no public reference to Taiwan at all.

V

Other problems may also have to be dealt with in negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations. None, however, will be comparable in difficulty to those previously discussed.

In the course of the Chinese Revolution in 1948–49 the victorious communist forces acted harshly against a number of American consular officials who remained behind after the departure of the nationalist government to which they were accredited. The most spectacular episodes of the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69 involved outrages against diplomats and dependents from a variety of countries. Because of Prime Minister Trudeau's concern for the personal security of his representatives, Canadian negotiators insisted that the joint communiqué announcing establishment of diplomatic relations between Ot-

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tawa and Peking contain some acknowledgment of customary standards of diplomatic privileges and immunities. This is the significance of that document's oblique reference to "performance of the functions of diplomatic missions . . . in accordance with international practice," a phrase that has also appeared in Peking's subsequent agreements establishing relations, such as those with Italy and Austria. Presumably the United States would wish to insert similar language in a Sino-American communiqué, even though so vague an invocation of prevailing norms can hardly constitute a substantial guarantee.

At least four Americans are currently detained by Chinese authorities. John Downey and Richard Fecteau are civilians who have been in prison since their plane was shot down over China in November 1952. They were convicted of espionage for having secretly dropped supplies and Chinese anti-communist agents into China as part of a CIA effort to foment rebellion. Fecteau's 20-year sentence will soon end, but Downey, the alleged leader of the operation, received a life sentence. The other two Americans known to be held are military pilots Philip Smith and Robert Flynn, whose planes went down over Chinese territory during the Vietnam conflict. The status of these two officers is uncertain, but it is generally assumed that their fate is linked to that of the American military prisoners detained by communist authorities in Vietnam. Although little is known of American sympathizers with the People's Republic who reside in China, some of them became involved in the intrigues of the Cultural Revolution and are believed to have been detained; it is unclear whether any are still in confinement.

During the mid-1950s, the last time that Peking made a serious effort at rapprochement with Washington, China carefully managed the release of American prisoners in order to create a favorable negotiating climate. It is entirely possible that it will adopt similar tactics in the present situation. The United States could substantially enhance the prospects for the prompt release of Downey and Fecteau by retracting its false denial of the charges against them and by apologizing for both its intentional infringement of China's sovereignty and the efforts that it made to defame Chinese justice following their conviction. To the extent that Americans may still be detained at the time that diplomatic relations are established, some provision for their release ought to be made.

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The United States should also consider including in the joint communiqué or a related document some prospective protection for the increasing numbers of its nationals who can be expected to visit China. Because of the resentment that all patriotic Chinese feel about foreign interference with China's judicial processes during its recent "century of humiliation" and because of covert American operations against China, persuading Peking to agree to refrain from arbitrary actions against our nationals—even on a reciprocal basis—will be a delicate exercise. Furthermore, even if such a vague promise should be forthcoming, it would do little to enhance international law's existing protection of aliens. More useful and more feasible would be a mutual pledge guaranteeing the other party that, within 48 hours of the detention of one of its nationals, its diplomats or consuls will be notified of the basis for the detention and granted an adequate opportunity to interview and advise the detained person and that they will continue to have access to him throughout the period of his detention. Other specific guarantees, such as the rights to a prompt and public trial and to legal counsel, might also be valuable. But, given the sensitivity of China's leadership about jurisdictional independence and their determination to create a distinctive legal system—one in which lawyers play virtually no role—we should not underestimate the difficulty of obtaining agreement on these points.

We must realize, of course, that after establishment of diplomatic relations Peking will have the exclusive right to extend to all Chinese nationals in this country diplomatic protection against any American violations of international law governing the treatment of aliens. It will also expect all Chinese who reside here to conform to its laws regulating the conduct of Chinese abroad as well as to the laws of the United States. Peking, like Taipei, determines Chinese nationality according to the *jus sanguinis* concept, which bases nationality upon descent from nationals of the state. Yet, because it has not published a nationality law, its precise application of this concept remains unclear. In view of the fact that many persons of Chinese descent residing in this country do not regard themselves as Chinese nationals or will not welcome China's extraterritorial regulation and diplomatic protection, some provision ought to be agreed upon to enable them, if they wish, to confirm that they are not Chinese nationals or to abandon their Chinese nationality.

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Sino-American negotiators will also have to address themselves to pending property problems. As a consequence of its recognition as the sole legitimate government of China, Peking will, of course, acquire legal title to all of the assets still owned in this country by the Republic of China; as in other countries where recognition of their communist rivals was anticipated, the nationalists can be expected to attempt to reduce their losses by skillful transfers of property prior to the change in recognition. There is, however, approximately $75 million in other American-controlled assets in which Peking already has an interest. For example, communist Chinese organizations and nationals have a direct or indirect interest in certain funds on deposit in American banks and in dollar accounts in third-country banks; and a few American enterprises are obligated to China for services rendered since 1949. After the entry of Chinese "volunteers" into Korea, in December 1950, Washington took steps "to place under control" all Chinese communist assets within its jurisdiction. In retaliation Peking ordered its local organs of government to "control and inventory all property of the American government and American enterprises," restricted the transfer of this property, and declared that "all American public and private deposits within the territory of the People's Republic of China shall be frozen." It also adopted a series of measures liquidating "American-subsidized cultural, educational and relief agencies and religious bodies."

As of March 31, 1971 the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission had processed and validated 375 awards to American businesses, religious and educational institutions and individuals who suffered losses as a result of Peking's action against their property in China. These awards, which represent unpaid claims against China, total almost $200 million. In addition, the United States itself may seek compensation for embassy, consular and other U.S. government facilities taken over by the communist régime.

It is conceivable that Washington and Peking may settle at least some of these property claims against each other prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations. In the spring of 1968, for example, the Johnson administration quietly informed Peking that Radio Corporation of America would be allowed to remit $600,000 to China in payment for 18 years of service for telecommunication with China. Although Peking ignored that

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offer, it is now in a more receptive mood and, in order to improve prospects for agreement on the principal issues, may even make some gestures concerning compensation for American interests that have been seized. In so far as property claims remain unsatisfied, however, provision ought to be made for their settlement at the time that diplomatic relations are established.

VI

Prime Minister Sato of Japan has stated that Japan seeks to improve its relations with the People's Republic of China, but that this improvement can only take place to the extent that it does not damage Japan's diplomatic ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan. The United States confronts the same dilemma as Japan and thus far maintains a similar position. Both governments want something for nothing. Each seeks to square the circle. But the facts of life are otherwise, and changing forces at last require abandonment of the pretense that the government on Taiwan is the government of China. Perhaps the reference in the Kissinger-Chou communiqué to "the leaders of China," rather than "the leaders of the People's Republic of China," foreshadows future acknowledgment of this reality. Certainly we cannot content ourselves with pious platitudes about the desirability of Sino-American diplomatic relations; we now have to face up to the difficult questions of cost and timing that decision-making involves.

Obviously, a multitude of factors have to be weighed in deciding to withdraw recognition from Taipei and to confer it upon Peking. But we must not allow the complexities of the substantive issues, of governmental processes, of domestic political considerations, and of relations with third countries to obscure the central criterion for decision-making—the need to establish diplomatic relations with the real China and to complete the process of China's formal integration into the world community. Of course, the establishment of diplomatic relations will not transform enmity into amity, but it is a prerequisite for significantly relaxing Sino-American tensions. After heading in the wrong direction for over 20 years, we should at least get back to the starting point. As the President reminded us in his July announcement, "there can be no stable and enduring peace without the participation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people."

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APPROACHING CHINA, DEFENDING TAIWAN

By Earl C. Ravenal

THE defense of Taiwan remains at the heart of the issue of China. The recent initiatives of Peking and Washington, and the impending presidential visit, have inspired hopeful speculation. Discussion has centered on formulas for recognition and entry into the United Nations. Our alliance with the Republic of China on Taiwan has been given less consideration, and its implications are optimistically avoided. But our security relationship with Taiwan—in particular the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954—dictates certain diplomatic solutions and precludes others. Definitive choices will have to be made, and illusions of entertaining contradictory positions will have to be abandoned. If the consequences of our defense arrangement are not grasped, and the problems not deliberately resolved, the expectations that have been aroused may be unfulfilled, and the United States may proceed to underwrite a new order in East Asia that offers at best a tense military equilibrium and perpetual American involvement in the political evolution of the region.

Two inquiries are in order: one into the logic, the other into the facts. The logic is that alliance with Taipei and relations with Peking are mutually exclusive. And the facts are that our military support is unnecessary for the immediate defense of Taiwan, and the island in turn is unnecessary for the security of the United States and its regional interests. Therefore, the military value of Taiwan is not a sufficient reason for upholding the indefinite partition of China. Yet the consequences of ending the alliance would be more significant than is generally appreciated, for it would not only signal abandonment of the containment of China but threaten the concept of collective security.

Our defense relationship with Taiwan is integral to the question of recognizing the governments and states of China. Each diplomatic alternative has specific implications for the status of the treaty and the territory to be defended:

(1) One China (Taipei). This stance implies no change in our treaty arrangements. It does not discourage the nationalists' occupation of the Offshore Islands, which confirms their claim to sovereignty over more than the province of Taiwan. (We have

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recognized the Government of the Republic of China as "legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Pescadores." This modality has permitted Taipei its pretensions, while allowing us to deal with Peking.)

(2) Two Chinas. Juridical acknowledgment of two governments, each sovereign in its territory, would be a profound change. Such an attitude is noncommittal as to nationalist control of the Offshore Islands as long as this does not prejudice the security of Taiwan. It is compatible with the Mutual Defense Treaty, but begs the question of whether Taipei would acquiesce.

(3) One China/One Taiwan. This formula differs from Two Chinas in suggesting the secession of Taiwan rather than the partition of China. It also differs in its military and political consequences. It implies that Taiwan must relinquish the Offshore Islands since they are not part of the province. It also implies our support for self-determination. This end-state would be compatible with the defense treaty, though it is difficult to imagine how we could arrive at it.

(4) One China (Peking). This position affirms the territorial integrity of China but recognizes the verdict of the civil war. The Offshore Islands would be an internal problem. In some recent discussions, Peking has ignored our defense treaty with Taiwan, stimulating the hope that we might conveniently retain it. But the alliance would become an illegal compact with an appendage of China that would have recognized no international status, and the resolution of this contradiction could not long be postponed.

The choice among the formulas of recognition is also a choice between two competing principles of international law. (1) The Government of the Republic of China has been in effective and continuous control of Taiwan and the Pescadores since 1945. It would be inconsistent to ignore this same demonstration of effective control that commends our recognition of the People's Republic of China as the government of the mainland. (2) On the other hand, we have historically tended to respect the territorial integrity of states in general and the theoretical unity of China in particular (notably in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and President Truman's statement of January 1950). It is within this tradition that we might—as did Britain in 1949, after the removal of the nationalist capital from the mainland —simply withdraw recognition from Taipei and extend it to

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Peking. One virtue of such a procedure is that it chooses among governments and avoids a redefinition of states.

The Administration is seeking a version of dual identity for China, both in the United Nations and in relations with Peking, without assuming a definite legal attitude. This quest is expressive of the delicate balance of U.S. interests. On the one hand, state relations with Peking would benefit the United States by (a) offsetting the Soviets in a triangular world power balance; (b) creating the possibility of involving China in future multilateral agreements on arms control and peace in Southeast Asia; and (c) opening China to American commerce. On the other hand, affirmation of the integrity of Taiwan takes account of (a) the tradition of support for the Republic of China; (b) concern for the fate of the Taiwanese people; (c) deference to Japan's interests; and (d) the perception of the strategic value of the island.

But Two Chinas, or One China/One Taiwan, or even Taiwanese "autonomy" within Chinese "sovereignty," underwritten by our continuing military guarantee, is a theoretical compromise, not a practical reconciliation. Two interlocked propositions deserve consideration. The first is that this solution would not work, even if we could get it. Taiwan by itself would not be a stable entity, internationally or internally; it would fundamentally rely on the protection of American power, and it might provoke China to use force against it. The White House might calculate that it can trade on China's anxiety over its northern frontier to drive a hard bargain over Taiwan. But Peking is unlikely, over the long term, to accept any relic of containment or intrusion on its sovereignty. If the enforced separation of Taiwan endured, China might, as opportunity permits, mount probes against Taiwan or the Offshore Islands. (Vietnam may have obscured our memory of the extended and severe Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958 that brought the United States to the brink of a direct—even nuclear—war with China.)

Even certain advocates of the One China (Peking) solution hope for a graceful integration of Taiwan and the mainland under the mantle of our protective guarantee. But the United States has, since the mid-1950s, tried several times to induce China to agree formally to the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Strait. It has become clear in these discussions that Peking might agree to settle all disputes "through peaceful negotia-

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tions," but will not accept any qualification that reserves for Taiwan "the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense." This position might seem inconsistent, but it accurately represents the paradox of Peking's probable behavior toward Taiwan. If the United States were to accept China's historic objectives, then China would not seek to attain them by belligerent means, but would work toward a peaceful or even nominal accession. The preservation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, however, is not in harmony with the renunciation of force. We cannot compel a peaceful evolution of authority on Taiwan.

The second proposition is that we are not likely to reach a Two China solution—attaining our new interests in China while preserving our old interests in Taiwan—because the terms are contradictory. President Nixon, in his foreign policy message of February 1971, denies the incompatibility: "I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China." But in characterizing our alliance—correctly—as "exclusively defensive," he avoids the essential point: that it represents our protection of the integrity of Taiwan, a condition that Peking will not accept. Although the Mutual Defense Treaty itself does not define the legal status of Taiwan or affect its ultimate sovereignty, adherence to the treaty in fact precludes recognition of Peking, even as the government of the mainland only. Of the four formulas, Peking rejects the three that are compatible with the defense treaty; and Taipei rejects the three that allow recognition of Peking. What remains is a choice between the approach to China and the defense of Taiwan.

II

It is appropriate to review the circumstances and conditions of our security relationship with Taiwan. U.S. responsibility for the defense of Taiwan began with the decision of President Truman, on June 27, 1950, three days after the outbreak of the Korean War, to interpose the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, protecting the island from the communists and barring the nationalists from offensive actions against the mainland. This was a reversal of his policy of January 1950, which had expressed neutrality toward the determination, even by force, of the issue of Taiwan. In agreements of January and February 1951 and sub-

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sequently, the United States undertook to provide military matériel and advice. In September 1952, a U.S. Formosa Defense Command was formed. In February 1953, President Eisenhower "unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek by deleting that part of the mission of the Seventh Fleet that restrained nationalist attacks on the mainland. In August and September 1954, possibly in reaction to the concurrent SEATO negotiations, the communists mounted a series of attacks on nationalist positions on Quemoy and the Tachens, began to mass along the coast opposing the Offshore Islands and Taiwan, and accelerated the construction of airfields near the Strait. To harass and retaliate, nationalist air and naval forces staged heavy raids.

A Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, negotiated in Washington during October and November 1954, was signed by Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh on December 2 and submitted to the Senate for ratification. On November 1, 1954, and again on January 10, 1955, large armadas of communist planes bombarded the Tachens. On January 18, 4,000 communist troops seized the island of Ichiang, off the mainland 200 miles north of Taiwan. On January 24, President Eisenhower requested from Congress a joint resolution authorizing the President to employ United States forces to defend Taiwan, and also the Offshore Islands if in his judgment an attack on them was related to an attack on Taiwan itself. This Formosa Resolution passed the House by 410 to 3 on January 25, and the Senate by 83 to 3 on January 28. The Senate advised ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty on February 9. During that week, the U.S. Seventh Fleet evacuated the nationalists from the Tachens, which were subsequently occupied by the communists. The Strait crisis lasted until May 22, when an informal ceasefire prevailed. Throughout the period of tension, anxious debates were conducted within our government as to whether the nationalists could defend themselves without our active intervention, and whether we would have to use nuclear weapons against Red Chinese airfields.

Forged in the Korean War and the Strait crisis, our defense arrangement with Taiwan suited Dulles' diplomacy of containment, deterrence and collective security. Also, the Mutual Defense Treaty was a compensation to Chiang for accepting a cauterization of the civil war along its existing territorial division. Other motives were access to Taiwan as a base for U.S.

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forces and preservation of the nationalist army for possible use on the mainland. The salient points of the Mutual Defense Treaty are: Article II, in which the parties agree to resist "armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability;" Article V, in which each party "recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes;" Article VI, which defines the territory to be defended as "Taiwan and the Pescadores" and "such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement;" Article VII, in which the Republic of China grants "the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement;" and Article X, which gives either party the right to "terminate [the treaty] one year after notice has been given to the other Party."

An Exchange of Notes on December 10, 1954, postulates that the "use of force [against the mainland from Taiwan or the Offshore Islands] will be a matter of joint agreement." It also provides that "military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from [Taiwan and the Pescadores] to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement"—a clause that is interpreted to apply to the nationalists rather than the United States. In addition, the State Department has said that "the Government of the Republic of China is aware that we would not consider ourselves bound by the obligations of the Mutual Defense Treaty in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan and the Pescadores provoked by GRC offensive action against the mainland to which we had not agreed." As for the Formosa Resolution, which extends unilateral and discretionary United States protection to "related positions and territories," the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in July 1971 recommended its repeal. The State Department had already notified Senator Fulbright in March 1970 that "in the event of a new crisis in the Formosa Strait, this Administration would not view the continued existence of the Formosa Resolution as a source of con-

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gressional authority"—a stipulation that leaves the Mutual Defense Treaty itself as the only authority for intervention.

III

Let us examine the cost, necessity and advantages of our military position on Taiwan, and the consequences of abandoning it. It has been suggested that our contribution to the defense of Taiwan should be cancelled as part of a program to cut the costs of overseas deployments. An assessment of cost depends on the way one looks at the question. Current United States military expenditures in Taiwan, though not negligible in absolute terms, are minor in comparison with those in other countries on the periphery of China. We have fewer than 9,000 military personnel on Taiwan, of which about 5,000 are involved with the war in Southeast Asia. Before 1966, only 3,700 United States troops were on Taiwan. The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) has been reduced to under 400. The U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, a subordinate unified command reporting to the Commander in Chief/Pacific (CINCPAC) in Hawaii, is primarily a planning staff, now under 200 persons, and controls no combat forces. Also, our national strategy does not provide ground forces for a defense of Taiwan, even against the largest communist assault; and air and naval forces to be detailed to the area in such a contingency would be diverted from other requirements and therefore are not a marginal expense. Military assistance for fiscal 1972, in all categories, will total $112 million (up from $82 million in fiscal 1971). There has been virtually no economic assistance since 1965.

Over the long haul, however, our assistance to Taiwan has been considerable. From 1950 to 1972, the Republic of China will have received military and economic aid, in all categories, of almost $6 billion, a figure exceeded in East Asia only by Korea and Vietnam. But these are "sunk costs," and count as reasons neither for maintaining nor for curtailing our commitment and military posture on Taiwan.

Figures on overt expenditures exclude, however, an important budgetary concern. In the fiscal 1972 defense budget, general purpose forces oriented to Asia will cost $19 billion. If we consider China the source of our Asian requirements, and Taiwan the principal obstacle to a relationship with China that would generate lower requirements, then the real annual cost of our

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military position on Taiwan is a large fraction of this $19 billion.

In challenging the military validity of our defense arrangement with Taiwan, we must first ask whether our commitment is necessary for the security of Taiwan itself. The worst imaginable threat—a massive communist amphibious invasion—is not likely and would not succeed, according to studies done in the Pentagon in the late 1960s. This would be true even without United States air or naval intervention, and certainly without invoking nuclear contingency plans such as those readied during the Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958. Peking knows this and has not been building toward such an attack. The communists can airlift only 5,000 troops, and have amphibious vessels for only 30,000 in the first, or assault, wave. There is, of course, the legendary "junk threat;" Red China could, in theory, assemble enough local shipping to carry 350,000 troops across the 100-mile Strait. But even these troops would not be assured of landing. In such attacks the advantage is with the defender by a ratio of 3:1, and there are 320,000 nationalist army troops and 36,000 marines on Taiwan. In addition, the nationalist air force and navy could inflict serious losses on an invading force, both during its staging and its deployment.

An air attack of the communists could pit 1,200 (of their 3,300) light bomber and fighter-attack planes against 350 Nationalist planes and several air defense missile battalions. But the nationalist force could survive such an air assault, since the assault would be impaired by limited payload and time over target; inaccuracy in the face of anti-aircraft fire; dispersion and concealment of targets; and loss of aircraft. A series of air battles might, however, deplete the nationalist air inventory.

Even the island of Quemoy, only a few thousand yards from the port of Amoy, presents the prospect of a bloodbath for an attacking communist force. The nationalists have 65,000 troops on Quemoy and Little Quemoy and have spent the 17 years since the communist bombardment of 1954–55 digging in to indestructible positions, with landing areas thickly protected and armored forces in reserve to defeat attempts to establish a beachhead. In 1949, in their last large-scale invasion of Quemoy, communist forces were repulsed by nationalist armor with heavy casualties. A more promising strategy would be a blockade, as in 1958, when only a U.S. escort for supply convoys saved Quemoy.

The cost and indeterminate outcome of an attack on Taiwan

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or the Offshore Islands suggest that the Chinese communists would not pursue this course soon, especially when negotiations were in progress with the United States toward recognition and other accommodations. Even much later, Peking would be reluctant to jeopardize years of painstaking diplomacy, court the risk of retaliation and expend large forces in such an adventure.

IV

Is our military access to Taiwan, and its denial to the communists, of significant advantage to the United States? The term "strategic importance" has been lavishly applied, as an absolute property, to many territories or positions. In actuality, however, this attribute is relative to larger national strategies and objectives, which are never absolute but always under review. Taiwan has no irreplaceable military functions and offers no unique strategic advantages, except for a landing on the mainland—a nationalist objective which we do not share.[1]

A commentary on the military value of Taiwan is the fact that until 1966 there was no major American base there, and only one combat unit—a detachment of fighter-attack planes from the 405th Fighter Wing in the Philippines that arrived at Tainan Air Base in 1962 (a second detachment, for air defense, arrived in 1969). In part, this may simply testify to the availability and greater political flexibility of Okinawa; but this only underscores the point that there would always be inhibiting political connotations in a large U.S. military use of Taiwan.

In fact, the two air operations that we established since 1966—expanding on our treaty right to use nationalist facilities in the common defense—are entirely devoted to support of the Indochina war. In 1966 the first contingent of the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing arrived at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base to inaugurate an intra-theater air transport facility that ultimately employed 64 C-130s to ferry food and supplies to our forces in Vietnam. This facility was regarded simply as a convenient alternative to our crowded bases in the Philippines. It is now declining, along with the reduction of our troop level in Viet-

[1] This judgment holds despite the ambiguous participation of our Special Forces for almost ten years in joint commando exercises with the nationalists that seemed designed for operations on the mainland of China. Also, our military assistance reflects only the concepts of air and ground defense of Taiwan and air and sea control of the Strait in order to foil an amphibious attack or permit the resupply of the Offshore Islands—though the concept has been stretched to encompass the provision of fighter-attack aircraft capable of bombing mainland airfields.

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nam. In January 1968 we based the 4220th Air Refueling Squadron, with 21 KC-135 tanker aircraft, at Ching Chuan Kang, to refuel B-52s on bombing runs to Indochina from Guam and Okinawa. With the covert encouragement of American military officials, the nationalists have extended and strengthened the runways at Hsinchu and one other air base to accommodate B-52 operations as a possible alternative to Okinawa.

The United States maintains the 327th Air Division headquarters in Taipei, as a satellite of the 13th Air Force at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. This headquarters supports all United States air operations on Taiwan and coördinates American with nationalist air activities over Taiwan and the Strait. Bases on Taiwan have served as the point of origin of aerial surveillance, manned and unmanned, along the coast and over the mainland. Cryptological intelligence is collected and processed at the large installation at Shu-lin-kuo Air Station. The minor portion of this intelligence is relevant to the security of Taiwan itself; the remainder can be replaced through other locations or technologies. A very small number of the tactical nuclear weapons we keep in the Pacific is stored on Taiwan. The Defense Department has proposed that the President authorize the removal of larger numbers of nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Taiwan. But this unlikely proposal is founded on the marginal rationales of convenience and cost-effectiveness and is not strategically compelling.

It can no longer be argued convincingly that the very existence of the forces of the Republic of China—equivalent to 21 army and 2 marine divisions—immobilizes large communist forces in the opposite provinces of the mainland. A rough examination of the deployments of the People's Liberation Army reveals that the 28 divisions in the three military regions opposite Taiwan represent only the average national distribution, and the 25 additional divisions in the adjacent Canton and Wuhan military regions represent only slightly more than the average. In any case, even if the nationalist threat pinned down disproportionate forces, the beneficiaries would be the Soviets.

The possible use of nationalist forces in an Asian war, other than a conflict over Taiwan itself, is now almost totally illusory. Though very minor special units (such as a 31-man psychological warfare team) were sent to Vietnam, and some covert operations have been revealed, the repeated requests of CINCPAC

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for the dispatch of a light division or engineer unit were denied by Washington. The political disadvantages of reintroducing nationalist troops onto the mainland weighed against the tactical contribution.

Of course, Taiwan might become more valuable if we lost the use of Okinawa. But any circumstances in which Japan denied us the use of Okinawa would also be circumstances in which our commitments to Korea and Japan would themselves be inoperative or pointless and would therefore not require Taiwan as an alternative. And in a larger sense, the conditions that might justify the need for either Okinawa or Taiwan would be obviated by the same change in our China policy that caused us to give up our military position on Taiwan.

The importance of Taiwan to "the integrity of the island barrier in the Pacific," though not perceived by General MacArthur in 1949, became a dogma during the Eisenhower administration. But the barrier concept is no more than a geographical *gestalt,* and does not stand up to specific military analysis. The same factors that inhibit China's ability to invade Taiwan itself, or even the Offshore Islands, militate against China's use of Taiwan as a base to threaten the Philippines or Okinawa. Evocative metaphors must yield to a sober appreciation of the practical difficulties of moving a decisive quantity of men and firepower over several hundred miles of ocean, holding captured ground against counterattack, and supplying and protecting forces in the face of air and naval attack. The physical recovery of Taiwan would leave China far short of the threshold for aggression against neighboring islands.

V

If we were to abandon our defense arrangement on Taiwan, what would be the effects on the pattern of regional security? There are two aspects: the efficacy of deterrence, and the will and allegiance of our allies, particularly Japan.

The Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China is typical of the deterrent alliances fashioned by Secretary Dulles in East Asia. In his argument for the treaty before the Senate, he identified two purposes: "(1) It would give the Chinese Communists notice, beyond any possibility of misinterpretation, that the United States would regard an armed attack directed against Taiwan and the Pescadores as a danger to its own peace

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and safety and would act to meet the danger. . . (2) It would provide firm reassurance to the Republic of China and to the world that Taiwan and the Pescadores are not a subject for barter as part of some Far Eastern 'deal' with the Chinese Communists." These alliances were not designed to contribute net strength to the United States or to furnish positions strategically advantageous to the protection of other allied territory. They were designed, rather, to demarcate the border with the communist world. The demarcation itself, the equipping of indigenous forces, and the threat of massive retaliation were elements in the stabilization of large and important areas. Thus, the alliance with the Republic of China shielded territory of arbitrary value with a minimal expenditure of American resources and an unidentifiable gain in American security. But the "pactomania" of that period was not irrational. Since, under that concept, an infinitely extensive area can be defended with the same infinitely extensible means, each pact costs nothing and produces at least fictive gains.

Conversely, terminating our alliance with the Republic of China would not impair our defense capability either in limited or general war, increase our defense burden or diminish our security. As for the effect on deterrence itself, two factors cancel each other out: annexation by Peking would be encouraged by the withdrawal of our support, but the use of force might be less indicated as Taipei's morale deteriorated.

A thorough realignment of our relations with China and our military situation on Taiwan would accelerate the disintegration of our treaty system in East Asia. Lesser allies, such as Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea, might seek an accommodation with Peking and hedge hostile relationships with other regional states. Some, inspired by other ambiguous American behavior, have already begun to explore such arrangements. But such an eventuality would be less than a disaster. After twenty years, the alliance system may have fulfilled its basic and limited purpose; either the nations on China's periphery have used the protection and assistance well, or they probably never will. It may be time for them to adjust to their communist neighbors and to China's irrefutable ascendancy. And after giving $40 to $50 billion in subsidies, we are entitled now to question the further value to us of our East Asian connections. Most clients appear as interminable military aid recipients. The argument that

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military assistance is a substitute for direct U. S. deployments begs the questions of whether our clients' security is parallel to ours and whether our continuing patronage is consistent with a new orientation to Peking.

A retrograde American move in Taiwan might put serious pressures on Japan. In contrast with the lesser allies, Japan—it is asserted—might react not only by distinguishing its foreign policy objectives more sharply from those of the United States, but by accelerating its conventional rearmament, acquiring an independent nuclear capability, giving up the security treaty with the United States, and asserting more control over contiguous areas, especially Korea and Taiwan. In the Sato-Nixon communiqué of November 21, 1969, the Japanese Prime Minister threw a protective shadow over Taiwan: "The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area [is] a most important factor for the security of Japan." Subsequent official statements have been more portentous. Japan's increasingly active role could inhibit our diplomacy in the area.

The Administration's moves toward China do not override, but advance, its larger design for East Asia. The President's 1971 foreign policy message contemplates a quadrilateral balance, with China, the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union as countervailing participants, and a buffer of lesser states, including an independent Taiwan, sponsored by the United States and Japan. This pattern is represented as a stable situation in which the United States, with modest effort, could preclude any dominant West Pacific competitor. Containment is not ended, but transformed into something more multiple and complex. But would this state of affairs be durable and profitable for the United States? Taiwan itself could unhinge the architectonics: either internationally, as China becomes more confident, effective and impatient; or internally, if a Taiwanese movement—perhaps with Peking's active sympathy—challenged the present Chinese overlordship. The Administration's manipulation of power in East Asia might indeed produce an equilibrium, but at the cost of continuing American liability and recurrent crises.

VI

The cancellation of our security arrangement with Taiwan would involve a wide pattern of deliberate moves. For example:

(1) After preliminary soundings favored the probability of

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an agreement, the United States would publicly announce that it had decided to enter talks with Peking that would lead to our recognition of Peking as the government of one China, and that we would accept a status for Taiwan within the Chinese state.

(2) We would concurrently declare that the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taipei would not be consistent with this formula of recognition and exercise our right, under Article X of the treaty, to give one year's notice of termination.

(3) Within the year, we would withdraw all United States military forces from Taiwan and dissolve the U. S. Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group.

(4) We would immediately cancel all military assistance to Taiwan, remove items from the pipeline, suspend commercial sales of military equipment and prevent the further transfer of advanced technology.

(5) At the United Nations, Washington would move to seat Peking in the United Nations and related organizations, and would favor Peking's occupancy of the permanent Chinese seat in the Security Council.

(6) In its strategic planning for the Pacific, the United States would begin to take a mid-Pacific posture. We would move progressively to neutralize the military effects and obligations of our alliances with Korea and Thailand and convert these relationships into associations for economic and technical assistance, political consultation and cultural exchange.

Such a reversal of policy in this situation would have transcendent significance for our international role. First, it would imply a renunciation of the Dulles syndrome of containment, treaties and counter-ideology. Second, it would suggest an alternative American disposition toward the balance of power. In East Asia, in particular, instead of an intricate and strained quadrilateral array of great nations, we might accept a looser system. Third, our removal of force from Taiwan, this extreme outpost in the Western Pacific, would indicate the adoption of "second chance" military strategies. Threats do not develop with the speed of modern communications—a misplaced analogy used to rationalize the need for large ready forces and alert forward defenses. We could allow ourselves time to see if China is "expansionist"—impatient with the prospect of regaining its former province by some brand of politics rather than raw force, or unsatisfied with the restoration of its historical territory. There

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might be a decade—as in the case of Japan in the 1930s—for us to discern and react to Chinese intentions.

Fourth, an abandonment of our defense commitment to Taiwan would mark a revulsion against the seductive logic of deterrence—a concept that was given a new lease on life as the keynote of the Secretary of Defense's posture statement for fiscal 1972. A premise of deterrence is that strength of will can be a substitute for material military power; the reputation for supporting commitments is a vital element in this model. Unfortunately, the ultimate extension of deterrence is its ultimate perversion: the less valuable the interest, the more necessary it becomes to honor it.

Finally, abrogation of our alliance with the Republic of China would prefigure a repudiation of the obsolescent wisdom of collective security. Collective security has rarely attained its pure form, occasioning full and automatic response, for such an obligation would compromise the essential of national sovereignty, the prerogative of staying out of wars.

At stake are two antithetical principles. One is the stern stricture of John Foster Dulles, the architect of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China: "There can never in the long run be real peace unless there is . . . the will and the capacity to use force to punish an aggressor." The other is the gentle irony of U Thant: "The idea that . . . war can be used . . . to counter aggression and secure the peace seems now to be rather impractical."

To conclude, the military advantages of our defense arrangement with Taiwan are dispensable and should not govern our approach to China. But we are not impelled by budgetary pressures or immediate danger to reduce our position on Taiwan. The decision rests on the larger effects: (1) the bearing of our alliance with Taipei on our diplomacy toward Peking; (2) the consequences of a political realignment for the people of Taiwan; (3) the impact of abandoning this treaty on our alliance structure in East Asia, and particularly on Japan; and (4) the implications of our choice for the future attitude of the United States toward the international system. The last factor, though the least urgent in the immediate decision, may deserve to be the most influential.

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THE INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Charles W. Yost

THERE are many different ways of conducting a government. In the United States the executive authority is both more formally centralized in the President and more sharply separated from the legislature than in most democracies. This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign affairs, where the authority of the President has been seriously challenged only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overriding the opinions both of the Congress and of the public.

In general, he has been free to conduct foreign affairs more or less as he chooses, to use traditional instruments, to set up new ones or to carry on diplomacy from his own hip pocket. There is little use arguing whether or not he has the constitutional right to do so. As our government is organized, he has both the responsibility and the power. Critics in or out of the Congress can make things difficult for him, but they can neither conduct foreign affairs themselves nor prevent him from doing so. Of course, a wise President will consult the Congress closely, in fact as well as in form, on matters of major import, which recent Presidents have often foolishly failed to do.

Our concern here, however, is with the instruments which Presidents use for the conduct of foreign affairs. Up until the 1930s the instrument was almost always the traditional one, the Secretary and Department of State, except in those not infrequent cases where a strong President, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, chose to carry on a particular exercise in diplomacy himself, sometimes with the help of a personal adviser or emissary. Nevertheless, as late as 1931, President Hoover, though not himself inexperienced in foreign affairs, relied on Secretary Stimson to deal, in so far as the United States was prepared to deal, with the Manchurian crises.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, just at the moment when the rise to power of ambitious dictators in both Europe and Asia made inevitable much deeper American involvement in foreign affairs, named as Secretary of State, almost entirely for domestic political reasons, an eminent Senator, Cordell Hull, who had

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unhappily neither the taste nor the talent for the conduct of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, again for domestic political reasons, he remained in office for nearly 12 years, longer than any previous Secretary of State. This did not seriously disturb FDR, who was contemptuous of the diplomatic establishment and overestimated his own capacity to direct domestic and foreign, and later military, affairs personally and simultaneously.

Even Roosevelt, however, while bypassing Hull as much as he could, at first placed his own men, on whom he did to some extent rely, inside the State Department itself—Welles and later Stettinius as Under Secretary, Moley and Berle as Assistant Secretaries, and Bullitt and Kennedy as Ambassadors. On the other hand, when war came, the authority and responsibilities of the Department, as well as of its chief, were progressively and seriously undermined in two respects. In the first place, unlike Churchill, Roosevelt to a substantial degree excluded the Department and the Foreign Service from wartime decision-making under the peculiar delusion that most political decisions should and could be adjourned till after victory, and that those that could not he could resolve alone or with purely military advice. Due to this delusion very serious mistakes were made. In the second place, after one or two abortive experiments in permitting the State Department to handle some of the significant new duties arising from the war, Roosevelt chose for the most part to create for this purpose new agencies wholly outside State's control, and indeed to multiply, reorganize or wipe out these agencies with confusing rapidity.

Thus, for largely personal and accidental reasons, a precedent was set during the critical period of U.S. emergence as a superpower for bypassing the Secretary of State and the Foreign Service and for diffusing the conduct of foreign affairs at home and abroad among a wide and constantly changing complex of agencies. An even more unfortunate precedent set at the same time was the persistent and intimate involvement of the military in foreign policy decision-making, natural enough in wartime but creating in peacetime an imbalance of judgment toward military instruments and solutions which gravely distorted U.S. foreign policy over 25 years. These developments arose not from any need to confirm or strengthen the authority of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs, which was never challenged, but simply from the sudden pressures of an abnormal situation,

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the personal style of a particular President, and the limitations of a particular Secretary of State.

II

After the war an earnest and partially successful effort was made by Secretaries Marshall, Acheson and Dulles, each in his own way, to restore the authority and preëminence of the Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs. This effort was undertaken and carried on not for any self-serving or bureaucratic reasons but simply on grounds of clear national interest and sound administration. If the United States was to carry out effectively its new responsibilities as a world power, it had to be able to take decisions sensibly and promptly in Washington, to speak with one voice to other governments, and to coördinate and discipline its sprawling operations overseas.

This was obviously a task beyond the capacities of any President, no matter how genial, or of personal advisers like Colonel House or Harry Hopkins. Responsibility and control, if not in all cases administration, had to be vested in a single agency and the logical agency was the Department established for the conduct of foreign affairs. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower recognized this fact without question, as did the three abovementioned Secretaries of State. They all also recognized that the State Department and the Foreign Service had to be drastically reformed and strengthened for this purpose and they made a significant beginning in doing so.

Stettinius, even while Roosevelt was still alive, organized and institutionalized such policy-making as the President had left to the Department. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 reformed and invigorated the Foreign Service so sensibly that all the numerous subsequent reorganizations of the Service have not in most respects improved upon it. Marshall and Kennan created, and Acheson and Nitze maintained and developed, the Policy Planning Staff, which in those best of times provided much of the inspiration for foreign policy-making in the U.S. government.

Dulles was a strong Secretary of State enjoying the fullest confidence of the President; he never let other agencies infringe on his own authority nor, with a few calculated exceptions, their representatives abroad infringe on the authority of his ambassadors; he filled most of the principal positions at home and

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abroad with career officers. On the other hand, his term of office was marred by three shortcomings from the operational point of view. First, for domestic political reasons, he tolerated and to some extent even abetted McCarthy's attacks on the Foreign Service, with consequences for its stature and morale not yet wholly overcome. Second, his preferred style was to work almost totally with three or four close advisers, so that he did not fully use or foresightedly develop the resources of the Department as a whole. Third, because of his almost total disinterest in administration, he permitted some reorganizations which, with the best of intentions, substantially weakened the Department and the Service. At the end of Eisenhower's second term, therefore, while the prestige and power of the Secretary of State was very high, the Department and the Service were significantly less strong and healthy than they had been ten years before.

The next three Presidents, without particularly solid grounds in my view, all considered themselves experts in foreign affairs and each desired to be his own Secretary of State. All of them, moreover, for different personal reasons, had little respect for the career Foreign Service. These predilections and antipathies had several unfortunate consequences from the point of view of the conduct of foreign affairs and, in my opinion, of the protection of the national interest.

In the first place, the two Secretaries of State of the period were allowed very little initiative and latitude and, when they were, only in areas of lesser interest to the President. Second, the three Presidents actively built up separate directorates of foreign affairs in the White House, headed by men of outstanding ability but without the depth and breadth of experience in the foreign field which might have saved them from some of the blunders into which they stumbled. Indochina of course was the most significant. Third, these three Presidents and their two Secretaries of State, while they did not actually augment the already overinflated role of the military in foreign policy formulation, were less able to put military advice in perspective than Eisenhower and less willing to insist on the prerogatives of State than Acheson and Dulles. Finally, there was under these three Presidents a creeping tendency, while maintaining the overall proportion of career to noncareer chiefs of mission overseas at about two to one, more and more to place political appointees, for the most part without significant prior experience, in the

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most important diplomatic posts. For example, at the present time all of our ambassadors in Western Europe with two exceptions are political appointees, as well as our ambassadors in Canada, Australia, India and Pakistan.

The focus of the conduct of foreign affairs has therefore shifted even more sharply away from the State Department during the past decade than during the previous one. The fact that this shift was consciously undertaken by three Presidents does not make it a wise one, unless it can be shown that the new system is better than the traditional one which was so successfully revived and refreshed by Secretary Marshall.

Frankly I do not find the record of these three Presidents in the conduct of foreign affairs a brilliant one. I believe some of the main causes of their failures were their own oversimplified conception of world politics (similar, incidentally, to that of the communists) as a universal struggle between darkness and light, their excessive reliance on the advice of military and academic strategists committed to the same misconception, and their reluctance to heed advice from either experienced diplomats or more down-to-earth politicians, no doubt less brilliant and articulate, but a little more knowledgeable and realistic about what could and could not be achieved among peoples unfamiliar with the doctrines of Calvin and Mahan.

III

In so far as there is a system for the conduct of foreign affairs at the present time, which one would hesitate to assert categorically, it is centered not in the State Department but in the National Security Council. A few words about the origin and purpose of the Council will be relevant.

The National Security Council was established in 1947 by an act of Congress which was primarily designed to bring about unification of the armed services. President Truman reports in his memoirs, however, that in proposing establishment of the Council, "I wanted one top-level permanent setup in the government to concern itself with advising the President on high policy decisions concerning the security of the nation." The Council was intended, he said, to give him "a perpetual inventory of where we stood and where we were going on all strategic questions affecting the national security."

Truman also noted in his memoirs that the NSC "built a

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small but highly competent permanent staff which was selected for its objectivity and lack of political ties. It was our plan that the staff should serve as a continuing organization regardless of what administration was in power." While this conception of the NSC staff continued for the most part to prevail until the end of the 1950s, it has been radically altered since that time. First, the staff is no longer "small": it comprised about ten persons in 1948, about 25 in 1953, about 50 in 1961, and about 120 today. Second, its "executive secretary," as he was at the outset, an inconspicuous civil servant without "political ties," has been transformed into the President's National Security Adviser, one of the most conspicuous and prestigious policy-makers in Washington, not normally "permanent" or necessarily nonpartisan.

Decision-making in the whole field of foreign affairs has in recent years become more and more entangled and distorted in the machinery of the Council. This radical shift of locus has of course occurred because the last three Presidents, as we have suggested, distrusted the State Department and thought they could themselves better control both foreign and military affairs through an instrument inside the White House. Whether or not they calculated correctly in this respect, excessive reliance on the Council to the detriment of the State Department has had several side-effects which have been distinctly unfortunate.

The most significant arises from the prominent place of the military in the Council. Their place there was proper as long as the Council was restricted to the original role it was assigned by Truman: providing the President with "a perpetual inventory of where we stood and where we are going on all strategic questions affecting the national security." In the past decade, however, partly at the behest of the Presidents and partly under the inspiration of powerful and energetic National Security Advisers, almost every foreign policy question of any significance is "processed" through the NSC machinery. One consequence, in view of the composition and unconscious bias of the Council, has been all too often to accord undue weight to military factors in assessing foreign policy problems. The seemingly neutral meshing of foreign policy decision-making into the NSC machinery over the past decade has therefore in fact further warped that decision-making in a military direction and is to a substantial degree responsible for some of the most serious misjudgments of that period.

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A second damaging side-effect of foreign policy by the NSC and its even more abundant staff has been further to complicate and prolong an already tedious and constipated decision-making process. Parkinson's Law is given still another golden opportunity to perform. Matters which have already been subjected to the most exhaustive review in the State Department, and by State with other agencies, are dissected, dismantled and put together all over again by the NSC staff. The result often is that months pass before a crucial decision is finally taken, by which time events have frequently moved so far that the decision is obsolete or irrelevant.

Still a third effect is to undermine the prestige and effectiveness of the Secretary of State and the Foreign Service in the conduct of day-to-day relations with other governments. An adviser spending 12 hours a day in the White House and with easy access to the President can, if the President will let him, play more of a part in shaping the structure, and even the superstructure, of foreign policy than a Secretary of State who, confined by his duties in the Department and at meetings overseas, sees the President much less frequently. Foreign ambassadors in Washington and American ambassadors abroad are even at times encouraged to believe they can obtain satisfaction of their requirements more easily from the National Security Adviser than from the Secretary of State. This is both petty and scandalous. One is reminded of the anecdote Blanche Dugdale recounted of an exchange at the Paris Peace Conference between Lord Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, and Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), Lloyd George's private secretary, who had a habit of usurping the Foreign Office role. On this occasion when Balfour asked Kerr whether Lloyd George had read a certain memo, Kerr replied: "I don't think so, but I have." Balfour answered: "Not quite the same thing, is it, Philip—yet."

A final damaging consequence of the transfer of foreign policy decision-making from State to NSC has been, since the NSC staff is not normally permitted to testify before Congressional committees, further to remove this process from Congressional scrutiny, to stimulate Congressional mistrust of the President's behavior and intentions in this field, and to foster quite unnecessarily the politico-constitutional crisis over the conduct of foreign affairs which we are now witnessing.

On all of these counts the diversion of foreign policy responsi-

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bilities from the State Department to an office inside the White House has been a disservice to the national interest and indeed, as events are now beginning to demonstrate, a disservice to the political interests of the President as well.

What is the alternative?

IV

The logical alternative is the traditional one, a single agency charged by the President with full responsibility under his direction for the formulation of foreign policy and the administration of foreign affairs. The Secretary of State must be a man of eminence and experience in whom the President has fullest confidence, to whom he is willing to grant considerable latitude but with whom he confers nearly every day when the Secretary is in Washington. When the Secretary is absent on official duties he should report to the President daily and the President should see the Acting Secretary almost daily.

The President may wish to have on his White House staff three or four officers who follow closely the flow of State Department and related agency communications, as well as Congressional, public and press opinion on foreign affairs, to keep him informed daily of significant developments, but he should expect from these officers information, not analysis, policy formulation or recommendation. These should come from the State Department in consultation with other interested agencies. The National Security Council should be returned to the role for which it was originally intended, to examine "strategic questions of interest to the national security," that is, issues having both military and foreign policy components of major significance. The Council's staff should again become "small," "selected for its objectivity and lack of political ties," serving "as a continuing organization regardless of what administration is in power." Its main function should be so to identify and present the major questions at issue that the President, advised by the Secretaries of State and Defense and others concerned, may make the necessary decisions clearly, promptly and finally.

The Secretary of State, moreover, must be master in his own house at home and all of his representatives abroad must be masters of their own houses. The Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, the Commerce, Agriculture and Labor Departments, the successive

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foreign aid and development agencies, all have important functions to perform in relation to foreign affairs, but all must be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State when their functions impinge on his, and he, not they, must be the judge when their functions do so impinge. In case of irreconcilable jurisdictional or policy differences the President would of course have to decide.

All of these prescriptions have been set down in innumerable executive orders and presidential directives over the past 20 years, but most of them are still more honored in the breach than in the observance. The chief fault in Washington is in the White House, which is too prone to play one agency off against another, in the NSC for reasons already cited, in the Pentagon by sheer weight of numbers and dollars, and in Congressional committees which jealously protect their own competing prerogatives by sustaining their competing clients. Overseas the task of coördination and control by the ambassador is vastly magnified by the grossly excessive staffs many of the other agencies, particularly Defense and CIA, insist on maintaining. But if an ambassador is firm but tactful and is left alone by Washington, he usually manages to control his establishment reasonably well.

Can the State Department, after so many years of neglect by Presidents and Secretaries of State, of eclipse under the shadow of Defense, of harassment by McCarthy and others, of repeated bleedings, transfusions and transplants, still carry the primary responsibility for the conduct of the foreign affairs of what is still the world's leading power? Of course it can, if the President wants it to do so and will help it do so. Obviously it will have to be revived and reinvigorated for this purpose, in much the same way that it was revived and reinvigorated in the late forties. But this is not the place to describe in detail how this could and should be done.

I might only suggest that the Policy Planning Council needs to be restored as the intellectual inspiration and conscience of the Department, that the economic and international organization bureaus need to be substantially strengthened to cope with the new world of the seventies and eighties, that the number of people in the Department needs to be cut by at least one-third, that political appointees to ambassadorships should be limited to no more than ten percent of the total and to truly distinguished personalities such as Harriman, Bunker and Bruce, and that all

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necessary steps should be taken to ensure that in the future the Foreign Service offers a career open to the talents of ambitious and able young men and women. Fortunately several reforms with this aim in view, provoked in large part by courageous "young turks" in the Service itself, are at present being vigorously and rapidly applied by Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Macomber. The capacity of the Department and the Service to carry in the future the responsibilities I have been describing will depend on the quality of career officers it is able to attract and to retain. The quality is high but it is threatened by the dissatisfaction of the most talented with the prospects of their Service and their career. Enhancing the role of the Department and the quality of its personnel are therefore two sides of the same coin.

Desirable as they are, none of these improvements in the Department and the Service will serve the broader purpose this article has proposed unless and until the President himself decides to restore to the Secretary and the Department of State their primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. If he did, he would, I believe, find their stewardship more efficient, more consistent, more ripe with experience and, in the long run, more politically wise and safe, than that of any surrogate, no matter how brilliantly staffed, he might set up in the White House.

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A NEW EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

By François Duchêne

AT the moment when East Asia is emerging as the new center of great-power confrontation, the old one, Europe, is showing signs of settling down. Eighteen years of almost glacially imperceptible movement have elapsed between the post-Stalin "thaw" of 1953 and the wary "era of negotiations" of 1971. But now the whole constellation of talks between the Soviet Union and its major Western adversaries, around the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the *Ostpolitik,* Berlin, force reductions and the convocation of a security conference, look like ratifying the stalemate between the two blocs painfully reached in Europe over the years. Since this recognizes in particular the frontiers between the contestants, it amounts not only to a virtual settlement of the cold war but to the nearest approximation one can expect of a peace treaty ending the Second World War. Moreover, this development coincides with another of great importance. The likely enlargement of the European Community from six to ten member countries, including Britain, is bound to open a new phase in the integration of Western Europe. With two such changes, European security in the middle and later 1970s will necessarily be very different from the patterns that have grown familiar during 20 years.

On the whole, the natural expectation is a shift away from the quasi-military confrontation of the cold war to civilian and political processes gradually increasing the interdependence of industrial societies with potentially complementary interests. If so, it will probably be the first time that an area vital to the world balance, without being itself a great power, is brought under control not as a victim of rival masters but as a field of coöperation sought keenly by the weaker states. It could be almost the equivalent in nuclear and international terms of the King's Peace which brought the European nation-state out of feudal chaos. This is an intoxicating hope and it is not surprising that one of the questions it inspires is whether the time has not come to lower the heavy military guard which has succeeded in stabilizing Europe. Russia is not to be feared because it is increasingly preoccupied with East Asia and with consumer

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demands at home; and because the last thing the declining ideological metropolis of Moscow would want would be a communist Germany, let alone Western Europe, to dethrone it altogether from its already precarious monopoly. The economic and political cohesion of an integrating Western Europe, sheltered by America's nuclear deterrent, could compensate for the superior military power of the Soviet Union.

Talk of a new European security system rests upon such presuppositions. As pressed by reformers in the establishments of the smaller East European states, such a posture even becomes a Western duty. Only if Russia loses all fear of Western military power, they argue, will conservatives in the Soviet Politburo be stripped of their great alibi and forced to concede the experiments in liberal communism essential to lighten the Russian imperium in Eastern Europe. That the ultimate aim should be to deëmphasize military confrontation as much as possible is already virtually beyond controversy. It is the gospel after President Nixon's "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's," which declares: "There is a growing impatience with confrontation. We and our allies seek a . . . détente."

The question is no longer the objective but the means, and in particular the means in terms of the requirements of security. Revisionist American historians of the cold war tend to deny that today's stability in Europe owes much to the security balance. This is impossible, with today's knowledge, to prove one way or the other. What can hardly be denied is that peace has been strong and not weak in the most heavily armed of all the continents; and that the acceptance of the existence of two blocs has led not to a widening rift but to closer contacts in the last ten years. The tragic expression of this was the way in which the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was followed almost immediately by the unfurling of the *Ostpolitik*. It has been demonstrated as far as such things can be in politics that the security control of the European situation has been basic to the confidence needed for coöperation.

This does not necessarily mean that an emphasis on security helps to accelerate coöperation now. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union might move rather faster to a consumer society if it discounted the West as a military force in Europe and that this might help economic coöperation between East and West. But Western attitudes are patently far from the only factor in Soviet

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attitudes. Jugoslavia is regarded as a thorn in Russia's flesh in its own right. *A fortiori,* China is a powerful reason for Russia to tighten its control over, for instance, Rumania. It is often claimed in Eastern Europe that fear of NATO played a large part in the Soviet decision to suppress the Dubček régime. But it is highly questionable whether the Politburo would have allowed what it regarded, probably rightly, as a loss of control in Czechoslovakia by the communist party even if NATO had been irrelevant to its discussions.

Common to all these questions, as indeed to the change in internal planning, or to Comecon integration, is the desire of a rigid bureaucratic structure to maintain and enhance its power. NATO is tangential to this obstacle, which is rooted in the domestic situation of the Soviet Union and which is likely to set the ultimate limits on the speed of East-West coöperation. This is particularly so because the Czech crisis itself, and since then pressures to reduce forces in both America and Europe have been monuments to the military passivity of the West. It will be hard in the future to argue seriously that military confrontation is a major factor in Moscow's attempts to maintain socialist orthodoxy as the communist party and the Soviet Union understand it. The political confrontation is harder to dispose of because it cannot disappear so long as Western Europe fulfills aspirations indigenous to East European societies themselves and these aspirations are thought to threaten the Soviet power structure. The only circumstances under which that could disappear would be if internal developments in Russia or the West led to the convergence of societies, or if the Soviet Union established a hegemony over Europe as a whole and treated it as a backyard. In the former case coöperation is largely a product, not the sole or even primary cause, of convergence, and Western security policies, though relevant, are secondary; in the latter, the security of Western Europe itself is involved.

II

In practice, therefore, Western strategies must not drop security for coöperation but seek to combine the two, rather as in another phrase of President Nixon's which calls at once for lower levels of forces and costs and, protesting almost too much, one feels, "a *more* stable military balance" as well. This squares with two psychological postures which have been de-

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veloping for some time and are likely, barring sharp changes of political direction, to develop further during the coming decade. One is the feeling that if East-West coöperation is to mean anything, it must be possible to lighten the military apparatus in Europe and buy security more cheaply, or to put the East-West balance on a more codified and contractual basis, or both. The other is that Western security policies must be tailored to a situation where the use of force seems remote, and yet to ignore its possibility might in the end raise it up again or at least undermine security and even the long-term hopes for equitable cooperation.

The simplest way to reconcile these aims would be to confirm the superpower control, based on nuclear caution, already established over Europe. It is in some ways the most likely development because it would require the minimum changes in interstate relations and attitudes. It is hard to imagine the Soviet Union, the "elephant" of modern military power, diluting its politico-military primacy in Eastern Europe. There are more doubts about the American "whale," because its insular position gives it an inherent political mobility currently illustrated by the Administration's policies in Asia.

Yet it is in Europe, if anywhere, that American interests are most firmly fixed. This is partly for economic reasons: Europe is not only the great foreign center of U.S. enterprise but still represents 20 percent of the world's annual output, whereas the whole of Asia, including China and Japan (though not Siberia) reaches barely 15 percent. It is also cultural and psychological: the family relationship between the two remains close and may become consciously closer if non-Western influences increasingly shape the world. Everything in the attitudes of the American leadership suggests that in its eyes Europe is indeed as "indispensable as Alaska" and perhaps a lot less forbidding. Moreover, though the relationship between America and Western Europe is very different from the semi-colonial situation in the East, it is hard to see any alternative for years to come to the U.S. nuclear guarantee over West Germany. British, French or European federal nuclear ambitions seem insufficient or remote; and the one subject on which the Soviet Union, fearing that the *Ostpolitik* conceals German ambitions for reunification, and West Germany, aware that the slightest chances for fulfillment of such hopes require Russian assent, are certain

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to agree on is the non-nuclear status of the Federal Republic.

The danger of real U.S. withdrawal from Europe is probably less likely than is often assumed in a Western Europe nervous of the cold, as the protected always are. The essential structure of the European security balance is likely to subsist. The rising importance of Asia and of domestic priorities should reinforce this tendency. Closer contacts, from SALT to joint production ventures and concern with the environment, could even gradually create constituencies of interest in both East and West concerned to temper rivalry with elements of genuine coöperation. In such circumstances, agreements on force reductions could codify the relationship in security terms and the process of civilian interchange gradually gain more weight and the military confrontation less and the cold war be not ended but left behind. The almost unique character of Europe as a zone of peace in the field of great-power confrontation could well be reinforced and, for the East, improved.

The difficulty with this relatively serene picture is that détente has such a different impact on Eastern and Western societies that it may actually stimulate the dangers of conflict. Given the long history of muffled explosions in Eastern Europe, East-West coöperation, far from diminishing tensions, could ultimately increase them there. Simultaneously, the powerful pressures toward domesticity in the West could lead societies to downgrade defense to the point where excessive risks are taken with security. It is plain that such pressures on governments in the West are far greater than in the Soviet Union, as they were indeed immediately after the war. The way in which the United States has proposed negotiations on force reductions to forestall unilateral decisions imposed upon it by Congress is symptomatic of a situation which also exists in Europe. There will be about 40,000 conscientious objectors in West Germany this year. It is true that the West German laws are very liberal, a reflection of the fact that the authorities have more manpower than they know how to use; but the government has not decreed the fashion sweeping the universities. In Britain, the all-volunteer armed forces shrink year by year (though recruitment tends to rise in a crisis and Ulster has been no exception).

There is good deal of anxiety that if the United States adopts volunteer forces, whatever is said to the contrary, the sheer contraction of manpower will gradually compel cumulative cuts in

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American troops in Europe. These tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic raise special doubts because NATO is already weaker in combat forces and, above all, reinforcements, than the Warsaw Pact, and further reductions would compel excessive reliance on nuclear forms of deterrence which themselves inspire trepidation.[1] In psychological terms, and therefore political ones, the balance of security in Europe could become weighted against the West.

The Soviet Union has more freedom of manœuvre. Though its many disarmament proposals may be sincere in that Russia would like to economize and perhaps also exorcize as much as it can potential perils in East Asia, it does not seem to be under anything like the internal pressures that beset the West. The priority on consumption figured much more prominently in the platform rhetoric of the 24th Congress of the CPSU than it does in the Five Year Plan. Moreover, troop reductions can hardly be applied to forces within Russia, since these are required by the bad relations within the communist world. And so long as these forces remain, any reductions in Europe only tend to emphasize the Soviet advantage in reinforcements. In such circumstances, Russian disarmament plans, though worth taking up for the chances they offer of maintaining cheaper security, seem at least partly designed to reinforce political processes which work in favor of Soviet power.

From this point of view, the general style of Soviet military-political behavior in recent years is not particularly promising. For the Politburo, the use of military means to political ends has been highly successful in Czechoslovakia. The blatant pressures brought to bear this year on Rumania and Jugoslavia by publicizing manœuvres in Hungary and Bulgaria suggest further reliance on such means. This saber rattling does not mean danger for the West as such, but it does raise the question whether the Soviet Union is really seeking only to stabilize the European status quo in the East or behaving according to the nature of an authoritarian régime which exercises hegemony wherever it prudently can. In that case, the nature of the restraints NATO continues to place on Soviet ambitions remains important.

The main problem is that a West aware of Soviet potential, but unable to do much about such anxieties because of divergent

[1] The Soviet Union alone has about as many combat forces in Central Europe as NATO, and it has 39 divisions in western Russia able to reinforce them in less than 30 days. There is no comparable Western equivalent in Europe or America.

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national policies and divisions of opinion about détente, might begin to doubt its capacity to face unforeseen crises. European and American force reductions, economic rivalries and "inward-looking" attitudes in both societies could reduce each country's trust in its allies and particularly that of Europe in an America faced with a potential nuclear crisis. In such circumstances, American opinion might grow increasingly irritated with the European states while an element of appeasement could enter into the policies toward the Soviet Union. "Détente" would then connote mainly a shift in the balance of power in Europe in favor of Russia. The Soviet Union might increasingly interfere in Western policy-making, particularly on security issues, in the name of enlightened East-West relations and be sure to find a party in the West responsive to its arguments. In the long run, it could come to regard itself as the righteous policeman of a European security defined according to its standards and convenience, exercising hegemonial pressure on the policies of West European powers whose very existence, culture, wealth and example make them, willy-nilly, the specter which haunts the domestic politics of Eastern Europe.

Such a Soviet hegemony in Europe would not pose security issues in the extreme form of "freedom or slavery," but it would place West European governments in constant and sometimes acute discomfort. For instance, if the communists were to enter into a governing coalition in Italy at a time of West European self-confidence, this would be seen as a step in their absorption into the Western system. If confidence were lacking, it could seem laden with the promise of various kinds of subordination to a politically backward superpower. All this remains wildly alarmist, of course, while one assumes the political effectiveness of the American umbrella over Western Europe. If doubts about it spread, the judgment might change. Much depends on the effects of the new doubts which have cropped up between Americans and Europeans.

III

As is the way with dependents, the Europeans have always had doubts about their protectors. The fear that Asia might distract America from Europe is as old as the cold war. Doubts about strategic nuclear parity are not new either. They go back to Sputnik, when it became evident America too was becoming

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vulnerable at home. These doubts have in the end proved easy to live with. The new one looks more serious. It is rooted not in nuclear parity but in a general impression of potential imparity in political will between the two superpowers, the one all too modern and the other too old-fashioned. Such fears may be excessively tied to short-term modes, like the aftermath of Vietnam, but they are also related to a subtle shift in the European environment which does not look like a passing phase and is no less important for being partly unavoidable.

By 1960, the major European empires were virtually dismantled, but the world system which accompanied them was prolonged and the change disguised by American strategic and economic power, ringing and encroaching on Eurasia. America's retreat from these advance positions is beginning to expose Europe to some of the consequences of its own earlier withdrawal. Strategically, the Soviet fleets are increasingly impinging on Europe's environment in the Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas as well as, more distantly, the oil routes of the Indian Ocean. On land, Jugoslavia is more concerned about security than at any time since 1948. Economically, the United States is no longer able to guarantee European oil supplies, as in 1956, or the monetary and trading context for growth. And Europe is now beginning to feel a little naked in the winds of the larger world.

IV

That the United States reacts as a society rather than as a state to world events, while Russia reacts as a state rather than as a society, poses problems of American purpose. That the United States no longer shapes the environment and perpetuates the European world poses problems of European purpose. This is the basis of a third alternative to superpower control or Soviet hegemony in Europe, the possibility of a West European entity becoming an increasingly significant element in the security balance. The West European Ten together will have total forces numbering over two million men and 300 combat vessels, respectable resources even by superpower standards. They do not mean much without a common political purpose, which is lacking, but even the potentials of power have an effect on that.

A more coördinated West European defense system could not replace the American nuclear guarantee, but it could reinforce

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it and make it more credible, which would be especially welcome if the totals of West European forces and of American forces in Europe both go down. It could also help in the long run to add a more effective complement to the American navy in the maritime periphery of Europe. This would not replace superpower control over Europe but it would change its inner content and possibly long-term prospects. The European option will be open to West European leaders seeking to face the new and less serene environment or simply perhaps, in the cases of Britain and France, to prolong national ambitions through a collective effort. Without that they will be politically too weak to make their own choices.

The differences between various hypotheses about European security in the coming years presented here (and others one might put forward) are less military than political. Unless forces are maintained at levels very near the current ones, which seems unlikely, military risks have to be taken by the present standards of deterrence. But these risks may be politically acceptable in certain cases, as are the long-standing insufficiencies of NATO today, whereas in others they might seem unbearable. Thus, an agreement on force reductions with substantial cuts on both sides, accompanied by a general climate of coöperation, might maintain the credibility of the NATO structure even if present strategic concepts had to be modified, whereas smaller unilateral Western cuts would sap confidence. Similarly, a West European defense organization would be less likely to increase the number of troops than promise a better use of a smaller number and, even more important, a more cohesive reaction of the Ten to unforeseen eventualities. More depends on political than military factors, not least, timing.

There will probably be a first symbolic cut in forces in 1972; the enlargement of the European Community should take place in 1973. If there are signs of satisfactory agreements on force reductions within a reasonable time-scale, security policies may well stick to multilateral approaches both within NATO and in the East-West context. That will raise a minimum of diplomatic problems for the Germans concerned with the *Ostpolitik* and the French and Italians with their communist parties. It will not force gaullism in France to face a change in national priorities or the Scandinavians to touch the domestically thorny issues of defense. The European Community as it enlarges would

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seek its new frontier more in common trade and finance policies than in security. Yet East-West negotiations on force reductions are likely to be incredibly complex, and unless things go very well, to raise more anxieties than they allay because of the imparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In that case, the urge to launch the European Community on a more political course might well move into the area of defense.

There are several reasons for this. One is the anxiety about security in the governments of the larger West European countries, which is greater than one might imagine from the atmospherics of the "era of negotiation," and to some extent is a result of them. Prime Minister Edward Heath always mentions security before prosperity as an argument for British entry into the European Community. The West Germans are conscious of a need to anchor the Americans more firmly in Europe and to find a long-term alternative should the effort fail. A collective European effort might help both. To a lesser extent, a European operation would also be attractive as the only way to bring the heirs of de Gaulle back into the Western defense fold without a formal tie to NATO.

A second reason is that if Western disarmament reaches a point where doubt is cast on present doctrines of deterrence, it might well drive a wedge into the triangle between Germany, France and Britain which is the core of West European relationships. The French and the British would be tempted to stress their nuclear deterrents, and, whether they did so nationally or coöperatively, this would underline what divides them from Germany even if German attitudes to their deterrents are changing as doubts about the United States increase. This could be particularly important if other developments point the same way. Force reductions would tend to apply to Germany, the *terre d'élection* of NATO. Similarly, attempts to meet manpower shortages by raising militia would affect Germany in the front more than France in the rear and still more than Britain behind the Channel. Should these fault-lines in NATO-Europe become too marked they could disintegrate it, Britain and France emphasizing nuclear deterrence, Germany the *Ostpolitik*. A European grouping would counter this tendency. Finally, there are existing pressures toward closer organization, notably in joint arms production. Together, these factors could push the major powers in the Community to propose that Europe move into defense.

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The most extreme version of the skepticism about a European defense organization one might expect would be that of the French government. That at least is the assumption, and will not be dispelled, since it is in the nature of President Pompidou's style of government that his policies should be expressed in action rather than declared principles. The moment for action cannot come before British entry into the European Community. However, for a gaullist, M. Pompidou has given hints which suggest his mind may be more open than is supposed. He has stressed the importance of U.S. troops staying in Europe, and his anxiety about withdrawals is well known. In his press conference of January 21, 1971, he proposed that a European confederation should cover the major fields of government including political ones. He stressed that the major decisions should be taken by governments, but did not exclude a role for the Commission in implementing them. All this leaves some room for manœuvre and a possibility that M. Pompidou is willing to consider proposals that serve a concrete purpose.

V

Indeed, it should be quite possible to establish effective defense coöperation inside the enlarged European Community on terms the governments will accept. There could be two mutually reinforcing levels of operation: consultation between the governments on broad policies, and contracts to establish joint programs in a few functional areas, like arms production, implemented in ways roughly similar to the Common Market's.

An obvious theme for European consultation would be policy on East-West force reductions and arms control. The same would apply to strategic and tactical concepts—the use of forces, the control of nuclear escalation, and so on—problems which the major NATO allies must discuss in any case when France deploys its tactical nuclear artillery, *Pluton,* in 1973 or 1974 in the only place where it makes sense, in Germany. This should be carried on in a European Nuclear Planning Group (ENPG) parallel to the very successful one which already exists in NATO. Other committees could be set up to discuss manpower and other policies. In themselves, such consultations need not change the attitudes of the countries involved, but, placed in the context of a European grouping with a recognizably separate identity, and associated with functional coöperation at a second

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level, they almost certainly would have a larger political impact.

The governments would also negotiate contracts, or treaties, establishing common functional bodies mainly in the area of what one might call Defense Support—training, logistics and the procurement of arms. The governments could set the targets and timing and entrust the implementation to a kind of Common Market system with a Defense Commission proposing policies and the national ministers disposing of them. The lack of a single logistic system is a NATO weakness which could lead to serious confusion in a crisis. In an age of travel, training in a neighboring country and learning a language as well as a trade could be a critical advantage over national systems in the recruitment of otherwise reluctant soldiers. As for procurement, the aerospace industry, which accounts for almost 40 percent of arms spending, looks like being reduced to perhaps three major European consortia in a couple of years' time. If so, the pressure for common production in other arms industries, particularly in electronics, will be increased and the main remaining problem will be to overcome the particularisms of the defense staffs and ministries. One need hardly underline in an American journal that this is never easy even within a single country, but a joint Procurement Agency, proposing criteria for weapons not tarred by a national brush, could help. A related Management Committee to stabilize government-industrial relations would also be useful.

Together, such innovations would establish what would be in effect a European Defense Support Organization. What would still be lacking, apart from the inevitable nuclear absentee, would be a Joint European Command. Its attractions would increase if the troops in Europe declined significantly, because the best counter to small numbers is mobility, *i.e.* the ability to order troops from any member country to where they are most needed in an agreed area. That might be too much for the governments, particularly the French, to take, though it would in fact allow France to make her point that she will not accept an American Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. For the Europeans to have their own NPG would also imply a grouping outside the NATO equivalent. But in both cases no decisions could be taken without the Americans, so that the changes would in part be more formal than real.

Implicit in them, however, would be the idea of a bilateral relationship between Europe and America. Since the U.S. ad-

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ministration has been favorable to the emergence of a European "caucus" in NATO, this could be turned to good account in renewing the NATO contract between the United States and its allies. A new agreement could be reached under the roof of the Atlantic Alliance in which new pledges for the commitment of American troops in Europe would be given in return for signs of European self-help through integration, and consolidated by a "sense of the Senate" vote. This could invaluably stabilize the European-American relationship for a number of years ahead.

One would expect the Soviet Union to condemn a European Defense Organization, or Community, for much the same reasons as the United States favors it. But there is no force to the idea a Community need hold up East-West coöperation, because this ignores both the time factor and the military and political context. The establishment of a Defense Support Organization, however disliked, could hardly be invoked with success as a provocation; and even a stronger arrangement, a more thoroughgoing Community, would take place against a background of falling forces and possibly agreements on them. The active emphasis of East-West exchanges would in any case be on negotiations and increasing economic contacts. In such circumstances, a West European defense organization would stand for what it was—a minimum security insurance against a breakdown in détente, which the West Europeans of all peoples have an interest in avoiding.

VI

Confidence is, in fact, the key. The problem for Western Europe, in fact for the West *tout court,* with its affluent societies so responsive to hopes of external peace parallel to their own domestic ideals, is how to manage a period of détente which remains full of uncertainty. The problem is a difficult one because it involves opposite movements in the evolution of estimates of "intent" on the one hand and military capability on the other. While political expectations of a Russian invasion are declining to near zero, it makes no political sense to stress the military aspects of security. But to take prospects of peace and coöperation for granted could gradually undermine the security on which an equitable peace and balanced coöperation are based. What is needed is a capacity to meet unexpected circumstances

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with means relevant to them, and when circumstances mean the Soviet Union, the means can only be American or collective European or both. Such reserves of power are necessary to control détente, maintain confidence and restrain distortions of the political process.

The issue in Europe is an historic one. The nuclear stalemate is making it possible to move away from naked force toward politics and so to civilize conflict in one of the centers of gravity of the balance of power. If this can be done by freeing political forces rather than in the usual way of setting up an empire over them, it will mark a real moment of progress in international twentieth-century society. But, for all that, détente must be carefully controlled and the forces of political backwardness contained as they have already been during the cold war. In some ways the situation is more dangerous because détente can make the process reach into Eastern Europe itself. It is therefore more than ever vital, in a period when attention is directed elsewhere, to maintain a system of security insurance in Europe. This may be possible without new means such as a European Defense Community to bolster up the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. But if optimism were to prove wrong, it might be too late to correct the political if not military degradation which would have set in. On balance, it seems wiser to control détente by building up in Western Europe a Defense Community to shore up in new circumstances the peace which has made détente possible.

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THE SECOND LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

By Eduardo Frei Montalva

LATIN America embraces a number of different realities within a common course. At least four of them can be easily identified, even though their lines of demarcation are not clearly defined. Thus, the four major units appear to be (1) Brazil, a world in itself; (2) Mexico and Central America, which to a man from the deep South seem, at times, more remote than Europe; (3) the Andean world; and (4) Argentina. Moreover, within this broad division there are subtle questions, such as whether Venezuela does not in fact have closer ties to the Caribbean than to the Andean world. Chile's Pacific location must be measured against its visceral union with Argentina at the southern tip of the continent. The remnants of ancient civilizations and the existence of large Indian populations profoundly alter the personalities of Peru, Bolivia and Mexico. Yet, despite these differences, Latin America shares common phenomena that go beyond its origins, geography and self-expression, and reach its innermost structure.

As part of the New World, it is "notoriously young." Older civilizations have solid values to uphold and a well-entrenched status quo that makes them shun adventure and change; age has made them cautious, and they protect accumulated treasures. By contrast, young nations are visionary, unstable and passionate, and—free from ties with the past and without solid roots—they seek to find in actuality what they have read in books and thus are not always rational in their reactions.

To this innate instability must be added the fact that this is a continent of paradoxes. Modern cities a stone's throw away from feudal estates, advanced universities in a sea of illiteracy, lack of opportunity for large segments of the young, extremes of wealth and poverty, refined habits coexisting with primitive forms of life, automation in the midst of unemployment or underemployment, democratic forms of government side-by-side with others lacking true organization, social mobility and representation.

Common as the above features are to less developed nations, it would be a serious mistake to classify Latin America sum-

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marily among the underdeveloped nations without paying attention to specific features which simply cannot be ignored. After all, there are several nations that are taxi-ing, ready for takeoff, with national incomes of such viable proportions that, if well distributed, they could give rise to consumer societies.

Possibilities for rapid economic growth are real, since all the requisite conditions are present, including defense-mechanisms against latent ills. Thus, the high population growth rate is counteracted by the area's virtually unlimited land resources while its sustenance is guaranteed by its enormous natural resources, many as yet undiscovered or undeveloped. In other words, in the absurdity of this situation, Latin America can no longer avoid confronting its paradoxes.

II

The historical youth of the area is complemented by its biological youth, since almost two-thirds of the population is under 25 years of age. This youthful mass is in a deeply critical mood, like their peers in the rest of the world and certainly in the United States which at this moment in time is experiencing the most radical and novel forms of dissent and protest.

By sheer weight of its existence and numbers, this youth demands to be heard and, for the first time, feels that it is a direct participant in a movement with worldwide repercussions; this is, perhaps, the most characteristic phenomenon in the continent. Headquarters, both for ideas and for actual change, are no longer the labor unions or even the traditional left-wing parties, but the universities and student groups. They are the new vanguard and, for their struggle, the communist world has supplied a useful instrument in the form of Marxist theory—both technical and dialectic—of particular appeal to less developed societies. To them, the communist world appears like a model of discipline, where there is no dissension or criticism of the system.

By contrast, the non-communist world offers no such blueprint for development, since it is visibly engaged in dealing with the rebellion of its own youth, who are committed to the destruction of established institutions. But whereas in the rest of the world this onslaught is contained and somewhat abated by the underlying strength of the social structure, in Latin America, meeting no such strength, the movement takes on truly explosive proportions. This is particularly apparent in the sweeping changes that

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have taken place in traditional values and institutions which until now were considered to be impervious to change.

The first hit has been the family, which in Latin America has always had a different connotation than in the North, through a stronger paternal dominance, rural roots and the customs and mores set and preserved by a sense of clannishness. All this is changing rapidly as the city draws its population from the farm, while increased employment of women—the traditional custodians of the children in these societies—contributes to the weakening of the structure. Modern educational plans give the new generation knowledge that their semi-educated or plainly illiterate parents never had, and this too, has helped do away with the family's authority and control.

Migration to the cities has dislocated the very foundations of these until now rural societies, with the consequent human, social and economic effects. Uppermost among these is the uncontrollable proliferation of shantytowns, ringing every city in a belt of decay, while population grows at an explosive rate, accentuating the already critical problems of housing, education, health and employment.

The older, more experienced societies, having a higher degree of development, stronger cultural moorings and a deep-rooted sense of institutionality, are less receptive to propaganda; they are the benchmark for standards of living, and their affluence, visually and audibly proclaimed by the news media, stirs suppressed ambitions in underdeveloped peoples, making them only more keenly aware of their needs.

Marginally developed or newly emerging nations resist the impact better—the former through ingrained hopelessness, the latter through the euphoria of their new status. But the nations at the half-way mark are too sensitive to their own deficiencies and too aware of the possibilities for change to ignore the message. After all, they have been exposed to the new "consciousness," promoted not only by the traditional political proponents of social change but by all social groups under the conviction that present structures are no longer operative.

The deep changes made in the very bosom of the Roman Catholic Church must also be viewed as an element of considerable influence, since the Church has always been part of the very core of the Latin American identity. During the nineteenth century and as recently as the early 1950s, it was not only a con-

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servative power but also the pillar and underpinning of the established order in so far as intellectual values, social concepts, beliefs and customs were concerned. It was a solid, immovable bearing point not only to the faithful but also to unbelievers who, even while opposing it, were somewhat dependent on its staunchness and stability.

Today, the Church not only supports the tide of change, but actually gives birth to radical propositions in an apparent effort to erase an image perpetuated by the centuries; and this process has so shaken some segments of the clergy that it has taken on the nature of a personal test of their conscience and their calling. Thus, many of them have taken up political or social work, armed with not much more than a deep sense of justice and a moral inspiration, and sadly lacking in any sense of practicalities or awareness of the formal techniques required of these societies in the war against poverty. Many of them could aptly fit into Lenin's condemnation of leftism as "a childhood disease of communism." Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the fundamental revisions operating within the Church will be of positive benefit to Latin America in as much as, instead of being a retaining wall for change, it has now become a moving force. In the short term, though, the masses of people who depended for support on this pillar of strength have been somewhat cast adrift.

III

The fact of the matter is that the present juncture is a second revolution, a long-delayed sequel to the first and great one—the Wars of Independence of 1810–1830—an attempt to shed the frustrations that accompanied its gains. After all, Latin America gained only political independence and national sovereignty, and was thwarted in its desire to create a way of life for its peoples that they could truly call their own.

By contrast, the American Revolution did not only succeed in severing its umbilical cord with Britain, but gave birth to a nation fully conscious of a new way of life. Unity became strength, and the inner conquest of the continent by the westward trek enabled the fledgling nation to emerge in the twentieth century as a world power. But its neighbors to the South found no such unity—only dissension, rivalries and wars. No message to the world, no conquest of the hinterland, just a coastal civilization. Independence was merely a form of separation, which retained

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the same old agrarian and economic structures; even though government changed in form, the same social and political structures survived and, if anything, became more rigid on withdrawal of European rule.

On that basis, the almost permanent political crisis endured by Latin America had to reach a breaking point some day. Everything seems to indicate that the day has now arrived. Ten years ago, when the Alliance for Progress was conceived, it was stated that unless a peaceful revolution was implemented, a violent revolution would take place. If we are not actually witnessing one now, its imminence should be obvious even to the blind. And that is why there is no time for the injection of classical *solutions; they simply can no longer work.*

The large agrarian majorities, the crisis of industrial organizations, the emergence of an ever-broadening middle class, the new industrial proletariat and its unions, youth groups and the new technocracies—in sum, everything is changed. Even the military dictatorships which traditionally in certain countries were the protectors of the ruling classes, have now become either left-wing nationalists or stern taskmasters of development.

The worst that could happen in this second revolution would be that this deep and widespread unrest should result, as in the past, in only anarchy and uncertainty. In a way, Latin America is "like a character in search of an author." It would seem that the area was denied the gift of political creativity. A giant has awakened and his convulsions have unleashed a tidal wave that is overpowering the traditional ruling classes. Old structures cannot contain this flood, they were meant for other times, other techniques and other peoples. It is no longer a case of routine change or of the periodic local revolutions reported by news services, but of the second great revolution that will determine the future character of the continent. It would be difficult, if not pretentious, to make a prognosis, but still it is possible to identify some courses of action and confrontations that appear unavoidable.

For one, there will be a definitive transformation in the established form of agrarian ownership. To a greater or lesser degree, agrarian reform is being essayed in the majority of countries, but it is easy to see that these experiments, mostly on a limited scale, will not suffice. The method used will vary from country to country, but there is no doubt that the type of owner-labor re-

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lationship that has characterized agriculture will disappear very soon simply because it is technically wrong, economically unsound and a social and human impossibility.

Likewise, it seems evident that planned reforms of the educational system already underway will have to be broadened in scope, in order to provide not only increased but also a better quality of education. And the same applies to health services and housing.

These are common objectives that no government can evade, and accordingly they figure prominently in the platform of every political party. Thus they are no longer bones of contention and will play a minor role having little to do with the course of the new revolution.

III

The decisions in store involve deeper issues, the first and foremost of which should be admission of all the people into the mainstream of the nation. By and large, Latin American societies were organized on the basis of oligarchies, conservative during the first half of the twentieth century and liberal-rationalist in the second half. Those oligarchies, small in numbers, have become intellectually sterile through loss of contact with the common man; in fact they are an anachronism, without strength and, worse, without prestige in the minds of the new classes which represent not only the majorities but the new intelligentsia. Their platforms or programs cannot work, regardless of their soundness. What they claimed to do "for the people" must now necessarily be done "by the people."

Already, the increase in the numbers of voters prevents the existence of minorities capable of controlling the sources of power and of manipulating large blocs, particularly agrarian, in even democracies of limited expression; and the sudden emergence of such massive forces has caught many of these societies completely unaware. The emerging social masses, eager and immature, are emotionally ripe for plucking. But as there is no time for an orderly channeling of their numbers into the mainstreams, the floodgates are sometimes forcibly raised. Incorporating these formerly disenfranchised majorities into the political, economic, social and cultural stream is not easy since they are no longer a means to an end but duly licensed participants in the processes of change.

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Recognition of this is a prime condition for understanding Latin America today. Those of our countries that choose to retain a narrow base for the selection and utilization of human resources, with economic participation restricted to a small portion of the population, and subject to economic and even political conditioning by the great powers are doomed either to perennial underdevelopment or to seeing their takeoff hampered by structural flaws. Their collapse is not likely to be bemoaned.

We are witnessing the crisis of formal democracies and striving for construction of true democracies. Better still—if it is possible to bypass the distorted political connotation of the term —for the construction of popular democracies.

Transition from restricted democracy to one of participation by all social strata is unavoidable. This greater participation must also bring about efforts in countries to redistribute their gross national product in order to provide a larger share for labor. Coupled with this must go increased government spending in the fields of education as a basic instrument for providing equal opportunity, public health, housing and general community improvements.

However, the keynote must be organizing the people, from the bottom up, into channels that will ensure effective representation. This must embrace an enlargement and improvement of the unions, and the reorganization of neighborhood, municipal and regional bodies into a true national community.

In the economic field must come changes—just as inevitably as agrarian reform and modified owner-labor relations—in the classical forms of capitalist private industrial enterprise. And the day will soon come when enterprise itself will be reorganized, not on the basis of a capital-labor subordination but on the basis of a new form of enterprise where labor will have participation not only in the profits but in management.

Last but not least, another aspect of this Latin American phase is that by one means or another all our countries are committed to regaining control over basic natural resources. The degree of awareness and development reached by these nations has led them to feel that it is against their interests and their very identity to allow natural resources, which are essential to them either as raw materials for their industry or as prime export items in their economies, to remain in foreign hands. Thus, the nationalization of these resources will be unavoidable; and it

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either has just begun or is in full swing in many of these nations.

IV

Everyone is more than willing to participate in a redistribution of income and to welcome nationalization as a vindication of national pride. But little thought is given to the effort entailed in building a modern state and an open society capable of fulfilling its promises. There are obstacles to be surmounted, and the first one is the time element. The developed nations had a phase of accumulation of capital during the industrial age, when they literally "squeezed the blood" out of labor with impunity, milked colonies or obtained the lion's share from investments in underdeveloped countries. But Latin America has reached the modern age without the accumulated capital required for its development.

Also, within the same time limitations, it is hard to believe, in political terms, that these societies will be willing to postpone their aspirations for any given length of time in favor of the continuity, discipline, effort, systematic savings and accumulation of capital required for development. Deferment will not be rationally accepted.

One of the main features of democratic cycles is a "something for nothing" attitude, where everyone demands concessions but not at the expense of hard, sustained effort; and this is perhaps the gravest danger that faces Latin American societies in search of full equality after generations of constraint. Development requires detailed, organized planning and a high level of efficiency in the collective effort, hinging mainly on science and technology and the quick multiplication of teams of the highest professional caliber. Unfortunately, those teams do not seem to be forthcoming, as the universities, instead of being centers of higher learning and research, have become largely headquarters in the struggle for political power and foci of revolutionary activity, thus thwarting the formation of leaders who should by rights be the architects of the new society.

V

One of Latin America's most serious shortcomings is the tendency to transform programs into myths and processes of change into mere political manœuvres designed to please the public eye. Change does not necessarily mean progress: and

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Latin Americans have traditionally been myopic in discerning change, gravitating toward extreme forms where violence has been a prime ingredient.

"Violence," said Georges Bernanos, "is the last resort of a world that refuses to judge itself." In Latin America, it has been but one of the many symptoms pointing to the lack of a proper channel for the building of a new society. There is nothing new in the appeal of violence. Characteristic of the anarchist movements so well described by Barbara Tuchman in "The Proud Tower," it resurfaced again, between the two World Wars, wearing the uniforms of Fascism and Nazism. Today, it wears a different ideological badge but still its tools continue to be force, the underground, adventuresome youth, strict sectarianism and hatred.

Despite their evolution, Latin American peoples continue to yield to the temptation of turning ideas and men into myths, perhaps as a form of escapism or evasion of the portion of personal responsibility that demands individual effort in any process of change. Thus, they run the risk of repeating the dramatic political inadequacies that marked the nineteenth century and part of this one.

In the majority of these countries, the pendulum swung from tyranny to freedom and back to tyranny with monotonous regularity. Under tyranny, freedom became an idealized dream. The magic formula was to overthrow the government and to replace it in the name of democratic principles by the savior who, by mere accession, would end outrage and right all wrongs. In a rich mythology such as ours, the savior was always near at hand.

After the "revolution" and overthrow of "the strong man" a brief period of euphoria ensued but, needless to say, the miracle never materialized and soon all the old injustices and distortions reared their ugly heads. Political immaturity could not be overcome and pipe dreams could not be fulfilled under the torrent of grievances, demands and clamors for vengeance against the old régime. The poor miracle man, the answer to everyone's prayers, could not please everyone and ended up pleasing no one. Behind all the axes to be ground, there was not enough organized collective consciousness of the fact that solutions demand more action than words, and soon again disillusionment set in.

Once again, the myth was shattered by reality, and gradually the longed-for freedom became numbness if not a threat of an-

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archy; and so the same people who, not long before, clamored for freedom began to fashion new dreams of "law and order" and of the "strong man" who could restore authority. The pendulum swung again, and the countries never found their true center.

The latest instance in this ingrained pattern is supplied by Cuba, where a movement of heroic proportions was turned by sleight of hand into a personal dictatorship, thus perverting the revolution and in the process selling the people out to a foreign power. Since this treachery cannot be concealed from the world, it is to be hoped that Latin America will soon accept the fact that there are no magic formulas. Neither myths nor ideologies can substitute for rational planning and concerted effort.

Within this context of expectations and risks, Latin America is groping its way, wooed on all sides by the Marxist-Leninist world, by Christian humanitarianism and by new forms of authoritarian nationalism. The only certain conclusion seems to be that the new Latin America will have a totally different social and economic identity.

This identity will depend largely on the area's ability to find formulas consonant with its own historical, social, geographic and human realities. The line of least resistance would be the importation of time-tested foreign solutions. There are many who feel that the only way to channel economic and social development in these countries, establish discipline, and overcome tensions that cause inaction, is to use the tools of totalitarian societies based on Marxist-Leninist ideology and technology, whose blueprints and dialectic power have great appeal, both in terms of action and thought.

These patterns, however, go against the grain of Latin Americans' irrepressible love for freedom, their respect for the human being and their profound aversion to police states and thought-control. These values are in the very marrow of Latin Americans, regardless of ideology, and since the conviction is widespread that the patterns have not worked for the socioeconomic development of the countries where they have been applied, there is no justification for their totalitarian implantation here. Unquestionably then, Latin America must find self-expression in the creation of a formula that will reflect its own identity, and reject foreign transplants or run the risk of falling under "thought-colonialism" which, in the long run, can lead only to political dependence.

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Whether or not Latin America will measure up to the challenge of creating a new society will depend largely on the answers to the following questions:

Will it again be carried away by myths so that once again, words will displace the stern demands of reality?

Is it possible that the Latin America which today speaks of socialism with the same voice that once proclaimed freedom uses the term as a cover for a multitude of confused and contradictory illusions?

Will Latin America be capable of laying the foundations for a society based on solidarity, community organizations, general well-being and individual creativity? Or will it waste its efforts on a collectivism or statism that will absorb and subjugate man?

Will Latin America leap out of a primitive form of capitalism into a totalitarian statism totally incapable of leading it toward an effective form of human development?

These are the questions hovering above a deeply convulsed Latin America. And they are repeated in each national unit.

VI

Not one of the Latin American nations can by itself resolve these questions, since all of them, with the possible exception of Brazil, have limited possibilities of development. Not one of them is in a position to finance and support a valid program of science and technology, the sine qua non for development, to set up capital-goods industries at rational levels of cost and capacity utilization.

These facts, unanimously accepted in theory, have not been translated into a workable policy. In spite of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Andean Pact, we are as distant from integration as in the days of Bolívar and even more so in terms of minimal political coördination. The problem is further dramatized if viewed in the light of the new conditions in international life, the magnitude of the great powers and their relationships within the global balance of power. Latin America is in danger of being relegated to the sidelines of history with no weight on the scale of global decisions.

This state is not a consequence of outside actions but of an inner vacuum, brought about by lack of unity and duly implemented political decisions. In a harsh world, the weak go unheeded and the countries that lack direction and Balkanize them-

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selves have little to expect from outside, except what is in the interest of those who would manipulate them.

A promising sign that these facts are beginning to be understood is the constitution of the Special Commission for Latin-American Coördination, the strengthening of which could be an answer to the need for coördination in dealing not only with the United States but also with the European Community and other areas of the world.

Outside intervention that in any way curtails internal decisions cannot be accepted. Intervention might be considered at a given moment if justified as a check against outrageous disregard for basic human rights or against forms of genocide, but what is patently clear in the Latin American mind is that no form of intervention can be justified if its aim is to prevent or in any way curtail the principle of self-determination in choosing whatever political system is desired. Likewise, Latin America today is convinced of the advisability of having normal relations throughout the world regardless of differences in political systems or geographic distances.

Another determinant in the Latin-American mind is that in the relationships between developing nations and the superpowers, ideological differences are progressively less important than the interests at stake. In this respect the interests of Russia and the United States—particularly in the field of world trade —are thought to be just as apt to dovetail as to be diametrically opposed to the interests of developing nations.

Last but not least, outside obstacles to Latin American economic growth have not been removed but rather have tended to increase. For this reason, a new form of nationalism has emerged which is not only concerned with recapturing control over natural resources but with achieving independence in industrial, agricultural and commercial development.

VII

This is the Latin America that the United States must deal with today. It appears that with the demise of the Alliance for Progress the policy is, essentially, that there is no policy. Latin America is at a loss to define what it expects of the United States and its feelings are evidently contradictory as, knowing full well that it needs the friend, it pretends to reject him. If the United States has investments it is criticized, and if it does not,

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it is reproached. On the other hand, it would appear, from this end, that the United States has not really defined relations with the South in the new circumstances. The general impression is that the prevailing policy is to let things work themselves out, avoiding involvement as one would avoid a hornet's nest.

Obviously, to us, the United States is preoccupied with resolving areas of conflict in other parts of the world. Understandings with Europe, Russia and China are its prime concerns. This truth cannot be concealed behind formulas or organizations which can be considered empty shells, like store-fronts in a ghost town. They may outwardly represent necessary structures, but they are unable to nurture, much less create, a policy that will respond to the new identity of Latin America.

The United States has always looked upon us as its back yard. The Monroe Doctrine, the Big Stick, the Good Neighbor policies and the Alliance for Progress have succeeded each other as political expedients. In actual fact, however, the United States took for granted that Latin America was its sphere of influence, where it did business and laid down the law; and in international bodies that it could count on a bundle of votes to support its positions.

International circumstances have compelled Washington to change its views, as private capital has progressively been withdrawn from the field of investment in public utilities and transportation, and the process of nationalization has come to be accepted as inevitable. The era of applying pressure to protect investment is past, and today discussion is conducted on a juridical and contractual plane, with full regard for the new policies even in those obvious cases when governments provoke conflict as a means of internal political consolidation. Without a doubt, this attitude is a big step in the right direction.

For their part, the Latin Americans have abandoned any recourse to the rich uncle who was appealed to in case of need. They understand that the answer to development needs cannot be found in "aid," in investments or in royalty agreements. They are now turning their attention to the transmission of technology, to assistance with development programs, to negotiating new conditions in the field of international trade, etc. They are beginning to understand that their future depends much more on their own internal decisiveness than on external support.

For this reason, the Declaration of the Special Commission

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for Latin-American Coördination is encouraging in stating that the Latin American nations, "... having decided to overcome the condition of underdevelopment, reiterate their conviction that economic growth and social progress are the responsibility of their own peoples and that the attainment of their national and regional objectives depends basically on the efforts of each country, supported at the same time by an increasingly closer coöperation, coördination and determination of policies and outlooks on the part of the Latin-American nations."

Neither side can delude itself. If the United States thinks that it can concentrate its attention on other continents and dismiss Latin America as a mere security problem, it would be making a serious mistake. The United States cannot erase geography, history or the fact that we are all bound by common ties affecting our destiny. If, for its part, Latin America believes that it can build its economic development in an atmosphere of strategically nurtured antagonism to the United States, it will only succeed in imposing on its peoples extreme and unnecessary hardships and compromising its future in a senseless policy.

It is not merely a question of specific formulas, which can always be worked out when we know what we want, for what purpose and by what means. The major problem has often been that the parties did not know exactly what their aims were, and this was dramatically illustrated when Kennedy outlined the Alliance for Progress. The ally he was seeking did not respond; at best, the ally felt it was a new formula for indebtedness, and the dialogue died out.

To quote the French sociologist Alain Touraine: "There are moments, privileged epochs to the historian: those in which the human condition is transformed and traditional rules either change or decompose; when the actors are no longer players reasoning before a chessboard but revolutionary crowds or individuals who build temples or tumble Bastilles, who alter knowledge and actuate new machines; new eras in which history overflows circumstances and seems, at each instant, unpredictable and yet, lending itself more often than ever to understanding."

Nobody could deny that in our America, history is overflowing circumstances and seems, at each instant, unpredictable. Nevertheless, the first requirement for formulation of a policy is an effort at understanding. Just as a body cannot acquire life without a soul, no policy can live without a guiding spirit.

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THE VIEW FROM JAPAN

By Frank Gibney

AFTER more than a quarter-century of formally close contact, the real relationship of the American and the Japanese peoples is like that of two men observing each other through the flawed glass and distorting mirrors of a funhouse. Their perspectives are strikingly, sometimes absurdly different. Our dealings of the last 25 years—one war, a successful occupation, unnumbered seminars, government conferences, student exchanges and an $11 billion yearly trade relationship—seem not to have clarified the view.

This would be tolerable in the cases of many nations less closely involved with one another, or in times less troubled. But Japan is not only the principal U.S. trading partner and a pledged political ally; it is the one great world power—outside the West European complex—which shares with the United States common social aspirations, a strikingly similar urban-technological way of life and an intelligent devotion to the democratic principle. The failure, more plainly, of Americans to see Japan and its people as they really are is coming to affect us badly.

For Japanese-American relations are backing into a crisis, in large part because neither party can perceive the other's position. Trade confrontations have escalated into virtual economic warfare. And politically, on the heels of Okinawa revisionism and vexing questions about Japanese "rearmament," came the July announcement of President Nixon's invitation to Peking. The 180-degree turn in the American attitude toward China, made conspicuously without advice from Tokyo and without informing Tokyo in advance, has dramatized the distorted perspectives as nothing else could.

Where and how do they differ? The View from There, *i.e.* the United States as the average Japanese sees it, is at least a three-dimensional study. He sees a people whose achievements and energies spell competence. His regard for American technological skill and the essential modernity of things American verges on the superstitious. American politics, as copiously reported in the Japanese press, may seem an unpredictable blend of toughness and indecision, but even among the far Left there is a certain respect for American "fairness" and "democratic principles."

Socially, the American comes on as likeable, with an enviable

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informality. (Americans visiting Japan after residence in Europe are interested to find that their nationality is no longer a pejorative.) Culturally, the kinetic modernity of modern Japan—songs, movies, TV quiz-shows, billboards, *sake* vending machines, business management seminars, even the majority of new phrases in its language—expresses itself in American terms. Hemingway, Faulkner and Norman Mailer are nearly as real to Japanese university students as their own Kawabata, Mishima and Kenzaburo Oi.

Thanks to the postwar occupation and their own peculiar reaction to the one military defeat in their history, the Japanese rarely think of the United States as an enemy, past or present—except in the sense of an economic competitor. The ultimate in cities remains New York or, more comfortably, Los Angeles with its Japanese hotels, banks and shopping sections. The ideal vacation is to go to Hawaii. The ideal baseball team to beat is still the U.S. World Series champions.

Thus the image of America, as Viewed from There, is larger than life-size, and that presents a problem. Accustomed to thinking of the United States, variously, as an elder brother, a cornucopia, or an abode of inexhaustible resources, the Japanese find it hard to realize that a certain portion of their own prosperity is coming out of America's hide—and that this is increasingly resented across the Pacific.

There is one more conspicuous blind spot. With a deep inner pride in their own worth, the Japanese tend to assume that their intense scrutiny of American fads, social ferment, economic indicators, and legislative processes is naturally to some extent reciprocated. Of course it is not. The View from Here is cursory and casual. Its limits are accurately suggested by the relatively minuscule coverage of Japan in the daily and weekly U.S. press. To be sure, there is Economic Japan: a clouded but impressive picture of pell-mell, purposeful industry—Sony-Toyopet-Honda-tanker-Mitsubishi. But the "economic miracle" is generally presented as inexplicable, or the effect of "low wages" and "human wave" salesmanship. It still excites a kind of involuntary anger in American visitors to note that phenomena like the great super-trains of the New Tokaido line were designed and produced with no borrowing from Western sources.

Japan's politics and political figures are almost unknown. The same holds true for political parties, inner economic trends

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—aside from notes on new car exports—or social statistics. Where the Japanese newspaper reader and TV viewer receives a continuing report on the United States, the comparable American reporting on Japan is spasmodic and hence over-dramatized when it appears, *e.g.* a picture of an isolated student riot in Tokyo, selected by an editor principally for its violence, will probably be all that the average, well-informed American knows about the Japanese university.

About one of the world's liveliest and most sophisticated literatures the American knows nothing, except when one of its major exponents either receives the Nobel prize or commits suicide. He is unaware of the urban ferment in discoveries, ideas and new designs for living going on in Japan—the only country whose mass communication and city civilization are facing precisely the same problems of transport, pollution and so on as his own—barring, of course, the racial one. The quaint Japanese are cracking the technological sound barrier right behind us.

Yet behind the textiles and transistors, the American, so relatively sophisticated about the changing situations of Britons, Italians or Russians, sees in the Japanese the same 25-year old image which American soldiers originally brought back from the occupation days: smiling, polite little people (if on occasion deceitful) who are hard-working but inscrutable, living in a lovely country with a big snow-capped mountain, fragile temples, inept taxi drivers and, of course, geisha. It was a significant commentary on the View of Japan from Here that *Time* magazine, in an otherwise thoughtful cover story on Japanese business last May, saw fit to illumine its last page with an utterly implausible photograph titled "Businessman Relaxing with Geisha," showing two nude figures in a hot spring bath.

Indeed, the American historical image of Japan is worse. For the myth of the Japanese as a bayonet-wielding soldier, perpetrating the rape of Nanking, somehow was ground into our consciousness through all the "save China" rallies of the thirties and the stored racial prejudice of an earlier era. Japan still bears the marks of an enemy country. Long after the Germans of World War II have resumed their popular status as beer-drinking efficiency experts and shortly after the Chinese hordes who slaughtered Americans on the Yalu in 1951 were transformed into cheerful ping-pong players, the memory of Pearl Harbor somehow remains green.

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Japanese travelers in the United States do not help the image much. Business contacts excepted, their social shyness, linguistic failings and over-sensitivity to mistakes in front of foreigners drive them into self-chosen cultural ghettos. Whether in New York, Düsseldorf or Paris, all but the most sophisticated Japanese businessmen head like homing pigeons for their cotes in the local Nippon Club. This voluntary seclusion adds to the idea of a people hopelessly "inscrutable."

II

If not inscrutable, the Japanese are undeniably unique. Japan is best described as a nation society—a tightly threaded 2,000-year old mesh of human fabric, with an extraordinarily broadly based culture, a low common denominator of artistic tastes and living standards and a talent for narrowing the national energies to certain shared tasks or objectives. It is a meritocracy, where almost every bright boy (and most bright girls) can get to college if he passes the exam. It is a consensus-style democracy, where it is considered bad form for the majority to outvote the minority without compromise. In fact, the Japanese have long achieved of their own free will the kind of society that Marxist ideologues only dream about.

Japan continues to have a recognized Political-Economic-Social Establishment, at a time when from New York to Moscow almost every other Establishment is on the run. The Japanese cult of industry, their strong sense of community, their patience and adaptability to crowded conditions have given them a marvelous cushion against modern technological and cultural shock. The problems that Western man is now desperately trying to solve—how to preserve one's individuality in a society taken over by "group-think," how to develop a social ethic, if not a new morality, strong enough to hold its ground against the pressures of mechanistic progress—the Japanese have been working out for centuries. Like an early commuter who has waited all night for the morning bus, the Japanese is there already.

The Japanese can wax indignant over rising prices, bad housing or faulty sewage systems—and their new consumer movement is formidable—but their resiliency remains prodigious. A U.N. survey recently showed how in all West European countries the incidence of crimes of violence always increased as

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living standards rose; but in Japan it decreased. In adding his own appreciation of Japan's high social boiling point, a columnist for Tokyo's *Asahi* wrote: "Given what we have here—the world's highest rise in commodity prices, horrible pollution and environment problems, severe housing difficulties—the people of any Western European country would probably have thrown out their government many times over. . . ."

It is partly this kind of inspired groupiness that made the success of "Japan, Inc." so spectacular. But there is another reason: the protective insulation of Japan over two decades. During this time the country could gather its energies for a leap forward quite as it had in the last years of the Tokugawa period, before the samurai of old Edo had become the technicians of the Meiji Restoration. It might be said that the Japanese, considered as members of the world community, passed with rocket speed from the militarist thirties to the scientific sixties, without ever having really lived through the international turmoil of the forties and fifties. In the light of the changes now being wrought by the post-industrial society and the overturn of methods and thought-patterns that the forties and fifties considered modern, this asset seems considerable.

This is hardly to say that the Japanese missed the quarter-century of history which included war and the A-bomb. But during this time they were isolated from the sense of living in an international community, thanks first to the censorship of the militarist government and, later, the avuncular embrace of MacArthur's occupation.

When Japan's energies were released, she immediately fell into the pursuit of economic gain. With undemanding political leadership and an ultimate guarantee of safety under the American nuclear umbrella, the Japanese felt free to concentrate on being "economic animals," and showed a conspicuous disregard for the sensibilities of both their customers and rival tradesmen in the process.

In so doing they also almost deliberately ignored the political conflicts of the ideologically divided world around them (other than to make considerable economic profit from the war in Korea). Intellectuals, comfortably protected from the invasions and implosions of world communism, continued to denounce the fascism and militarism of the thirties as the prime enemies. The people as a whole, having fallen into a chronically Japanese

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situation of mass dependency during the U.S. occupation, tended to feel that international politics, pro-American or no, were simply not Japan's concern. This political myopia plagues Japan to this day.

Over the last few years, however, the mood has changed. "Economic animal" is becoming a dirty word. A new generation is emerging—more traveled, more outspoken and, indeed, physically bigger than its elders, thanks largely to the spectacular changes in the Japanese diet. There is little of the obviously revolutionary about this generation in Japan. Although young people are quick to denounce inept bureaucrats, greedy businessmen or excessive ceremony, they are possibly less discontented with the structure of their society than young people anywhere. The new generation is genuinely internationalist-minded, with an almost desperate urge to be thought cosmopolitan. It is also vigorously proud of being Japanese, at least tolerant of the Emperor system and anxious that Japan play its rightful role as a great power.

The problem is how. Japan's current political leadership is hardly inspiring. The Sato government has steadily played cautious international politics, content to follow the U.S. lead in most matters, and conservative to a fault. The Socialists, the major opposition party, are not only committed to a kind of high-buttoned shoe Marxism which flies in the face of Japan's economic reality, but their Mao-first, anti-imperialist foreign policy embarrasses the other opposition parties, including the Communist. No party, statesman or party faction has yet appeared who can either rally both Right and Left behind a new foreign policy or dramatize such a policy to the people over the heads of the party leaders.

The Japanese make decisions by consensus. Until a national consensus has been taken, no really active diplomacy is possible. There are signs that a consensus is in the making, impelled by everyone's rising consciousness of great-power status. Major realignments of the two principal parties, at least, are taking place. But until the country makes up its mind, there will be no movement. Many compare this period with the middle and late thirties, when a similar debate was taking place over whether Japan should continue its militarist course, hold its gains, or retreat.

The current drift of thinking, however, is miles away from

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militarism. The country, most particularly the younger generation, is still determined that a modern great power need *not* be a military power. Having had their one losing war, the Japanese do not want even the risk of another. Nor has the American failure in Vietnam been reassuring about the virtues of conventional military power. As the almost desperate recruiting posters of the Self-Defense Forces suggest, it takes a lot to get young Japanese marching. They may be fascinated with the currently popular revival of old war songs and memoirs, but this is no more to be confused with a new militarism than Yukio Mishima's startling *hara-kiri* suicide. It is no coincidence that the country's number one popular hit song is called *Senso wo shiranai kodomotachi*—"Children Who Have Never Known War."

The feeling also grows that Japan has too slavishly followed American policy, that Japan alone of the major powers is still practicing bipolar diplomacy in a changed world. This mood has been fueled by the fuss over Okinawa, by the heavy protectionist and rearmament pressure from the United States and, not least of all, by the unilateral China policy of the United States. Not since the sudden flare-up of the 1960 riots against the Japanese-American security treaty has the American-Japanese political relationship been so problematical.

The so-called dialogue which has existed between Japan and America is much overrated. It is, in fact, little more than a series of meetings, seminars and symposia, held by generally the same group of participants—a coterie of U.S. experts on Japan and Japanese experts on America who are well accustomed to hearing each other's views.

Nor have the two governments helped much to clear the view. They have been curiously passive, if for different reasons.

The Japanese Foreign Office is a group of competent professionals who have the misfortune of working without any firm foreign policy to interpret. After the late Premier Shigeru Yoshida laid the foundations for the Japanese-American alliance (while opting out of anything like a military commitment to it), his successor, Hayato Ikeda, went on to further the Japanese economic miracle with a low-posture diplomacy to match his government's self-effacing politics at home. Premier Eisaku Sato has continued this modest stance, partly out of reluctance to exacerbate his domestic problems. Only on economic matters does Japanese diplomacy go into high gear, quick to mobilize in

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support of the errant businessman. In contrast to modern China, where economic considerations are unfailingly sacrificed to political, Japan's diplomats are instructed to put the economic first.

As a corollary of this, the information effort of the Japanese government is minimal. Even Japan's representation on the U.N. Secretariat is less than half the desired maximum, despite the obvious competence of Japanese civil servants. The Japanese government has yet to develop even a large-scale program for educating students from other Asian countries in Tokyo or, to begin with, teaching them Japanese.

In Southeast Asia, where Japan has a huge economic stake, Japanese businessmen are about as popular as Yankees in Chile. It is a galling fact that the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank, an institution largely dependent on Japan for its success, had to be located in Manila rather than Tokyo because of general anti-Japanese prejudice. (Japanese aid programs tend to be cautious and, in relation to the country's GNP, minimal—another source of resentment.)

Yet with all these handicaps, and despite the emerging national consensus that international communications must be improved, Japan has yet to make a national effort to meet the outside world. The nation will put its best face forward for a 1964 or a 1972 Olympics in Tokyo or Hokkaido, or a 1970 World's Fair in Osaka; everything will be done at such times to assure the happiness of the visitor from Oswego or Indianapolis. But as for presenting the Japanese case in Oswego or Indianapolis, that is a different matter. There is still too much stored ethnic and cultural arrogance within the Japanese and too much visible doubt as to what role he should or could assume in a world outside which is, after all, peopled with foreigners.

III

By comparison, the American government, like American business and academic interests, has every advantage in presenting the American case to Japan. The basic national sympathy toward Americans is so strong that Japanese criticism of the whole Vietnam involvement, through the last seven years, has been, in a relative sense, mild. And Japanese diplomacy gives the impression of an interested bridge partner, waiting to follow the first good bid from the American side.

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Good bids have been hard to find. Although the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo is one of the world's largest, it has since the departure of Edwin Reischauer in 1967 largely confined itself to a low posture, of which the most self-effacing Japanese diplomat could be proud. All the visibility comes direct from Washington. The number of U.S. diplomats who speak adequate Japanese is shockingly limited as are the linguists in the U.S. business community. And both groups, not to mention the great bulk of the U.S. press corps, remain largely sealed off from the life around them, for social as well as linguistic reasons.

For all their trust in technology, the Japanese remain an intensely ceremonial people, with an abnormal appreciation for a good or graceful gesture and an abnormal sensitivity to a bad one. Manner is almost as matter to them. They abhor open controversy, except in recognized public bear-baiting sessions like the Diet where it is part of the established order. They dislike litigation, and lawyers occupy an interestingly humble position in their councils. The American businessman who makes decisions and deals after long confrontations between rival teams of lawyers and accountants finds that such forensics often boomerang disastrously.

Despite this obvious Japanese fact of life (which, indeed, General MacArthur exploited to the full in a gesture-packed occupation), the executors of American foreign policy have ignored the advantages of the right gesture or the apt courtesy. On the contrary, in recent years they have concentrated on making the relationship with Japan an exercise in open confrontations and public pressures. Even more than most, the Japanese find it hard to understand our penchant for installing the adversary system of justice in diplomacy.

The three crises which have lately arisen between the United States and Japan are symptomatic of this problem: (1) the trade imbalance, with the loud revival of American protectionism; (2) Japanese rearmament and U.S. nuclear defense, originally touched off by the Okinawa reversion movement; (3) the projected new American relationship with China, with the implied downgrading of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. None of them need have reached a crisis point. But in handling all three, the Japanese and the American sense for what is appropriate grew ever further apart—so that the View from Here and the View from There might be from different planets—on the American side,

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unnecessarily public confrontation politics, on the Japanese side, smouldering, but stubborn resistance and resentment.

The textile controversy first dramatized the sharpness of economic competition between Japan and America, which grows worse almost hourly. Even allowing for President Nixon's new ten percent import surtax, the imbalance of trade between the United States and Japan will this year come close to $2 billion, in Japan's favor. Not since 1965 have accounts been reasonably equal. Japan makes most of its export money to the United States by straight sales, while a good bit of the American export to Japan takes the shape of direct or indirect investment, royalties, patent rights, and so on. Foreign investment in their country is a traditional sore spot with the Japanese, who had the Meiji Restoration, among other things, to forestall it. Japan not only subsidizes its exporters, but fences in foreign investments and imports with an anachronistic web of legal and bureaucratic restrictions unworthy of a great power. While Japanese TV sets, motorcycles, small cars and steel were crashing into the U.S. market, U.S. exporters and investors continued to be cut off from fair competition in Japan. The Americans have just cause for complaint, which the Japanese belatedly recognize.

The Nixon administration set out to solve this problem, however, in the worst possible way. Early in 1969, even before an ambassador had been appointed, the new President sent Secretary of Commerce Stans to Tokyo to give the Japanese government a widely publicized lecture on what would happen if they did not moderate excessive competition with American textile manufacturers.

It is well known in Japan that textiles are far from the most important export to the United States (electronics and automobiles make up 30 percent, textiles barely 10 percent.) It was also widely believed that President Nixon had promised various Southern statesmen to ease competitive pressure on textiles in return for their votes.[1] (The same articles discussing this in the U.S. press were faithfully translated and read in Japan.) As the U.S. government kept publicly emphasizing demands for Japan itself to restrict textile exports to the United States, Japanese indignation went up proportionally. Japanese textile manufacturers have their political lobbies, too, and the somewhat leftist press is always quick to headline any point of confronta-

[1] Imports from Japan amount to a total of two percent of U.S. textile production.

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tion with the Americans. Over the past two and a half years every step in the textile negotiations has been scanned with a magnifying glass on page one of Japanese newspapers.

Meanwhile, more important economic dangers were neglected, more opportunities for negotiation overlooked. On the contrary, when the dollar was suddenly cut loose from gold and the surtax invoked, Washington left little doubt that its principal target was Japan. On no European country ever has the United States publicly used such bludgeoning tactics. On no other country could such tactics have a worse effect. "Never push an adversary into a corner," the late Prime Minister Ikeda was fond of saying, "you give him no room to manœuvre and he becomes desperate."

The problem of Okinawa and its bases showed the same pattern of neglect, irritation and ultimate crisis. It took 20 years of studiously unimaginative U.S. military government to turn the Okinawans from poor relations of Japan, who in the late forties would have welcomed American annexation outright, to the angry irredentists of the nineteen-sixties. Five years too late for it to be a graceful gesture, the United States agreed to give up Okinawa by 1972. But the Administration's sudden decision to leave ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty to the Senate, where the textile lobby might conceivably block it, removed even the traces of goodwill.

The current stipulations about the United States retaining bases, with the furor over poison gas storage on Okinawa, have brought a second wave of agitation against any special future status for Okinawan bases whatsoever. Here, just as with the trade controversy, the Japanese press headlines the slightest news development, while American readers and viewers remained until recently ignorant that there is a controversy at all.

In the wake of this—and just shortly before Mr. Kissinger returned from China—Secretary of Defense Laird made his recent, well-publicized visit to Tokyo. The Secretary may have been careful in his public statements, but both U.S. and Japanese newspaper reports suggested, most forcibly, that his visit was: (1) part of an American campaign to make Japan increase her conventional armaments; and (2) a corollary effort to persuade Japan to develop her own nuclear warfare capability, in case the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan suddenly had to be folded, *e.g.* as a result of SALT commitments.

To the Japanese, the two pressures seemed paradoxical. On

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the one hand the United States urged them to increase their conventional military forces, designed from the beginning purely as back-up to the American nuclear protective power. Then, in the same breath, it was suggested that this nuclear protection may have to be curtailed. (Meanwhile, some U.S. Congressmen had recently visited Premier Sato to express their concern at the possibility of Japan going "militarist" again.)

From Washington it may have seemed only simple logic that the Secretary of Defense would advise the Japanese to strengthen their own military commitment, now that the United States was phasing out of Okinawa and feeling a general financial pinch about all miltary commitments overseas. This was, indeed, only a logical continuation of a consistent U.S. effort, begun only five years after MacArthur's anti-war constitution, to have Japan increase its forces.

The View from There is quite different. The Self-Defense Forces in Japan are barely past the status of a public embarrassment. Most Japanese continue to think that a strong economy and a unified society are worth more than numerous divisions. The need for armed forces may be understood by some, but not by many.

Some Japanese commentators even extrapolated the belief that the Laird visit was in fact timed to fit the Kissinger visit to Peking, as a reminder to the Chinese that the United States could still exert military pressure on them, via Japan. However far from the truth this may be, it had an effect on Japanese intellectuals comparable to the popular indignation against the proposed Soviet fleet manœuvres off Shikoku last year.[2]

IV

The new American relationship with China has brought alive the historic triangle among the three countries, in which the roles of wife and mistress seem to keep switching. Although China's past role in this relationship was more that of a patient than an agent, this can hardly be said today. To many Japanese —right-wing businessmen as well as left-wing editorial writers

[2] In March 1970, the Soviet government notified Japan that some of its fleet units would be holding firing practice off the coast of Shikoku, as well as certain other areas north of Japan, the following month. Although these manœuvres were probably part of a pattern aimed to exert *indirect* pressure on China, Moscow completely underestimated the *direct* Japanese reaction. After Foreign Office protests, the Soviet government agreed to cancel the whole business.

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—China to the west represents a strong and needed counter-attraction to the heavy American magnetic pull eastward. (Russians are not much liked in Japan, and their negative postwar diplomacy toward Japan has yet to help the image.) Many elements are involved—curiosity, a bookish nostalgia for China's classical culture, guilt over the Japanese spoliation of China for many decades, not least of all the fascination of opening a new vast hinterland for Japanese products.

Yet for all the talk of *Do-bun do-shu*—"Common culture, common race"—the Japanese do not know China well and have only a superficial interest in knowing more. Fewer than 2,000 students are currently studying the Chinese language, far less than those studying Spanish. There is no modern literature about China to compare with the tons of published comment and translated works on Europe and the United States. Japan's basic concern with China is no more than an unsentimental wish to establish some kind of lasting relationship with such a vast and fearful neighbor—but no less, either.

No one responded with more enthusiasm to Chou En-lai's ping-pong diplomacy than the Japanese. Even the Sato government, borne on a groundswell of public opinion, felt it time to change the attitude toward China from the current opportunistic economic relationship, called by the uninhibited *dogeza gaiko* —"kow-tow diplomacy"—in which Japanese trade representatives and unofficial diplomats regularly make the pilgrimage to Peking, and receive fairly substantial orders after signing declarations denouncing Japanese "militarism," which are then disavowed by the Administration in Tokyo.

Cautiously, Premier Sato's government began to make some overtures. At the same time, Foreign Office spokesmen continued to stress Japan's strong adherence to a joint U.S.–Japanese approach to the China problem; and in particular, regarding Taiwan, where Japan has large business interests.

It was at this point that the Nixon announcement struck with the suddenness of a bucket of cold water. Premier Sato's whole foreign policy toward China, a scaffolding built on the American model, tumbled overnight, as government spokesmen had to admit they had known nothing of the Kissinger visit until the very instant before the President's announcement.[8]

[8] Japanese recalled, with some irony, that Premier Kiichiro Hiranuma, Japan's prewar pro-Axis leader, had resigned under similar circumstances, after denouncing the "monstrous complications" of diplomacy, when he was surprised by the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939.

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On the surface, Japanese reaction to the United States overture to China was and is favorable. The current in favor of recognizing China has been running stronger in Japan than in the United States. But underneath ran an undertow of resentment. The Nixon announcement confirmed a long-gathering suspicion that, in any really important Asian diplomacy, the United States would go it alone. Comments ranged from "That proves that there is no Japanese diplomacy" to "In this world, there is no Japan." Trust in the United States has been cracked, and it may never be wholly put together. "Nixon finally freed us," one Japanese friend said to me. "We need never be bound to you again."

As of this writing, the U.S. government has not yet seen fit to make any substantial gesture toward Japan to balance remotely the Peking visit. President Nixon's announcement—made a few days after his surtax declaration—that he would meet Emperor Hirohito's Europe-bound plane in Alaska hardly seems to qualify. It is true that nations and peoples see each other through a glass darkly. But not often in national relationships has there been such a confused view of what is important in such an important relationship.

Some things could be done to make the U.S.-Japanese relationship less distorted.

(1) A major step would be an American motion to have Japan seated as a permanent member of the Security Council, along with communist China, in the realignment of that organ which seems inevitable. Japan is a great power in the sense that some present Council members are no longer. A wish for permanent representation in the Security Council has been growing strong in Japan. Yet, in all the talk about the United States sponsoring mainland Chinese membership, in the United Nations and on the Council, only one or two voices have been raised to consider the Japanese.

(2) A joint standing committee should be established to review the Japanese-American trade relationship and suggest mutually palatable ways of easing strains in it before the next venture into courtroom diplomacy. This would mercifully supplement the current periodic, formal joint Cabinet-level meetings.

(3) The cultural exchange and information conferences, started by Ambassador Reischauer in 1962, should receive heavy support both from government and industry. The work should

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include regular conferences between editors, which might persuade some Japanese journalists that a consistently negative anti-American attitude is not necessarily good news and might persuade their American counterparts that there is a flesh-and-blood Japan, apart from the "bullet train and geisha suicides."

(4) Both the United States and Japan could profit from a structured interchange of ideas on how to deal with the urban technological revolution. Their problems are astonishingly similar both in their scope and their degree of urgency.

(5) Some further work should be done on the reduction of American bases in and around Japan, and either a clear reaffirmation, a clear restatement, or a clear rejection of the nuclear umbrella principle. Before the Nixon announcement about China, one could have said flatly, "The Japanese will not take to nuclear weapons in the next decade, if at all." Now, there is some doubt. Too many American voices have lately been calling the nuclear umbrella into question.

The Japanese have their own fences to mend. The holier-than-thou attitude of Japanese businessmen about American protectionism ignores their own underbrush of protection at home and the hostile measures taken, until recently, against any foreign investment—not to mention the foot-dragging on yen reëvaluation.

These steps may seem weak and incomplete but they would be the beginning of a coöperation long overdue. For behind the distortions in the View from Here and the View from There is the basic breakdown of an alliance—an alliance which began as a military pact with one very senior and one very junior partner. This is so no longer. Japan is no longer a client state, nor must the United States be forever cast in the role of an understanding protector. On the contrary, these are two great powers, with essentially common objectives, vast resources, and few points of friction, present or foreseeable, that could not be negotiated on equal terms. It is not too late to reconstruct the alliance on new principles, in which an element of military protection can remain, but subordinate to more positive goals of coöperation in technology and education and an improvement of living standards in the whole area of Asia and the Pacific. But if some drastic changes are not made in its shape and functions—and most importantly, in the commitment of *both* peoples to it—the alliance will soon be dead.

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MARGINAL MEN

The Global Unemployment Crisis

By James P. Grant

SEVERAL factors are creating a new phenomenon in the developing world. It is what Robert McNamara of the World Bank has called the rising number of "marginal men"—people who have reached adulthood with no useful role to play in their societies. Largely the product of an unprecedented "baby survival" boom the world over, these individuals now find a dearth of jobs, of the means to provide for themselves and take part in life around them. Quite simply, there is a serious and growing unemployment problem in countries from one end of the developing world to the other and it is likely to dominate international development in the 1970s much as the food issue did in the 1960s.

The impact of the population explosion on employment has been aggravated in most developing countries by an equally unprecedented migration from the countryside to the cities, by the use of increasingly capital-intensive technology and by financial policies favoring use of capital rather than labor. At the same time, living standards are rising rapidly for a sizable segment of the population. This sharpens the contrast between those who are relatively well off and those for whom the present system is not working at all.

The lack of jobs, along with its consequences, is thereby helping to create the preconditions for political upheaval in many countries. It is probably no accident that many of the most severe of these upheavals in recent history have occurred in countries with the highest level of unemployment. In 1957, the average unemployment rate in Cuba was 16 percent, with a further fifth of the labor force reported as partially unemployed. The Philippines, Peru, Colombia and Ceylon are examples of countries which have high rates of unemployment and which today face problems that are nearly as serious.

This growing problem is already contributing to shifts in governments, often toward the two extremes: toward the Left, as in Ceylon, India, Peru and Chile, in response to pressures from the dissatisfied, or toward the Right, as in Brazil, in an at-

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tempt to contain these pressures. And, as several recent Latin American cases show, the whole gamut of intergovernmental and business relations can be affected.

The problem of marginal men is thus clearly of considerable importance to peoples and governments alike. But how big is the problem? We still have only a vague idea. Our Western concepts of "work" and "the labor force" do not apply in poor countries, and there are few adequate statistical or even descriptive surveys of conditions in these countries. But we do know that the problem is large already and rapidly becoming more urgent.

Even worse, the unemployed are only the tip of an iceberg composed of a wider group of underemployed. Since the cushion of social security does not exist in almost any poor countries, unemployment can be "afforded" only by people who have working relatives to provide support. Most people in the third world, therefore, must take whatever work they can find. Millions subsist on casual labor, while others often work extremely long hours for pittances as shoeshine boys or petty traders.

These problems are well-nigh universal in the developing world. In Latin America, for example, the number of people who were openly unemployed approximately tripled in number between 1950 and 1965. The number doubled as a percentage of the labor force, from 5.6 percent to 11.1 percent. The figures are even higher today. Furthermore, unemployment rates of 15 to 20 percent are increasingly common in large cities throughout the developing world. Young people, particularly those with an education, generally have even higher rates of joblessness.

In general, the labor force of the non-communist developing world will increase by 170 million in the 1970s, adding at least 25 percent to the size of the work force during the decade. In some areas, particularly in Latin America, where the population explosion started earlier, the increase will be even higher, up to one-third or more. Even in India, a late-comer to rapid population growth, the work force should increase from 210 million in 1970 to 273 million by the end of the decade.

Unfortunately, there is still no end in sight to the population explosion in the developing world. Worse still, for about 20 years after it does end, the labor force will continue to grow accordingly. Therefore the problem of absorbing workers is far more serious for the developing countries than it was for the presently developed countries during their period of industrial-

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ization. The populations of the European nations rarely grew by as much as one percent a year, compared to the current annual increase of 2.6 percent in the LDCs.

The population explosion is not the only cause of the employment problem, however. Despite historically unprecedented rates of economic growth throughout the third world over the last decade, the supply of productive jobs is not increasing fast enough to meet the demand. Both the patterns of economic growth and technological changes have slowed the creation of jobs. For example, a million dollars invested in industrial expansion today does not generate as many jobs as it did 20 or 30 years ago, because of growing technological sophistication. At the same time, many of the policies designed to speed industrial growth have effectively encouraged substitution of capital for labor. These policies include overvalued exchange rates, excessive protection for import-substitution industries and low interest rates. They provide incentives for entrepreneurs to use machinery, especially imported machinery, despite the abundant supply of poorly employed labor. These policies also encourage entrepreneurs to favor capital-intensive import enterprises over labor-intensive export industries.

The job problem is further aggravated by the rate of migration from the country to the city, which also has no precedent in American or European history. A type of "gold rush fever" afflicts underemployed and jobless peasants who are flocking to the cities in increasing numbers. Many seek the rewards of high-paying factory jobs which only few can find. In Latin America, urban populations have grown twice as fast as urban jobs. Today, the cities include more than 50 percent of total population—breeding enormous problems of slums, crime and disease.

II

What should be done about these problems? In most developing countries there is no clear answer. Planners, administrators and political leaders do not yet have more than the beginnings of a consensus on the way to provide enough productive jobs for their expanding labor forces. But there are sparks of hope, deriving from successful programs during the sixties. In particular, there are new possibilities for programs capitalizing on progress in agriculture, and from lessons learned in some of the smaller countries of East Asia.

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The search for new policies is spurred by the knowledge that the traditional approach to development could achieve reasonable employment objectives only by attaining unrealizable rates of economic growth. According to one recent estimate, it may be necessary to increase the gross domestic product (GDP) in most developing countries by nine to eleven percent annually. But these rates would only absorb the increase in the labor force in nonagricultural jobs. They would not decrease the absolute number of people working on the land, nor would they affect the existing backlog of unemployment and underemployment. These are striking estimates, particularly when compared with the U.S. experience where we reached the same point while achieving a GDP growth rate of only three percent per year.

It is this type of analysis which led Raul Prebisch to call in his recent report[1] for a growth rate in Latin America of at least eight percent annually. But would attaining even this target—a very ambitious one—be enough? Some economists are skeptical of this approach, arguing that without other major structural changes, most countries are likely to achieve such high growth rates only through much heavier emphasis than before on modern industry. And this concentration would aggravate the problems of high wages in a small portion of the economy, leading to further inequities, migration to the cities and the intensification of urban problems. Thus, more growth is a necessary but insufficient condition for resolving the employment problem.

There is no complete solution to these difficulties, no one strategy that will encompass all the quandaries of development in a single theoretical sweep. Certainly, in practice, even the communist system has problems in combining adequate employment with economic growth in countries where population is increasing rapidly.

There are, however, several initiatives that developing countries could take in order to change the nature of their growth. They could remove biases favoring use of scarce capital over abundant labor, they could develop and favor labor-intensive technologies, and they could develop and use the potential of the Green Revolution. These steps would provide more employment in agriculture and permit programs for greatly increasing employment elsewhere in the economy—programs that have not

[1] Raul Prebisch, "Transformacion y Desarrolo: la Gran Tarea de America Latina." (Report for the Inter-American Development Bank; Santiago, April 1970).

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been previously feasible because of their inflationary potential where food is already in short supply.

First, in most developing economies, there remain serious and persistent imbalances in the prices attached to capital and labor even though there is far more labor than capital available. It is no accident that countries such as Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, which have taken the lion's share of the growing markets for manufactured products, have consciously avoided the capital-labor distortions prevalent in most poor countries. These countries have many means available to them to correct the distortions they have created. They could begin to make the price of capital more realistic by ceasing subsidies to it, devaluing exchange rates and raising interest rates. By raising interest and broadening access to savings institutions, the poor countries should be able to increase rates of saving, especially among farmers and small-scale entrepreneurs. Most poor countries should also extend less protection to their import-substitution industries, which tend to be capital-intensive and favor instead those industries which ultimately can withstand international competition, on the basis of their low-cost labor. And wage increases in industry and government should be slowed.

A second step for the developing countries relates to the use of technology. Assuming that price structures are made more realistic, industrialists and farmers will have an incentive to look for technologies that employ more labor and less scarce capital. For some basic heavy industries, such as steel and fertilizer production, the most modern technology used in the West may still represent the best use of resources in the poor countries. But in other types of industry, such as textiles and rubber, a range of technologies exists. In Japan, textile manufacturers adapted Western machinery and speeded it up, and thereby used three to seven times as much of their cheaper labor per machine as was typical in the United States. In Korea and Taiwan, the scarcity of capital is reflected in realistic exchange rates and in interest rates of 25 to 30 percent. In these countries, only one-half to one-quarter the amount of fixed capital has been expended per worker in the highly successful export rubber industries than is true in India and the Philippines. Therefore Korea and Taiwan were able to obtain higher payoffs on their investment, more savings, much higher economic growth than the others, as well as to create employment faster.

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But where are these technologies to come from? Here we encounter a vast vacuum of knowledge, beyond the adaptation in some cases of Western machinery. Unfortunately, perhaps 99 percent of all expenditures on research and development are made in the rich countries and are devoted largely to finding more capital-intensive ways of displacing high-cost labor. The poor countries therefore desperately need an expansion of research in labor-intensive technology.

III

A third step for the developing countries is rural development. Indeed, as Robert Shaw has explained in considerable detail,[2] increasing the use of labor through broad institutional and organizational changes in agriculture—an integrated approach to rural areas—may be the most promising way both to promote growth and to ease the unemployment problem. After all, the third world is still essentially rural, and most of its people, outside of Latin America, will live in the rural areas for at least the next generation despite high rates of migration to the cities.

The agricultural sector of a typical developing country will therefore remain central to its total economy. This becomes even clearer if we look at the way cities and towns are linked economically. To begin with, if more employment is provided in the towns and through public works, much of the wages generated will be spent on food. But if food prices are not to rise, more food must be produced, which means more jobs in rural areas. At the same time, rural areas comprise the largest mass market for urban products—provided, of course, that enough income is being generated there to make the purchases. Complemented by policies to improve social infrastructure, such as rural educational and health facilities, programs to create better job and income opportunities for hundreds of millions of peasant farmers could also substantially slow the rate of migration.

Fortunately, there are some signs that government interest in agriculture and rural areas in general is growing. In particular, the success of the new dwarf wheat and rice varieties in many parts of South and Southeast Asia has renewed interest in the possibilities of agricultural progress. The new seeds have much

[2] Robert d'A. Shaw, "Jobs and Agricultural Development." Overseas Development Council, November 1970.

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higher yields than traditional varieties, provided there is careful cultivation—preparation of the land, water control, fertilizer and weeding. Where there is a market for increased food production, therefore, the combination of higher yields and more careful cultivation increases the amount of labor used per acre of land, and also increases the income of those laborers. Precisely this sort of spur to labor-intensive agriculture is required in tackling the problems of the countryside. At the same time, of course, the higher yields give governments greater flexibility to increase employment, without having to worry as much about inflationary demand for food caused by increased incomes.

While agricultural technology is becoming a source of hope, however, it is also contributing to some of the problems it could be useful in solving. The same economic forces active in industry in such countries as Mexico, India and Pakistan are subsidizing tractors and combines which are displacing the agricultural laborer. As an alternative to the rapid mechanization of agriculture, several countries have developed a system of agriculture centered on small-holders able to use the new seed varieties, small machinery and fertilizer, demonstrating that it can be profitable and create more jobs. A farmer with suitable water control and no more than two or three acres can make a decent income for his family, providing that he has access to credit, fertilizer, high-yielding seeds and a place where he can sell his produce for a reasonable price.

In Taiwan, for example, where there is a seven-acre limit on farms, the agricultural breakthrough has been highly labor-intensive. And the cereal yields achieved in Taiwan have been higher than those in the Indian Punjab, where the size of farms is effectively unrestricted and the bigger ones make use of large-scale mechanization. This is a strong argument for those policies collectively known as land reform.

The demands made by hundreds of millions of small farmers for agricultural inputs, for marketing facilities and for basic consumer goods would also stimulate the development of small towns in the rural areas. This development would create more employment, as well as possible alternatives to the big cities as the goals of migration.

Finally, increased food production provides governments with an opportunity to experiment with ambitious public works programs as a partial solution to their unemployment problem. Of

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course, if the programs are of the leaf-raking variety, the effect on employment is likely to be short-term, but it is possible to use public works as a means to create investment that in turn will increase production and create new jobs. If the labor in these programs is used to build canals, roads, dams and tubewells, it will help create the infrastructure essential to the speeding up of rural regeneration. Furthermore, these projects are likely to be far more profitable in the context of rapidly increasing agricultural productivity. Returns on investment in farm-to-market roads and in small-scale irrigation are very high when they enable farmers to use new agricultural technologies and to market their newly increased production at lower cost.

IV

All of these measures that can be taken by poor countries to ease their employment problems inevitably involve questions of distribution—who is to benefit from the growth of the economy? The national product of most developing countries is growing at rates which could provide increasing income per capita at rates equal to those in the industrialized countries during comparable periods. In actual terms, however, only a minority of people are benefiting significantly from the rapid growth in the developing countries. These include industrialists, larger landowners, government employees and factory workers. This was brought out in the recent International Labour Office study of Colombia. It noted that even with considerable economic growth, urban unemployment today is probably worse than at the height of the Great Depression and the bottom third of the rural population may be no better off now than in the 1930s. Of course, it is sometimes argued that unequal distribution of income is necessary in poor countries because it is the wealthy who save, and these savings are essential to future economic growth. But the recent performance of most poor countries has not borne this out. Rather, some of the countries with the highest savings rates, such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea, are precisely those with the most equal distribution of income—providing that they have suitable institutions to collect and use the savings.

Interestingly, solutions to the problems of both unemployment and distribution may go hand in hand. Raising the incomes of the poor will result in the creation of more jobs than an equivalent rise in the incomes of the wealthy, for the luxury goods

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bought mainly by the wealthy tend to be relatively capital-intensive in nature, whereas the goods a poorer person normally buys require more labor to produce. The production of an automobile, for example, requires large amounts of capital but little labor, while the production of bicycles, shirts or food tends to use much more labor. Luxury products also generally put a higher strain on foreign exchange reserves, either because the luxury goods themselves are imported, or because their manufacture requires more complex, imported machinery than do labor-intensive goods. Thus the concentration of income in a few hands in most poor countries not only reflects the lack of job opportunities; it also contributes to the employment problem.

V

Despite all the efforts made by developing countries, the employment problem is becoming so monumental that they cannot cope with it alone, even where they take the initial—and painful—decisions to reorder their priorities. The rich countries have an indispensable supporting role to play in providing capital, research and technology, and access to their markets. Otherwise the poorer countries will never achieve substantially higher growth rates nor will they be able to make the major innovations which are required.

These facts are well illustrated in the field of trade, which currently is the source of nearly four-fifths of the poor countries' foreign exchange. The rest comes from aid and private investment. Unfortunately, despite the very rapid growth in world trade, most poor countries are not sharing fully in it. In the 1960s, for example, the value of total world trade grew by more than ten percent annually, but the exports of the developing nations only grew by some seven percent annually. In order to create more jobs in export production and to earn the foreign exchange required for expanded domestic production the poor countries must obtain a greater share of this trade.

In the past two decades, the policy of most developing countries has been to save foreign exchange by substituting domestic production for imports rather than to earn foreign exchange through aggressive export policies. However, this situation can be changed if the poor countries are prepared to capitalize on their advantages, and especially on their labor supply. By altering pricing policies and encouraging the use of appropriate

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technologies, many poor countries should be able to produce labor-intensive products that can compete on the world market in terms of price and quality. A few countries, especially in East Asia and Mexico, have shown how important these shifts can be.

When poor countries reach this stage, however, they begin to encounter problems. It takes two to trade. In the longer term, of course, both rich and poor countries would gain if workers in the former countries concentrated on products requiring high levels of skills and capital. Workers in the latter countries would concentrate on products with a high labor content at least while labor remains their most abundant resource. Unfortunately, the rich countries usually follow contrary policies. In the face of competition from cheaper labor abroad, they place the principal financial burden of adjustment on workers producing the same goods that the poor countries are trying to export. This is true of the cotton textile worker in South Carolina, the shoemaker in Maine, the French beet sugar farmer or the Japanese rice farmer. These groups usually are disadvantaged, they receive low wages and have little skill or training. Not surprisingly, they protest—politically. Thus, success in exporting by the poor countries is breeding restrictive reactions in rich countries.

Two highly significant pieces of legislation coming before Congress in 1971 and 1972 illustrate the conflicting tensions in the trade area. On the one hand, President Nixon will ask Congress in 1971 to pass preferential legislation to cut import tariffs to zero on all imports into the United States of manufactured goods from the poor countries. This request follows a series of negotiations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, in which all the Western industrialized nations agreed to this principle of preferences. And on the other hand, the Trade Bill of 1970 may reappear in a similar format this year or next. The purpose of the original bill was to give the President power to limit imports of so-called "sensitive" products. These are mainly such products as textiles and shoes in which American industries face competition from the labor forces of poor countries. If passed, this legislation would not only restrict many of the present imports from the third world, but it would also discourage the building of new export industries there. It could, for example, restrict about one-fourth of Mexico's present exports to the United States, one-third of Korea's, and 40 percent of Taiwan's.

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In addition to trade, the large multinational corporations are increasingly becoming factors in the employment picture, both in the poor countries and in the United States. These corporations have been increasing their investment in manufacturing in the third world, originally for local markets but more now as part of a new process of international production. In recent years, low-cost labor in certain countries has come to be treated as a valuable resource in its own right, and multinational corporations have worked effectively with these countries to utilize this resource. The U.S. electronics industry, for example, has reacted to tough foreign competition by moving most of its labor-intensive production overseas to countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Mexico. The fruits of these labors are then re-imported for assembly in the United States. These imports from developing countries are made under Tariff Schedule 807 (which confines tariffs to the value added abroad for components shipped from the United States and assembled in foreign plants). They have been growing rapidly from $60.5 million in 1966 to $366.9 million in 1969.

This is the beginning of a new movement toward production based on the law of comparative advantage—not between different companies operating in different countries, but within a single company itself. Corporations organized on this model are producing components that require a lot of labor in countries where labor is cheap and capital-intensive parts where capital is cheap. Not surprisingly, this nascent innovation is being met with loud outcries from some people in the American labor movement who see U.S. jobs going abroad. They demand controls on foreign investment and protection against cheap foreign imports. Their position merits great sympathy. But are the solutions they propose really in their own long-term interest or that of the nation as a whole? As with restrictions in general, the proposed controls on multinational corporations would raise prices here in the United States. In addition, the dollars earned by the poor countries through exporting are spent in the world market on goods from the rich countries. The labor case would be stronger if it called for better adjustment assistance, not blockage of imports from poor countries.

In addition to improving the foreign exchange situation of the developing countries, the multinational corporations can make other significant contributions to the solution of the employment

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problem. But their resources have only been partially tapped. Most importantly, the multinational corporations almost inevitably fall back on the most capital-intensive technology available. In present circumstances this is a rational action: these technologies are the ones with which they are most familiar; they are made profitable by the economic policies of the poor countries; and they avoid the possibility of trouble with large numbers of workers. However, if poor countries change their policies to make fuller use of their labor forces, the multinational corporations will increasingly find it worthwhile to invest in research into more appropriate technologies for their affiliates in the third world. Already some firms are beginning to do this. For example, a research division of the Dutch electronics manufacturer, Phillips, has developed small-scale, labor-intensive production methods for use in Indonesia.

The efforts of the multinational corporations, however, will not be enough to meet the problem of unemployment in the developing world. The need to create jobs in the poor countries, and the serious consequences of not doing so also add a new imperative to the case for financial assistance by the rich to the poor countries. Jobs cannot be created without investment. Therefore, the United States needs not only to reverse the downward trend of its aid but to increase it substantially, as most other developed countries are doing. Unfortunately, for the first time since the start of the coöperative global effort in 1961, the U.S. net official assistance to the developing countries will drop below $3 billion in 1971.

But money alone is not enough. If the approach to development is to be reëxamined in the light of the employment crisis, then development assistance will also need to be reëxamined. For example, many aid practices have tended to support the old approach to development, which has stressed modern capital-intensive equipment. Happily, there are ways in which the aid donors could modify their policies in order to make their help a major contribution to the solution of the employment problem.

This would involve, first, taking employment issues into consideration in the making of loans. By making more loans that are not tied to specific projects, and by supplying some of the local currency costs of projects, the aid donors would help remove the bias in favor of projects that emphasize the use of imported machinery. Second, removing the requirement that aid be

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spent in the donor country (tying) would allow the poor countries more latitude in choosing appropriate technologies. Third, increased and diversified food aid from the agricultural surpluses of North America, Western Europe and Japan could be used to support programs for expanding employment, by serving both as an interim source of supply pending expanded production and as standby against crop failure. Finally, technical assistance programs need to be revamped, particularly to stress research and development of appropriate technology.

The potential for dealing successfully with this problem is perhaps best illustrated by a few small countries such as Taiwan and Korea. They had very high rates of increase in their work forces in the 1960s, yet achieved rapid growth, improved income distribution and reduced both unemployment and birth rates. Of course, both these countries combined the right national policies with significant aid, foreign investment and access to rich country markets.

There are sobering implications in these success stories. At the very least, duplicating them elsewhere during the 1970s will require the rich countries to meet their aid and investment target of one percent of GNP. It would also require a sharp upward revision in the seven percent target for increases in LDC trade. Most poor countries would need to make major, politically difficult, changes ranging from devaluation to land reform. Rarely, and then only for fleeting periods, are countries able to move quickly on such a broad range of reforms.

India is an excellent illustration in 1971 of both opportunity and problems. India is momentarily at a point where difficult reforms are possible, following the landslide electoral victory in March 1971 by Indira Gandhi. But Mrs. Gandhi may not be able to make these necessary moves without outside coöperation.

At best, the employment problem cannot be solved easily, and not fully until population growth is brought under control. Yet, with enough innovation, reform and increased effort, both within developing countries and between them and the rich nations, there are reasonable prospects of limiting the damaging effects of unemployment. Certainly, reforms within developing countries, as well as changes in trade and investment patterns between rich and poor countries, are now becoming more than requirements of justice; they are becoming requirements for survival of a world economic system.

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PAKISTAN DIVIDED

By Sydney H. Schanberg

HISTORY, geopolitical forces, power balances and election results all helped shape the crisis in East Pakistan; but only in terms of "the pathology of the subcontinent," as one diplomat described it, can this bloody upheaval be adequately explained. From the night of March 25, when the Pakistani army launched its surprise offensive in East Pakistan in an attempt to crush the Bengali autonomy movement, normal standards of logic and reason stopped applying. The mindless brutality of the West Pakistani troops demonstrates the military régime's irrational determination to hold on to East Pakistan at whatever cost and by whatever tactics are necessary. In turn, this brutality has fired and fed an increasingly effective and popularly supported guerrilla counteroffensive that keeps East Pakistan in chaos. Every army reprisal against the civilian population produces new Bengali freedom-fighters. The Bengalis—now sullen, bitter, hating—seem ready for a long fight for full independence. Talk of anything less, such as the old goal of East Pakistani autonomy within Pakistan, is considered heresy.

Most Western diplomats regard Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the jailed leader of East Pakistan, as the key to any real settlement. But Pakistan's President, Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, has announced that Sheikh Mujib, who headed the now-banned Awami League and who was arrested on the first night of the army attack, will be tried for treason in camera and will face the death penalty. As this is written, no decision has been announced.

By now, more than seven million of East Pakistan's 71 million people have fled across the border to India to escape the army terror, and many more will flee if the chaos produces famine in the late fall. The refugees are not only a crushing economic burden on India, but they present a grim political specter as well—thrusting millions of jobless and homeless people into India's already unstable and disorderly eastern region, which the national government in Delhi lost effective control over some years ago. And since most of the refugees have been from East Pakistan's Hindu minority—a special target of the Pakistani army—the crisis has revived among all Indians the memories of the bloody Hindu-Moslem rioting of 1947, when the subconti-

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nent was divided into Pakistan as a Moslem homeland, and India as a secular but predominantly Hindu nation. Indians view the military repression in East Pakistan as nothing less than evil crushing good. Indian and Pakistani leaders rattle sabres at each other, many border clashes have already taken place, and another war between the two countries threatens, a war that would have obvious global implications.

Inexplicably, the responses of many foreign nations—notably the United States—have failed to give much weight to the strength of the passions at work. Washington, for example, continues to talk about its hope for a political settlement when no diplomat or other qualified observer in East Pakistan can see any lasting solution but independence. Washington continues military aid to the Pakistani government on the ground that it may thereby maintain its leverage for a moderate settlement. Yet, so far, there is no evidence of any successful leverage. The incompatibility of Washington's so-called pragmatic approach with the inflamed emotions in Pakistan has been obvious to observers for some time.

In their campaign to end military rule, stop the exploitation of their province by West Pakistan and win a large measure of self-rule, the Bengalis had burned the Pakistani flag, destroyed photographs of Pakistan's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and taunted army units. They also did more significant and more revolutionary things—such as boycotting the military régime and in March setting up their own government. But to the West Pakistani military rulers, the emotional, symbolic insults were the more heinous. "It's a religious thing with them about the flag and Islamic unity and Jinnah and their army pride," said an American diplomat. "They can't tolerate insults. It puts them in a rage."

II

In short the fanatic fury of a holy war seems to have been the overriding reason why the Pakistani government loosed the army on the Bengali population. This is not hard to understand when we recall that Pakistan is a state based on religion where democratic traditions are almost nonexistent and where the popular will has been often frustrated. When the army troops began their rampage that first night, they seemed to be enjoying themselves. As Punjabi patrols emerged from alleys after killing un-

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armed Bengalis, they came out with their hands upraised, shouting *"Narai Takbir!"* ("Victory for God!") and *"Pakistan Zindabad!"* ("Long Live Pakistan!").

Racial hatred is a basic element in this conflagration, for the peoples of the two wings of Pakistan, separated by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory, are ethnically more different than most enemy nations—which they now, in fact, are. They speak different languages (Urdu in the West, Bengali in the East), eat different foods (meat and grain in the West, fish and rice in the East), and have opposite cultures; the Punjabis are stolid types who prefer soldiering and government, while the Bengalis are volatile and love politics and literature. The lighter-skinned and taller West Pakistanis have their roots in the Middle East; the Bengalis with the lithe, slim brown people of Southeast Asia. The only thing they have in common is their religion, Islam, the shaky reason for the creation of the improbable two-part nation in 1947, when British rule ended on the subcontinent.

All the ethnic differences between the Bengalis and Punjabis, who dominate the Pakistani government, existed in 1947, but they were overshadowed by the euphoria of creating a nation. In the two decades since, these differences have been honed razor-sharp by West Pakistan's systematic exploitation of the Eastern wing— politically, economically and militarily. Though the East is the majority wing—71 million people compared to the West's 61 million—the West, where the government is based, received the overwhelming proportion of development funds, factories, public-works projects, foreign aid, imports and defense facilities.

Prices are higher in the East, but income lower. The jute and other exports from the East brought in more than half of Pakistan's foreign exchange and paid for the raw materials that kept the West's factories going. The East was also the main market for the West's products, including the sleazy cotton fabrics, sold at inflated government-fixed prices, which have no market anywhere else in the world. Bengali nationalists complained that the colonial exploitation of their land under the West Pakistanis was worse than under the British a generation before.

III

Two events catalyzed this bitterness. The first was last November's cyclone and the government's sluggish relief effort,

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which dramatized for the Bengalis what they considered West Pakistan's indifference and even callousness toward their plight. This reaction gave added votes to the Awami League, campaigning on a platform of more self-rule for East Pakistan, in the national election a month later.

The second catalyst was that very election—the first full and free vote in Pakistan's history. President Yahya must be credited with making the election possible. Restoration of civilian rule was one of his promises on taking power in March 1969, after bloody rioting and protest in both wings brought about the collapse of the ten-year strong-arm reign of Mohammad Ayub Khan.

Most diplomats credit Yahya with sincerity in this promise, and some still feel that had he been his own master, the army repression would not have been ordered. But major decisions in Pakistan are made by a junta of several generals, most of them tough hard-liners, and though General Yahya is commander in chief he cannot act independently of them. It is widely believed that the generals accepted the idea of an election only because they expected the results to ensure their continued control. They felt, as did most foreign diplomats, that although the Awami League would make a strong showing in East Pakistan, the army's supporters—the right-wing religious parties—would do well enough in both wings to command a majority and run the government.

But the cyclone rewrote that scenario. The Awami League won all but two of the National Assembly seats from East Pakistan, which—because of the population-based apportionment (another Yahya concession)—gave it an overall national majority. Some Bengalis believe that the generals decided on a military solution as soon as the election results were in. This will probably never be known, but in any case storm clouds were not long in appearing.

The leading political group of West Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party, began demanding that the Awami League scale down its autonomy program. But Sheikh Mujib—under pressure from extremist students and workers in his following and perhaps naïve about the risk of a military bloodbath—would not compromise, fearing that if he did so, the West Pakistani power élite would somehow cheat the Bengalis out of their rightfully won political power.

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The leader of the Pakistan People's Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then refused to attend the coming session of the National Assembly, which was to have written a new constitution, and Yahya responded by postponing the session set for March 3. Protests and rioting erupted in East Pakistan, the army fired on Bengalis, killing many, and the Bengalis then answered Sheikh Mujib's call for a noncoöperation movement in defiance of the military. This movement eventually evolved into the creation of a kind of Awami League government. The Pakistani government then began flying troop reinforcements into East Pakistan at night. On March 15, Yahya himself flew to Dacca to negotiate with Sheikh Mujib. Most Bengalis and some foreign observers now believe that the negotiations were merely a smokescreen to buy time until enough troops had been brought in to launch the attack. (The timing of the military decision is not known, but it seems likely from the available evidence that it was not taken at the last minute.)

In any event, on March 25, while the negotiations were still going on, the army struck in Dacca with tanks and rockets and other heavy weapons against a largely unarmed civilian population—in some cases destroying entire hutment colonies of the poor. In succeeding days and weeks, the West Pakistani troops fanned out throughout East Pakistan, devastating population centers in similar ruthless operations.

At this writing, foreign diplomats estimate that the army has killed at least 200,000 Bengalis. Despite claims that normalcy prevails in the province, the military has not been able as yet to restore law and order or establish even a semblance of governmental administration. On the contrary, the resistance activities of the *Mukti Bahini* (Liberation Forces) have been mounting, with aid and training and sanctuary provided by India. The economy in East Pakistan remains crippled, that in West Pakistan is shriveling. Army casualties are growing. And except for the small minority of collaborators (mostly non-Bengali Moslems, such as Biharis, and Bengali adherents of right-wing religious parties), the people of East Pakistan are hostile, sullen and unshakeable.

The idea of a united Pakistan clearly is finished. The military régime can hold East Pakistan as a colony only by force and terror and crude police-state tactics. There still is no realization among the Pakistani generals of the futility of continuing

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the military repression. There exists an impression among some —though this is doubtful—that President Yahya is not being told what is really happening in East Pakistan. Meanwhile added moves by the régime have seemed designed to increase hatred and distrust there rather than to restore confidence. The Bengali language has been suppressed; street names have been changed; Bengalis have been removed from responsible government jobs and replaced with West Pakistanis; and the shops and homes of Bengalis who fled to the countryside or to India have been given to collaborators.

The longer the conflict drags on, the greater the likelihood that the Bengali independence movement—a nationalist upsurge rather than an ideological one—could alter in character and fall under the leadership of Maoists or other extremists. Some pro-China freedom-fighters are already active in East Pakistan. The implications for foreign powers are grave. Some Asia analysts foresee the possibility of a belt of chaos and insurgency, stretching from India's already turbulent West Bengal state through East Pakistan to Burma, which could dwarf the Vietnam conflict.

IV

For India, the impact has been grim. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was overwhelmingly reëlected last March on a platform of *Garibi Hatao*—"Remove poverty"—but the cost of supporting the millions of Bengali refugees has forced virtually all development plans into suspension. India, in effect, must now tread water, which is dangerous for a nation with a soaring jobless rate, unchecked population growth and severe poverty.

Mrs. Gandhi has so far resisted the clamor by the public and politicians for some decisive action—such as a military move against Pakistan or recognition of Bangla Desh (Bengal Nation), the name the independence movement has given itself to East Pakistan. She and her top advisers apparently fear that the recognition of Bangla Desh, in the prevailing emotional climate, could prompt Pakistan to declare war—this Mrs. Gandhi has seemed eager to avoid. But the pressure for recognition has been intensifying, and she may come to feel such a concession to aroused Indian public opinion is necessary.

Although India has taken defensive measures on its borders with Pakistan, its apparent policy is not to make the first move—

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in short, to put the onus for a third Indo-Pak war on Pakistan. But this policy does not preclude continued military aid and sanctuary for the East Pakistani freedom-fighters, and in such conditions war is a persistent risk. President Yahya has warned that if India helps the Bengalis establish a guerrilla base area in East Pakistan, his government would treat that as an attack. "I shall declare a general war and let the world take note of it," he said recently. Moreover, by supporting the insurgency, India in a sense ensures continuing chaos in East Pakistan and therefore a continuing flow of refugees into India—compounding the pressures on its economy and social fabric.

One of India's greatest concerns—and, conversely, one of Pakistan's apparent hopes—is that the rest of the world will come to view the crisis as just another Indo-Pak dispute—thereby diverting attention from the real issue, the independence struggle in East Pakistan. India views President Yahya's talk of war as this type of diversionary tactic, and also possibly as a nervous reaction to the increasing successes of the Bengali guerrillas.

In this context, however, some Indian analysts think a Pakistani attack on India is entirely possible. To lose East Pakistan in a fight with the guerrillas, they argue, would be an untenable loss of face for Pakistani generals, and could inspire uprisings by autonomy-minded ethnic groups in West Pakistan, such as the Baluchis and Pathans—many of whom are as resentful of Punjabi domination as the Bengalis of the East. But, this theory goes, if East Pakistan is lost in a holy war with India, the generals have a better chance of rationalizing their defeat and of holding West Pakistan together with the glue of anti-Indian hatred.

Should an Indo-Pak war erupt, the great powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and communist China—could hardly remain disinterested bystanders, though how deeply involved they would get on one side or the other remains an imponderable. In broad terms, the lineup at the time this is written is as follows: China is supporting Pakistan, the Soviet Union is supporting India, and the United States is pursuing an ambiguous policy of providing sizable refugee aid to India while continuing its arms shipments to Pakistan as a means (Washington says) of keeping a dialogue open and exerting some influence on the Islamabad régime.

In the last several years, China—whose relations with India

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have remained strained since their border war of 1962—has become Pakistan's biggest arms supplier and closest friend among the great powers. Whether China would intervene with troops in the event of an Indo-Pak war is unknown, but diplomats in Islamabad report increasing Chinese aid to Pakistan since the Bengali trouble began, including an agreement to equip at least one new Pakistani division to replace troops sent to the Eastern wing. (These diplomats note, however, that China has not publicly denounced the independence struggle, and do not think that Peking's aid to Pakistan now precludes Chinese support for the Bengali insurgency later on.)

President Yahya was presumably talking about Peking when he said recently that if war came, Pakistan would not "be alone." Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh immediately retorted in parliament that India, too, would not be alone—presumably referring to Russia. Though Moscow has been supplying military assistance to India throughout the sixties, the Russians were also giving arms to the Pakistanis. In the last couple of years, however, this aid slowed to a trickle, mainly because of Indian objections. Moscow did not want to abandon Pakistan entirely to China, and therefore took no drastic action against Islamabad in the recent crisis, such as stopping economic aid. But the Soviet stake in Pakistan is not a large one; the signing of the India-Russia 20-year friendship treaty showed clearly that the Russians have decided to make India their ally.

V

The United States has been straddling the fence in the crisis, and the role has drawn worldwide attention and criticism. In India, it is regarded as a betrayal, and U.S.-Indian relations have plunged to a new low. Washington has apparently decided that it is impossible to separate the East Pakistani upheaval from the emerging Indo-Pakistan confrontation and that such punitive acts as stoppage of aid or public moral denunciation of the military repression would be counterproductive. Washington seems to be still wedded to its view of Pakistan as a "balance" against India on the subcontinent. There is also a reluctance to abandon the huge U.S. financial investment in Pakistan and even more so to concede that the old policy of massive military and economic aid was, on balance, a failure—that it fostered development only in West Pakistan and thus helped fuel Bengali

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bitterness. From 1954 to 1965, a decade of idyllic U.S.-Pakistan relations, Washington outfitted and trained the Pakistani armed forces, and Pakistan became a member of CENTO and SEATO, both pro-Western, anti-communist military alliances. During this period—when Pakistan was having problems with the Russians and Chinese—the Americans gave the Pakistanis what has been estimated at $1.7 billion in military aid alone (although it may be far less). The economic aid was even greater.

Relations cooled dramatically after 1965. This was a product of many factors—China's war with India in 1962, which drew Pakistan closer to Peking; the 1965 U.S. embargo on the supply of arms, on which the Pakistanis were much more dependent than the Indians; and the willingness of China and Russia to fill the arms vacuum left by the Americans. Washington lifted its embargo partially in 1967 to allow sales of nonlethal equipment and spare parts and also ammunition for previously supplied weapons.

After the army crackdown began in East Pakistan on March 25, the State Department announced a new embargo on arms to Pakistan and said no military supplies were in the pipeline. But in late June, a newspaper report disclosed that arms shipments were continuing from American ports on Pakistani ships. The State Department at first ascribed this to bureaucratic bungling, but later dropped this explanation and announced that the shipments were legitimate, that they had all been contracted for before March 25 and that they would continue. Congressional demands for halting these shipments were unsuccessful; authoritative sources in Washington reported that the policy decision was made by President Nixon personally.

Meanwhile, U.S. economic aid has been temporarily suspended ("under review," is the State Department's phrase). But the State Department has said it will not deny aid as an instrument of applying pressure on Pakistan and analysts view the suspension largely as a reflection of Washington's reluctance to go it alone against the hard line of other members of the World Bank's 11-nation aid-to-Pakistan consortium. A special World Bank report in June concluded that the military crackdown had so ravaged East Pakistan that international development assistance "would serve little purpose" and "will have to remain in a state of suspension for at least the next year or so." Pakistan is heavily dependent on the consortium's aid, which amounts to

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about $450 million a year (The United States provides about $200 million of it). Desperate to repair its world image and bring about resumption of foreign aid (its foreign-exchange reserves are dipping toward zero), the government of President Yahya agreed to the posting of over 100 U.N. observers in East Pakistan. Their ostensible job would be to help normalize conditions and thus facilitate the return of refugees from India.

The United Nations also asked India to accept a similar team on its soil, but the Indians angrily refused, pointing out that the refugee exodus would not stop until the army terror stopped in East Pakistan and that this could not be achieved by putting observers in India. New Delhi dismissed as baseless propaganda the Pakistani charge that India has been obstructing the refugees' return. (And indeed India has every reason to want them to return.) Indians see in the observer proposal their old bugaboo—the treatment of the crisis as simply an Indo-Pak dispute, and the assigning of equal responsibility for the resolution of the problem to India and Pakistan. India also noted that President Yahya's acceptance of the observers came only after a marked increase in guerrilla activity and effectiveness in East Pakistan.

The presence of the U.N. team may force the Pakistani army to curb its reprisals and terror and thus may induce some refugees to return. As such it is a positive development. But—judging from extensive interview tours of the refugee camps by this correspondent and other foreign observers—one feels that the vast majority of the refugees will probably never return. For one thing, their homes and other property have been destroyed and their land given to collaborators. For another, the Hindus—who make up the bulk of the refugees—naturally feel safer in predominantly Hindu India than they can ever feel again in East Pakistan after the army pogrom.

Moreover, the presence of U.N. observers will not stop the guerrilla activity, which will keep the region in chaos unless the army pulls out. But it may lead to criticism in the United Nations of Indian aid to the guerrillas. This of course Pakistan would welcome.

India was apparently concerned that U.N. observers on its side of the border could interfere with its support program—arms, training and sanctuary—for the resistance fighters. Since the move for posting observers in both India and Pakistan was reportedly initiated by Washington, it has further estranged India

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from the United States. Most Asia analysts feel that in clinging to its notion of maintaining a balance between India and Pakistan and in treating the current crisis as an Indo-Pak dispute, Washington is pursuing an unrealistic and shortsighted policy. They believe that Pakistan cannot be treated as equal to India—in size, importance, democratic traditions or stability—and that the realistic course for Washington would be to try to persuade Pakistan to adjust to a secondary role instead of inflating its delusions.

Washington's apparent desire to separate the refugee and humanitarian issues from the basic political problem in East Pakistan seems equally unrealistic. To many familiar with affairs on the subcontinent, the proposal to send U.N. observers, like other U.S. moves, seems an attempt to paper over the real conflict and produce a temporary standoff that can at best only postpone the inevitable division of Pakistan.

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TO GUARD THE SEA

By Elizabeth Young

AS far as government is concerned, less is often held better. Still, total absence of government gives a draughty feeling and it is just this sense of vacuum which pervades all today's discussions of the sea and seabed, areas into which, for good or evil, technology is fast hauling us. There is no government, no general system of law or of law enforcement, no obvious way even of setting about instituting government for these seven-tenths of the globe.

Arms control, it is rather hurriedly supposed, would be a good thing, not so much because there are too many weapons of a dangerous sort on and under the sea (although there may be), but rather to prevent a nuclear arms race breaking out on the sea bottom, just as the Space Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty have prevented arms races in space and in Antarctica.

In fact there is not much parallel, and the reason for considering sea and seabed arms control now is the almost total absence at sea of the kind of constabularies that are fundamental to any system of law and regulation. Trade has always followed the flag, because only a flag has given any guarantee of enforcible law (flags of convenience are another matter—their purpose has rather been the avoidance of enforcible law), but as far as most of the seabed, and more of the waters above it, are concerned, there is no flag, nor any other authority, unambiguously responsible for keeping what in England is called the Queen's Peace. The devising and control of sea-government forces must, I think, be considered a form of arms control of a rather new sort. If we are to use and civilize what is either our last frontier or our last great common, a purpose must govern its use. This purpose I take to be the enhancement and maintenance of national and international security and well-being at the lowest possible level of expenditure.

The problems that arise from the ungoverned status of the sea and seabed are themselves manifold: the seabed, on which industrial development of various kinds is beginning to take place, is not only the physical interface between underlying ground and superjacent waters, but also the interface between two quite different legal régimes, one for the continental shelf, one for the

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high seas. (There are three legal régimes when you include territorial waters.) It was Harry Truman who de facto initiated the distinction in 1945 by appropriating to the United States the natural resources of the seabed adjacent to the American coast.

Today the rights of a coastal state on the continental shelf (the continuation oceanwards of the continental land mass) and, arguably, beyond that, are limited, valuable and confusingly defined by the relevant Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 (an international convention widely, but not universally, accepted). This declares that beyond territorial waters the coastal state has exclusive rights on the shelf to explore and exploit its natural resources, out to a depth of 200 meters and, beyond that, "to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of natural resources." The limitation is confusing because there is probably no practical limit any more to the depth at which exploitation is possible—in 1958 it was thought there would be a technological limit. Moreover, wherever the coastal state sets up "installations and other devices" for exploration or exploitation, it can declare a cylinder of water, reaching out half a kilometer all around it and up to the surface, to be a "safety zone" into which others may not penetrate, even though this "safety zone" itself will be part of the high seas.

The Convention of the High Seas of 1958, on the other hand, declares that "no State may validly purport to subject any part [of the high seas] to its sovereignty." The high seas start where territorial waters (and national sovereignty) end, which may be three or 12 miles offshore, or in the case of several Latin American states, 200 miles. Fishing limits may be different still—in Western Europe, for instance, they are at 12 miles. The Canadian government last year added to the confusion by taking unique and wide-ranging powers to control all activities that could pollute Canadian Arctic waters, out to 100 miles from the Canadian coast. And recently the British government has taken powers to prevent oil pollution outside territorial waters. Certain international oil conventions now in process of ratification limit the amount of oil which may be discharged *anywhere* at sea.

In practice, as technology and industry take to the sea, the governments of coastal states have acquired new administrative duties on the adjacent seabed, new submarine frontiers with other states, and of course new responsibilities for defense and national security. The new frontiers are mostly ill-defined or not defined

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at all, and international law is too incoherent to provide much help. The International Court at The Hague has even decided not to back the relevant international Continental Shelf Convention. One of the few "natural laws" of political science is that violence most easily erupts over an ill-defined frontier: one need only envisage the dividing up of the bed of the Mediterranean, which is very likely to bear oil, or of the East and South China Seas, to realize what scope there is for dispute.

The whole situation so obviously leaves so much to be desired that the international community has quite definitely started to seek to improve it. Thus it has been generally accepted in the United Nations Seabed Committee that some sort of "seabed régime" should be devised, and also that there is an area of the seabed "beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction," which is the "common heritage of mankind," and which should be reserved "exclusively for peaceful purposes." But two other things are also generally accepted. The United States, the United Kingdom and France have all made proposals, more or less elaborate, for a régime, but there is no consensus about what it should be; nor about where the "limits of national jurisdiction" now are or should be, nor whether an international régime should overlap them. Particularly there is no consensus about how to take account of the fact that the sea and its bed is one natural system even though received law holds it to be several. The freedom of the high seas has come to include the freedom to dump, the freedom to pollute, the freedom to destroy living resources, and because most coastal states contain an influential body of opinion which would wish to maintain these freedoms uncurtailed, governments tend to speak with ambiguous voices and divided minds. Easy and total consensus is still very far away. Perhaps a knight's move is indicated, into another area of agreement.

It is also generally agreed that time is short if anarchy and chaos are not to acquire squatters' rights on our last common. This for three reasons—there is a limit to the amount of pollution the oceans and the shores they wash will endure: the Baltic, the Caspian, parts of the Atlantic, are already dying; there is a limit to the amount of mismanagement the living resources will endure, even if they survive the pollution: some fish stocks, by no means only whales, are now being extracted like ore from a mine, not harvested like the crop they are; and there is probably

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a limit, though this is not yet quite in sight, to the political uncertainties that industry will put up with as it moves into these potentially profitable fields. If Caesar doesn't soon decide to keep the peace in these places, Mammon will. The result would be that the overriding purpose of development and use would be profit alone instead of the wider range of interests (of course, including profit) which it is governments' function to consider. Chief among these concerns are the control of pollution, conservation and a just distribution of benefits; and of course a political régime which will allow the achievement and continuation of the first three. All will require political decision and organization and administration on a large and unfamiliar scale. A régime might plausibly seek to conciliate in cases of submarine boundary disputes below the high seas, though hardly to adjudicate or enforce judgments. Pollution controls and conservation will require—and very soon—the formulation and monitoring and enforcement of regulations. These will have to be functional, in the sense that they must relate not so much to the international community which endorses them, as to the natural systems which are to be protected and conserved for the long-term benefit of that community. Such monitoring and enforcement necessarily implies inspectorates and constabularies which, as ultimate sanction, can call for the application of legitimate and effective force.

II

A pioneering article by Robin and Frances Murray appeared in "Quiet Enjoyment: Arms Control and Police Forces for the Ocean,"[1] a collection of background papers for the Malta 1970 *Pacem in Maribus* Convocation. This study makes clear how infinitely far away the international community is from being able to call on even national inspectorates and constabularies to monitor and enforce such regulations as may be enacted. Not that national inspectorates, even if they became plentiful and widely effective, are likely to fill the international bill adequately, if only because neither pollution nor the requirements of conservation observe national boundaries. *De legibus, non curat natura.* The sea, its surface, its bed, its waters, its life, is a single system. Regulations concerning conservation or pollution which, however conveniently, relate to national (or indeed com-

[1] Edited by Elizabeth Young and Lord Ritchie-Calder. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1970.

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mercial) units, rather than to the ocean systems' natural phenomena, cannot but be inadequate.

In fact, an international police force, armed with powers of arrest and seizure, able to penetrate nationally declared "safety zones" and such, and backed by an international system of penal jurisdiction, is at present practically inconceivable. But monitoring and enforcement are separable, and monitoring of international regulations need not remain in national hands merely because enforcement cannot be internationalized.

International inspectorates, charged with monitoring regulations functionally devised and internationally endorsed, and able to require prosecution of wrongdoers in their national courts, we probably can hope for and achieve by negotiation (a combination of World Health Organization-type pollution monitoring activities and Intergovernmental Marine Consultative Organization reporting and prosecuting arrangements). Although there is perennial disagreement in the United Nations concerning armed peacekeeping forces for joint international enforcement action, there is far less disagreement over observation forces which monitoring inspectorates might well resemble. Agreement might even be reached to allow impecunious governments to delegate limited powers of arrest and seizure, though not penal jurisdiction, to the monitoring inspectorate.

The Murrays have pointed out that, at present, largely for reasons of expense, inspectorates and constabularies operate as far as possible on land and that seaborne inspectorates are scarce. However, the more industry itself moves into the sea (and the techniques enabling it to do so in increasing variety are being developed in all the advanced countries), the more the civil power will have to be there, too. Activities, for instance, on the British continental shelf are regulated almost exactly as are the same activities on land: the National Insurance Acts apply; there are specially designated Coroners; when coal is found, it is already nationalized; a police constable about his business in an offshore installation has all "the powers, protection and privileges which he has in the area for which he acts as constable" on land; the petroleum inspectorate inspects. So far, Planning Law (which regulates land use ashore) does not apply, but this too is likely when it comes to laying potentially very dangerous pipelines carrying crude oil along the bed of a sea as heavily used by man, fish and weather as the North Sea, even though

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at present the freedom to lay pipelines is specifically included in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. The Common Market Commission has explicitly concluded that the provisions of the Treaty of Rome apply to the continental shelf of member states on exactly the same basis as for land areas.

The processes of civilized administration—the job of government—are here seen spreading out from land as a concomitant of economic activity. Where this happens it has, necessarily and increasingly, an "arms-control" effect in that it is reducing the sea areas where military activities may clandestinely be carried on; and it is happening particularly in those areas that are likely to be militarily the most sensitive: it is in shallow seas and channels that minefields can most easily and effectively be laid and surveillance activities most rewardingly be carried out. However free in theory the high seas above a developed shelf may be, and however limited the sovereign rights of the coastal state on the seabed, in practice the freedom to use either waters or seabed for military purposes is shrinking, except for the coastal state, in direct proportion to development and exploitation. A form of arms limitation, a de facto reduction of military activities, will occur, in part because of the general reduction in privacy, but also because of the coastal state's probable right, certain interest and growing ability to remove any military or other hardware it may find lying about close to its shores.

There are, however, many parts of the world where the governments of coastal states have neither the technical, nor financial, nor administrative, nor military resources to follow richer parties' economic activity out to sea, to monitor their observance of national laws and international regulations, to apprehend transgressors, or to scan for military activities. Even off the shores of the United States respectable oil companies neglect safety regulations, are not apprehended in time by the local inspectorate, and cause massive pollution. The scale of the worldwide monitoring problem is daunting, but international inspectorates are not for that reason avoidable. They are necessary not only for the offshore oil industry, but for all potentially polluting offshore industries and seaborne activities, for traffic control in international narrows, and of course for the fishing industry (where nationalist folly is currently rampant). Such monitoring bodies might well make their services available to less affluent governments, or groups of governments, within territorial waters,

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as well as supervising the effectiveness of national inspectorates in their zones on the continental shelf, in the high seas and in whatever international seabed zones may eventually be determined. Pressure for the establishment of some such system is likely to grow, boosted by government and public opinion, and also by the opportunities for agreement and action presented by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Environment and the 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Such inspectorates would have an arms-limitation effect proportionate to the range and scale of their presence and activities. If, in time, the space powers were to contribute to such international inspectorates, virtually instantaneous information from observation satellites would be available for the identification, for instance, of oil spills, or areas of plankton and fish mortality. Thus, the inspectorates' work would become infinitely easier than now seems likely. Whether the Russian government would show a more positive attitude to satellite and aircraft photography of the high seas than they do to such photography of the land remains to be seen. Making such information available would result in the at least partial publication of naval activities, which naval powers might not care for, at least until their activities have become substantially more submarine than they now are. They well may.

Indeed, the arms race itself may go underwater. This it would do partly because technological developments will allow it to, but also because land-based missiles and airfields and surface vessels—particularly large ones—will become so vulnerable to attack by the end of the decade that they will cease to have much value for retaliatory deterrence—the only form at all stable. If only to conserve the stability of mutual deterrence, a switch away from land-based systems to mainly underwater strategic systems might well seem plausible, and indeed seems rather likely: the Soviet Union's submarine fleet continues to grow apace and in the United States funds are to be tripled next year for research and development for a new class of deep-diving, quiet-moving, missile-firing submarines and for a new underwater missile for them with a 5,000 or 6,000-mile range. With the whole wild ocean to roam, what could be more invulnerable?

The United States is already building a deep-diving rescue craft for submarines, and it is likely that the Soviet Union is too. Maintaining the morale of crews in long-diving submarines is

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obviously of great importance, and will depend on the possibility of rescue if things go wrong. The need for submarines self-revealingly to return to shore to pick up supplies and crews is obviated by having bases and supply craft submarine as well. The Soviet Union has been reported to have one underwater submarine base off the North American coast, and there is no inherent limit to what can be done with artificial islands and platforms, submerged or on the surface. A vast number of submersibles, manned and unmanned, apt for all sorts of commercial and military purposes, seem likely to break out from the Research and Development cupboard in the next few years, to swim, scamper, dig, dive, suck, scrape, throw and fire at almost any depth of sea. Should an agreement about land-based missiles, offensive or defensive, emerge from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), there would be the further impetus of unused aerospace expertise lying around, both in the United States and the Soviet Union, which would take to the deep sea. Indeed, major American firms in the aerospace industry have already begun so to diversify. The day of the large floating naval vessel may well be almost over (and so, one would have thought, of the absurdly vulnerable supertanker in the merchant fleet of any security-minded, oil-dependent state).

All of which does not seem to augur too well for sea or seabed arms control. At first sight, indeed, it looks as if two processes are at work, one military, one civil, set on a collision course. On the one hand, there is the arms race, which ought to be stabilized, slowed down, and eventually halted, for both political and economic reasons. Because strategic systems deployed in the ocean would allow a more stable deterrent balance in the next few years than would those deployed on land, the arms controller would welcome them as generally compatible with a slowing down of the arms race and progress toward a more satisfactory system of international security. They would provide that stable "nuclear umbrella" that was mentioned by both Russians and Americans in the early sixties as an essential element in any plausible disarmament process. The process itself would then depend on the continued invulnerability of submarines. On the other hand, the impetus of technological capability, commercial interest and plain human adventurousness is making the sea of increasingly immediate concern to governments rich and poor, to industry and to ordinary hungry people. All this will demand, sooner

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rather than later, a wide-ranging administrative régime, able to impose controls, directly or indirectly, by the exercise of physical power. The question arises whether such a régime, devised specifically to sustain global interests, can coexist with the highly national and secretive activities of great powers' strategic weapons systems, which depend for their invulnerability on the emptiness and wildness and opacity of the oceans and the absence of inspectorates and monitoring devices.

In fact the apposition is not as acute as that: economic exploitation is occurring on the continental shelf (which underlies less than 20 percent of the surface of the sea) and, in the case of the fishing industry, on the sea's surface. This, then, is where administrative inspectorates and constabularies will first be deployed. Deeper is still dearer, in economic terms, but increasingly not in military terms. Submarine strategic systems will operate either in the huge unexploitable space of the deep ocean or, armed with intercontinental range missiles, within the very substantial area of national territorial waters. This latter location would obviate problems of possibly catalytic mis-identification which could arise if missiles came to be fired from an area of ocean containing the missile submarines of several nationalities.

III

What prospects then are there for sea or seabed arms control? Arms-control negotiations are, necessarily, carried on within the existing legal framework, which here distinguishes with inappropriate precision between the high seas on the one hand and the seabed on the other. No government is at present proposing arms limitations in or on the sea as such (though the Soviet Union was proposing nuclear submarine-free zones at sea in 1968 and a Strategic Arms Limitation agreement might well cover numbers of submarines). But many governments support demilitarization or arms limitations on the seabed. The General Assembly of the United Nations last fall approved a "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof." When the United States and the Soviet Union produced a joint draft for this treaty in October 1969, first reactions were cool. The two superpowers should, it was felt, have been seeking agreement on the limitation of strategic arms rather than working on this irrelevant mite of a proposal. Article

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VI of the nonproliferation treaty had laid a specific duty on the nuclear powers to "pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date," and it was clear from its contents that this draft did not actually relate to probable developments in the nuclear arms race at all.

The treaty is now on its way, open for signature. It is of little significance as an arms-control measure because, as the U.S. Navy was pointing out in the early sixties, launchers mobile in three dimensions are preferable to immobile ones on technical, economic and military grounds; and only immobile ones are to be banned by this treaty. By chance, it may also ban the further dumping of obsolete rockets filled with nerve gas—they qualify as weapons of mass destruction—although this was not in anyone's mind during the negotiations. The valuable thing about the treaty, which was improved to this effect since the General Assembly returned the 1969 draft to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, is that it enshrines, even if academically, the right of all signatory governments to verify observance of the treaty, and to investigate suspicious activities on the seabed anywhere beyond a line 12 miles from the coast. The investigation may be conducted by the suspicious party, with assistance from others, and if there "remains a serious question," reference may be made to the Security Council, which then "may take action in accordance with the Charter." Whether there will be scope for dispute over the coastal states' own military equipment on the shelf beyond 12 miles remains to be seen. Nor is it clear how in practice "suspicions" about the coastal state will be acquired in the first place when it has the right to declare "safety zones" one kilometer in diameter.

Whether national or international monitoring inspectorates should have any positive function in verifying this and other seabed treaties is a question of considerable interest. The North Sea governments, concerned to prevent oil pollution there, solicit information from civil and military aircraft, lightships, even private vessels. While the mere existence of monitoring personnel and equipment will have an arms-limitation effect where they operate, this effect could be much enhanced by spelling out for them a duty to report on suspicious structures and activities beneath the high seas and providing them if necessary with specialized equipment. Whether such a duty was imposed would

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probably depend on any value that governments put on retaining the option to cheat under the seabed treaty. The increase in costs would be marginal, the overall saving substantial. This is indeed one of the central problems of seabed arms control: the cost, both in technical expertise and in money, of verification. Outside certain shallow seas the seabed nuclear treaty will probably be quite unverifiable, for this kind of reason. It has been said on good evidence that the cost of a reasonable search rate on the seabed, which is one square mile per day per vehicle, would be between half a million and one million dollars per year.

A treaty for the complete demilitarization of the seabed has already been proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies, but not accepted by the United States or the other Western powers, many of whom have enormously long coastlines and make extensive military use of the sea bottom for surveillance. In fact, would a treaty for the total demilitarization of the seabed add to or decrease international stability? And is such a treaty negotiable except as part of a general disarmament régime? The invulnerability of sea-based strategic systems, which is what would allow a stable deterrent balance, would certainly be reduced by any marked improvement in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) techniques such as might be built into mechanisms attached to the ocean floor. A specific agreement to prevent or limit such improvement would be useful, but almost impossible to frame, let alone to verify. A general seabed demilitarization agreement would not necessarily hobble ASW research or activities; ASW equipment secured to the sea bottom provides mainly passive information; but craft moving or stabilized in the water could equally well acquire it. Active ASW is carried on not from the seabed, but by aircraft, by surface craft, and by hunter-killer submarines. That a mere limitation on where an activity is carried out will not preclude the activity, we have already seen with the partial test ban: more tests per year have been carried out since its signature than before.

Discussing the current seabed treaty at the United Nations the French delegate declared that France would prefer a treaty for the total demilitarization of the seabed, which recognized the defensive rights of a coastal state on its adjacent shelf, and this seems to be a fairly common view. In practice, because of the expense and the difficulty, such a treaty would not be verifiable: it would be a declaration of international hope and it

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would make some kinds of equipment and activity illegitimate. Whether it would also make legitimate the destruction of such equipment when found is difficult to say: it might after all belong to a nonsignatory, or be made to appear to belong to a nonsignatory. There would probably not be much enhancement of certainty, which is, after all, a prime requirement for any arms-control measure.

What then? Is the current seabed nuclear nonemplacement treaty the most that can plausibly be negotiated? It probably is. The difficulty about going further is the usual one with all partial measures of arms control: progress is inhibited by lack of progress elsewhere. Just as only an agreement in the SALT to limit research will allow the partial test ban to be completed, so only an agreement in SALT to limit overall submarine numbers would allow any agreement to limit submarine surveillance equipment and activity. Only an agreement in SALT to limit offensive and defensive missiles will reduce the pressure toward more missile-bearing submarines, and consequently toward more equipment in the sea and on the seabed for servicing them.

And yet, and yet. The partial test ban was agreed to as an arms-control measure but the political decision to agree was prompted not only by the condition of the arms race in 1963, but also by widespread public objection to radioactive pollution of the atmosphere. In the event, the partial test ban has been much more successful as an international clean air bill than it has been in curbing nuclear proliferation. In the next few years sea and seabed arms limitation there will probably be, but as the by-product of general civil administration on the seabed and of the enforcement of conservation and anti-pollution regulations, rather than as the outcome of actual measures of arms control or disarmament.

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JUGOSLAVIA, 1971

By Anton Vratuša

CERTAIN moments in the lives of peoples represent milestones in their centuries-long journeys. There were several such moments in the process of establishing the principles of self-managed socialist democracy in the multinational federal state of Jugoslavia.

At Jajce on November 29, 1943, the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Jugoslavia laid the foundations of the present Socialist Federal Republic. What was proclaimed at Jajce became the Magna Carta of the Federation, built on the ruins of the old unitary monarchy of Jugoslavia by virtue of the War of National Liberation and the idea of brotherhood and unity.

Another historic step was taken in 1950 when the Law on Workers Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations was enacted.[1] However, more than a dozen years passed before the principle of self-management became pervasive in all domains of Jugoslav activity. Only then could it be incorporated in the 1963 Constitution.

Now in 1971 has come another major milestone. On June 30 of this year the Federal Assembly adopted 23 amendments to the 1963 Constitution. They spell out the functions of the Federation, clarify the relationship between the Federation and the constituent Republics and extend the economic foundations of self-management. The Federal Assembly also announced the nature of the Presidency, which is to be a new collective incarnation of the Socialist Federal Republic, based on equal representation of the Republics and adequate representation of the Autonomous Provinces. These achievements will further the country's socioeconomic advance and provide unity and stability for socialism and nonalignment.

II

It may now be said without exaggeration that after 25 years the three main aims of the National Liberation War and the

[1] The terminology used in the Law on the "transfer of factories to workers" indicates that at that time ownership was still state ownership and the factories were still managed by state organs. Today, the entire field of social relations, from factories to hospitals and schools, is marked by social ownership and self-management.

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socialist revolution in Jugoslavia have, on the whole, been achieved. The country soon recovered from the devastation of the war, even though it had lost 1,700,000 of its 15,000,000 people as well as suffering tremendous material damage. It developed political structures to provide for increasingly direct participation of workers and citizens in the management of public affairs. Finally, Jugoslavia's steady nonaligned international position has protected her independent, self-managing socialist development and enabled her to contribute actively to the efforts of the international community for peace, security and the democratization of relations among nations.

The working people of Jugoslavia have acquired better living conditions as a result of rapid industrialization and general overall development. Profound transformations have taken place. In 1945, the rural population accounted for 74 percent of the total; by 1971 it had dropped to 46 percent. This is still a high percentage compared with about 20 percent in highly developed countries. However, our interest is primarily to achieve a certain pace of change in the social structure. France took some 70 years to reduce the percentage of her agricultural population from 75 to 55. By comparison, Jugoslavia achieved the same change in the social structure in 14 years and despite adverse international conditions.

It is not the intention here to list achievements in material development or standards of living, but rather to compare the pace of development in Jugoslavia in the prewar and the postwar periods. In prewar Jugoslavia, in the school year 1938–39, there were 11 students to each 10,000 inhabitants; in 1968–69, the number was 115, ten times more. In prewar Jugoslavia during the period 1923–1939, the gross national product increased 1.5 times (industrial 1.8, agricultural 1.45). In the same span of time (1953–1969) the gross national product in socialist Jugoslavia increased almost three-fold (industrial five-fold, agricultural 1.6 times). In other words, the total social product grew twice as fast in the new Jugoslavia. One should add that agriculture was practically at a standstill until 1959, because almost all the public accumulation of funds was spent to speed up industrialization and for national defense. In those years when outside pressure was at its peak, the defense budget needs accounted for from 11 to 20 percent of the national income.

This comparison corroborates the view that the socioeconomic

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and political system of postwar Jugoslavia does much more to stimulate the development of productive forces and the growth of national wealth than the society of prewar Jugoslavia could possibly have done, rent as it was by social, economic, class and national antagonisms, and in an international position of semi-colonial dependence.

Another comparison is significant. In a period of 25 years (1938–1963) Jugoslavia's per-capita national income improved by two-fifths compared with Western Europe, one-quarter compared with North America (the United States and Canada), and one-tenth compared with the countries of Central Europe.[2] It is clear that Jugoslavia has succeeded in making faster progress than these more advanced nations. Jugoslavia's success proves that the widening of the gap between the industrially advanced countries and those that are developing may be avoided, provided the individual moral and material initiative of the working man is made the decisive element. Naturally, provided also that all the available resources of a country are mobilized, progressive socio-political transformations aimed at emancipating the people are carried out concurrently with the material advance, and, in addition to all this, there is adequate assistance from the international community.

Workers' self-management, introduced in Jugoslavia in 1950, is an instrument in the hands of the working class whereby the traditional domination of government over man yields increasingly to the management of man over things. It is a way for men who got rid of capitalist exploitation to avoid becoming hired laborers of the state. Moreover, ownership itself is transformed. Traditional state ownership of the means of production, primarily through nationalization, increasingly becomes social, *i.e.* anybody's and nobody's ownership. The right of self-management is guaranteed under the Constitution, the law and the statutes of working organizations, enterprises and institutions. It is based upon work performed, and it also constitutes the basis for the implementation of political and social rights.

Compared with the current phenomenon of participation in the world at large (which occurs not only as a demand of broad sections of people, especially the youth, but also in the practice of various social systems), self-management as practiced in Jugoslavia is different in two important regards. (a) Self-manage-

[2] *Ekonomist*, Belgrade, year XXI, p. 412.

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ment is the worker's right to full influence on decisions taken not only within his own organization but elsewhere as well, while participation, as a means of more or less intensive advisory participation in management, is limited largely to the spheres of personal income, welfare and standard of living.

(b) The other essential difference lies in the fact that while traditional economic democracy does not extend beyond the enterprise, workers' self-management in the Jugoslav practice refers to any kind of associated labor: from the factory to hospital, school and government administration. The right of self-management is exercised in every working place. It is institutionally and organizationally connected with self-management in the local community, commune or broader community. The decision-making is implemented either directly or through delegates to the workers' councils, whose members are elected by secret ballot, as well as through assemblies at the municipal, provincial, republic and federal levels. It increases the democratization of the nation's overall process of promoting social, economic and political cohesion.

It is sometimes alleged that decentralization is dangerous because it expands or even sets in motion centrifugal forces, makes coördination more difficult and debases work. For these reasons, it is said to be incompatible with high levels of organization and modern technology. These assumptions do not hold true. Decentralization as practiced in Jugoslavia is not a mechanical transfer of state power from central to local authorities or enterprises. It is a democratic devolution of authority.

Nor is decentralization an end in itself. It was necessary in order to break the monopoly of an increasingly powerful government apparatus and its methods of administrative centralization. As far as the problems of development are concerned, the entire experience of self-management in Jugoslavia indicates that the most formidable obstacle is precisely underdevelopment. This is only natural because under such conditions, the necessary concentration of capital leads inevitably to centralized control over allocation of the surplus product.

The self-managed Jugoslav society cannot be characterized as autarchic, closed in upon itself; coöperation and agreement among working people rather than bureaucratic commandeering are its basic characteristics. As such, this society is open to broad international coöperation.

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Let me cite a few examples of Jugoslavia's openness toward her neighbors and the rest of the world. During the International Tourism Year (1967–1968) she abolished entry visas for all foreign visitors. At present she has agreements abolishing all or some forms of visas with 36 countries. In 1970, a total of 30 million foreigners entered Jugoslavia, *i.e.* 50 percent more than the country's population. That year, a total of 17 million persons crossed the Jugoslav-Italian frontier under special arrangements regulating local frontier traffic. Also, Jugoslav citizens crossed their country's border on their way abroad 14 million times. This mobility of Jugoslav citizens results from a higher standard of living and from a feeling of freedom created by the system of self-management.

Naturally, travel of foreigners to Jugoslavia and of Jugoslav citizens abroad is only one aspect of the country's communication with the rest of the world. The relations of citizens, enterprises, institutions, communes and other elements with partners in other countries are much more important, involving varied forms of scientific, cultural, educational and technical coöperation, including joint ventures. The intensity of this coöperation represents the application in foreign policy not only of the principle of self-management at home but also of the principle of nonalignment which is the basis of Jugoslav foreign policy.

Just as self-management inside the country leads toward integration based on the individual and collective interests of the working people, so in international relations under conditions of modern technology Jugoslavia has found opportunities to stimulate national independence and to establish relations with the widest possible number of countries and links with other progressive and democratic forces throughout the world.

Of course, these aims cannot be achieved without difficulties.

On the level of self-management, a great obstacle is the country's relative underdevelopment. In addition there is a permanent contradiction between self-management, which paves the way toward the emancipation of labor on the one hand, and statist or technocratic bureaucratism on the other, both of which tend to deprive the working man of the results of his labor in the name of so-called higher goals of the State as higher efficiency.

Jugoslavia consists of several nations with long cultural and political traditions and with different levels of development. Under these conditions, various tendencies opposed to self-

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management can easily disguise themselves in chauvinistic, sectarian or nationalistic attire. Hence any problem of economic development in Jugoslavia has special political connotations; willy-nilly, it is viewed also (and sometimes primarily) from the angle of the equality of the nations which comprise it. This sometimes lends intensive political coloration to discussions of development, prices, taxes, or even of strictly economic matters.

Internationally, the nonalignment policy clashes with the policy of blocs or other divisions of the world into spheres of influence. It also challenges various policies which, relying on the possession of force, are a source of world crises, threats to independence and security, and a great obstacle to the democratic integration of the world on the basis of equality, solidarity and mutual respect.

III

Jugoslavia, in less than three decades, has had four Constitutions, the last of which has already had 40 amendments. Compared to the fact that the Constitution of the United States, in the 200 years of its existence, has had only 20 amendments, the number of changes in Jugoslavia may appear exaggerated. These, however, reflect dynamic developments and help toward resolving social stresses. It is essential to encourage the trend, while adapting the social forms in which that trend is expressed. This was recognized in the Program of the League of Communists of Jugoslavia, adopted in 1958, which states: "Nothing that has been created must be so sacred for us that it cannot be surpassed and cede its place to what is still more progressive, more free, more human."

The most important points to be cleared up at this stage of the constitutional reform are the role of the Federation, the relationship between the Federation and the Republics and Autonomous Provinces, and the further strengthening of the socio-economic status of the working man. Further elaboration in this field is being left for the next stage.

So far as the Federation's competence and organization are concerned, the solutions from the period of "administrative socialism" and the considerable degree of centralism inevitable in the initial period of development are now quite obviously inadequate. The system of self-management has permeated the entire social structure, and the Republics have transcended their

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formerly rather narrow framework. It has been necessary to link the entire federal structure more directly with the Republics.

The position of the individual worker using the means of production which he owns (farming, crafts, liberal professions, services, etc.) also had to be clarified constitutionally. The constitutional amendments guarantee freedom of the individual to engage in independent work, and those who do so are put on an equal socioeconomic plane with other workers, so as to reduce to a minimum the possibility of exploitation of hired labor by private entrepreneurs. Since as early as 1950, no one in a government or other office in Jugoslavia has been permitted to pick up the telephone and order what should be produced or how profit should be distributed. However, the development of the means whereby a working collective can dispose of the results of its work has been very slow. By 1968 enterprises were able to dispose independently of only 6 percent of the social product, with a tendency toward a further decrease. Particularly hard hit were resources for the expansion. The majority of these were allocated to the so-called extra-budgetary balances of the Federation and to the Republics or Autonomous Provinces for investment and for projects initiated by these bodies, while leading officials of business associations kept an eye on the balance left to the enterprises. Either procedure meant the separation of income from those who created it; improvements were needed to strengthen the autonomy of enterprises.

The following points should be made about the changes being brought about by the amendments:

(1) The Federation can be the protagonist only in those affairs where it should exercise jurisdiction in line with the principle of self-management and the autonomous position of the peoples and nationalities of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. This puts up a much stronger barrier to possible recurrences of centralism than was contained in previous constitutional clauses. However, it does not imply the establishment of some form of state polycentrism or substitution of republican and provincial statisms for federal statism. It means the further democratic evolution of the socio-political system on the basis of self-management.

Under the new conditions, competent organs in the Republics are rightly expected to rely on the self-managing structure when dealing with their own problems, and on agreement and associa-

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tion with other Republics on questions which can be settled successfully only in conjunction with others. Accordingly, the unity of the country may be expected to be strengthened.

(2) In addition to its own sources (such as duties, federal taxes and revenues), the Federation will also receive contributions from the Republics on the basis of uniform criteria. Federal budget outlays for national defense, security, foreign affairs, international contributions and other obligations of federal organs and administration will be shared proportionately by the Republics.

(3) The Federation is no longer an autonomous state structure, independent of the Republics. Its main organs are formed directly by the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. The Presidency of the Federal Republic is established in collective forms consisting of three representatives from each of the six Republics and two representatives from each Autonomous Province, among them the presidents of the assemblies of the Republics and Provinces as ex-officio members of the Presidency. The Federal Assembly merely promulgates the election and announces the composition of the Presidency, the members of which have been elected by the assemblies of the Republics and Provinces. This is not only an autonomous political organ of the Federation, but also the organ of the Republics and Provinces.

As the collective President of the Federation, the Presidency represents the Federation in dealing with foreign countries. It also is the supreme state organ for coördinating the interests of the Republics and Provinces, with the right of political and legislative initiative, although without touching the autonomous functions of the Federal Assembly (the parliament) and the Federal Executive Council (the cabinet). The Federal Assembly still retains its formal supreme position within the Constitution, and the Federal Executive Council is still responsible to the Assembly for the implementation of policy, federal laws and other decisions of the parliament. The Federal Executive Council reports to the Federal Assembly and informs the Presidency on the basis of its own initiative or upon the request of the Presidency on matters within its competence. In case of differences on essential questions, the Constitution provides a procedure for settling and reconciling them by democratic means, and it contains provisions for safeguarding the effectiveness and autonomy of any of the three supreme organs of the

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Jugoslav Federation within the framework of the Constitution.

(4) The Federal Executive Council remains the executive political organ of the Federal Assembly. The constitutional amendments increase the autonomy of the Council to pass regulations in regard to federal laws and other decisions of the Assembly. The members of the Council are nominated by the Federal Assembly. The government as a whole and its individual members can resign, and the Presidency and each of the chambers of the Federal Assembly, by a motion of at least ten deputies, can call for a vote of confidence in the Council.

(5) Organs of the Federation exercise power only in those affairs of common interest which have been transferred to them by the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. The Constitution specifies the questions on which the federal organs must previously obtain the agreement of those organs. To this end, so-called inter-Republic "parity committees," consisting of an equal number of representatives of the Republics and Provinces, have been formed within the Federal Executive Council.

(6) The decisions of the Federal Assembly will be coördinated with the competent organs of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces so as to carry out the Social Plan of Jugoslavia. Included will be the determination of the policies and laws regulating: the monetary system; the foreign-exchange system; foreign trade and credit relations with foreign countries; customs and public control of the prices of goods and services; credits for the more rapid development of economically underdeveloped Republics and Provinces; and in other strictly defined fields.

This means in effect that the direct participation of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces in the economic functions of the Federation concerns only those areas which are of vital importance to the whole Jugoslav community. The amendments to the Constitution have also set up a system of compensations to indemnify a Republic whose economy could suffer losses due to a federal decision.

(7) The amendments have also introduced important innovations in the sphere of foreign affairs. Specifically, the Republics and Autonomous Provinces have been given the possibility of initiative as well as relations with foreign partners within the framework of existing international agreements. In all international treaties and agreements made by Jugoslavia which set forth specific obligations for the Assemblies of the Republics

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and Provinces, the agreement of those bodies is obligatory. It should be added that one of the constitutional amendments requires that in international communications the principle of the equality of the languages of the peoples of Jugoslavia must be applied.

(8) Two regulations in the field of international economic relations are especially important. The first refers to the right of enterprises to invest capital abroad; and the second stipulates that the rights of foreigners to capital which they have invested in enterprises in Jugoslavia cannot, after the conclusion of a contract, be reduced by law or other act.

(9) As regards national defense, the former constitutional provisions denying anybody the right to sign or acknowledge any capitulation or occupation of Jugoslavia or any part thereof have been reaffirmed. Such acts are unconstitutional and punishable as high treason. Communes, Autonomous Provinces and Republics have a right and duty to arrange and organize for national defense in accordance with the national defense system. In case of an attack on the country they are also to undertake popular resistance by means of armed territorial units. All organizations are included in the defense system of the country, in accordance with the laws and decisions of territorial communities; this implies providing funds for national defense. Thus, every citizen, either armed or otherwise participating in resistance against an invader, is a member of the armed forces of the Federal Republic.

10) The amendments consolidate the position of the working man on the basis of self-management. Thus one amendment states precisely: "Income realized by any form of associated labor or means of production belongs entirely to the basic organization."

IV

Speculation as to whether Jugoslavia, following the adoption of the amendments, is a federation or a confederation is irrelevant. In fact, the multinational, self-managing, socialist Jugoslav community is neither a federation nor a confederation of the traditional type. It is something else again—a federal state and a federal self-managed community of equal peoples and nationalities. Its strength springs from its self-managing structure, which frees the initiative of the worker and of each citizen; from the equality of all its peoples and nationalities; and from its

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direct socialist democracy under the conditions of social ownership of the means of production; and from its association in general with democratic and progressive trends in the world.

Jugoslavia is vitally interested in friendly coöperation and association with all peace-loving forces in the world. And the world should be interested in Jugoslavia exactly as she is—independent, socialist and nonaligned.

The foundations of nonalignment are nonaffiliation with military-political blocs and other similar associations which might in any way restrict our country's autonomy in developing self-management or its independence of action in the international field.

What decided Jugoslavia in favor of a policy of nonalignment was, above all, her democratic and socialist orientation and her desire for overall international coöperation; she rejected a policy of manœuvring between the blocs or of trying to maintain equidistance between them, or of trying to rally the small, poor or dissatisfied for a confrontation with the rich and strong. Jugoslavia is not *a priori* against big and powerful countries; she is against a policy based on power, hegemony and suppression. Experience has proved that membership by a small country in a power bloc does not ensure its independence or unhampered development. The best guarantee of any country's security is its unity and prosperity and its active participation in international coöperation. These are, in fact, the fundamental conditions of a policy of nonalignment.

Consistent application of the policy of nonalignment enables Jugoslavia to have fruitful and open coöperation with her neighbors, based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference and mutual understanding. On this basis it was possible to settle even some highly delicate questions inherited by the countries of southeast Europe from the empires which had ruled the region. The policy of nonalignment also gives Jugoslavia room for coöperation elsewhere in Europe, although there the policy has rather narrow scope owing to the division of the continent into antagonistic blocs. Thus, Jugoslavia has succeeded in developing better relations with practically all European countries, regardless of their social systems. As a less developed European country, Jugoslavia is particularly interested in utilizing the knowledge and technology of advanced European countries for her own development.

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Nonalignment opens a road for Jugoslavia to reach even the remotest countries of other continents, especially those of the so-called third world. She has much in common with the peoples of these countries. Like her, they had to win freedom and independence at the cost of great sacrifices. And even now their place, like hers, is not secure. She has developed political, economic and technical coöperation with them, as part of the historic undertaking of the entire international community, to further the level of development, conscious that this is the responsibility of both the developed and underdeveloped, the rich and the poor.

The policy of nonalignment is the basis for Jugoslavia's independence within the changing balance of forces in the contemporary world and especially in her relations with the big powers. Jugoslavia stands by the principle that relations with one partner cannot be at the expense of those with any other partner; that new friendships cannot be to the detriment of existing friendships; that equitable coöperation with all without discrimination is in the interest of all. This is a reflection of both the strength of Jugoslavia's independent position and of the general ratio of power in the world; no one is so strong as to be entirely self-sufficient or to be able to impose one's will on others without harming oneself.

And finally, the nonaligned position enables Jugoslavia to coöperate fruitfully within the framework of the United Nations. She gives support to multilateral, joint or parallel actions for peace and security, disarmament, prevention of aggression, the strategy of development, a final liquidation of colonialism and defense of the rights of man. She sees as being especially significant the so-called new fields of U.N. activities, such as exploitation of the riches of the seabed, preservation of the environment, etc.

It has not been easy, and still is not easy today, to resist pressures for alignment. Nor is it simple to present an objective picture of the essence of nonalignment in Europe. Jugoslavia's position has been represented in some quarters as an obstacle to the relaxation of tension, as a "Trojan horse" for transmitting influences from one bloc or the other, as an impediment to world integration, or even as rampant nationalism. Nothing could be less correct. It is precisely the nonalignment policy that transcends bloc contradictions, opens up channels of mutual communication, narrows the possibilities of antagonistic confronta-

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tions and reduces nationalism and chauvinism to a minimum. True patriotism consists in the saying: "Respect others so that others may respect you."

Of course, what suits Jugoslavia may not be appropriate for other countries. After all, a characteristic feature of the policy of nonalignment is precisely that it takes realities into account. It is true, however, that whoever denies the fundamental principles of nonalignment—independence, peace, security, noninterference, observance of the right of any people to self-determination and free development, friendly coöperation among all peoples regardless of differences in social systems—cannot pursue a genuine policy of peace.

Nothing has changed the topical nature of these theses by reason of the fact that tension has of late diminished on the international scene and that negotiations between great powers have been stepped up. The lessening of tensions is taking place precisely because the above-mentioned principles are present to a greater extent in contemporary international practice.

It is certainly a positive development that the great powers negotiate on questions which concern their special responsibility for world peace and security. But peace and security can be stable only with the active contribution of all peoples. That is why participation of others in negotiations for settling the problems which threaten peace and security is essential. This is all the more important as the era of negotiations has failed to bring security to all and to eliminate many injustices.

In the era of negotiations, there is increased scope for the activities of the nonaligned. During the cold war, when open pressure was being exerted by the great powers for the smaller powers to align with them, this scope was very narrow. The main and most urgent thing then was how to prevent the cold war from turning into a general catastrophe, and how independent countries might wrench themselves out of the grip of forces which took the view that "he who is not with us is against us."

The main preoccupation at the time was how to avoid alignment with military blocs. However, the nonaligned strove then, as they still do, for independence, peace, security and democratic relations among states and peoples. That is why those who say that the "policy of nonalignment is not correct ideologically" because it allegedly has only a "no-program" are wrong.

Today, when it is clear even to those who urge bloc align-

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ments, or alignments with the powerful, that the will for independence is a force which cannot be subdued for long, the policy of nonalignment is seen increasingly as a common movement for independence, peace, security and development.

V

Experience shows that with the world's growing interdependence, peoples, nations and states are discovering an ever-larger field of common interest, and in it they seek new forms of coöperation. The constitutional amendments described here make it possible for the Jugoslav peoples to participate in these processes more and more directly.

The Jugoslav peoples are not linked solely through present economic and political interests. They are bound together by a considerable common history, by their ethnic similarities and, above all, by their common consciousness developed by the Revolution and the joint struggle for a self-managing democratic socialist society. Of course, sight should not be lost of the fact that there are also objectively differing interests among the peoples of the Republics. For instance, the interests of an advanced and of an underdeveloped Republic in Jugoslavia's single market are not always identical. Interests may also differ on programs of assistance to the less developed Republics and Provinces.

Existing contradictions cannot be settled by means of state enforcement or ideological formulae. We have chosen to deal with them in the following ways: (1) let the Federation settle only such questions as can obtain the best solutions by agreement with the Republics and Autonomous Provinces through the "parity committees;" (2) provide compensation in all cases in which a solution for the whole of Jugoslavia might adversely affect the economy of a particular Republic or Province; and (3) further consolidate, as a constitutional obligation of the entire community, the principle of financial assistance up to 1.9 percent of the G.N.P., to the less developed Republics and regions.

The real value and cohesive power of the amendments, however, will depend on the consistency with which they are implemented. The negative effect of outside factors can be of consequence only if the self-managing and democratic socialist course which is the basis of the amendments loses its clarity. That is why prophecies about the so-called disintegrating effect of the

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amendments and allegations that "Jugoslavia is slipping into uncertainty" are groundless. In the final analysis, outside dangers increase to the extent that internal forces to repel an attack become weaker. "Even wolves do not attack if they know that sharp teeth await them." The watchword of the National Liberation War was "Brotherhood and unity." It has sustained all postwar challenges and still remains a beacon for the Jugoslav ship of state.

There are two lasting postulates of the unity and firmness of contemporary Jugoslavia. First is the common interest of the peoples of Jugoslavia in self-management, creating the best possible conditions for an unhampered development of all the peoples and nationalities. Second is the legendary figure and legacy of President Tito, whose leadership in the National Liberation War, in developing the present self-managing socialist society and in evolving a broadly conceived foreign policy based firmly on independence and nonalignment has earned him a special and lasting place in the history of the Jugoslav peoples.

The first postulate is a lasting one. Its strength grows with the strengthening of Jugoslav socialist democracy and humanism. The second is as strong as the work of President Tito. But those admirers who see the unity of Jugoslavia only in Tito's figure and in his cohesive power do him a great wrong and diminish his historic achievement.

The Jugoslav self-managing socialist community, forged under Tito's leadership and bearing the imprint of his statesmanlike creativity, is strong and steadfast, for it rests on the common interests of the Jugoslav peoples and the emancipation of labor and man under the conditions of self-management.

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THE BERLIN BLOCKADE AND THE USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By Philip C. Jessup

WITH the tentative accord on the status of Berlin achieved by the envoys of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France in August it appears that this cause of contention may finally be put to rest. Agreement has been a long time in coming.

In 1948, Russian harassments blockading access to the city were submitted to the Security Council of the United Nations by France, Great Britain and the United States as "a threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter." In the spring of 1949 negotiations led to the lifting of the blockade but in 1959 the Soviets threatened to make a treaty with East Germany which, they claimed, would void the rights of the Western Allies.

The Berlin crisis of 1961 was, in the view of Richard Stebbins, "perhaps the gravest East-West crisis of the postwar period." On October 18 of that year, Secretary of State Rusk told a news conference that he would not pretend there had been no differences of opinion in the negotiations of the Western Powers on the way to deal with the Berlin crisis, but they were united on the principle of standing firm on their rights in Berlin. This was reminiscent of 1948, but now there were four Western Powers; for the German Federal Republic, whose abortion the Soviets had sought in 1948, participated on full equality with France, Great Britain and the United States. During that summer of 1961, Rusk was repeatedly asked whether the Berlin question would be taken to the United Nations. Rusk asserted that "if this crisis develops into a situation of very high tension, you can be certain it will come before the United Nations in some form."

In 1963 there were further Russian interferences with United States convoys on the autobahn. In March 1970 Four-Power talks on the status of Berlin started again. The patterns of 1948 were still sporadically recalled by hold-ups and blockages disingenuously justified by the repetition of stale excuses.

Drew Middleton quoted a "West European politician" in February 1971 as saying: "Don't ask me why the Russians continue to harass West Berlin. I just thank heaven they do; it helps hold Europe together." Is he correct, or is a quoted Dutch official more correct when he says: "Berlin is the panic button"?[1]

Even with a new agreement on the Four-Power status of Berlin and later ratification of Germany's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, Berlin as a geographical enclave will remain the sore thumb of Western Europe.

II

It is not necessary to retell the whole story which has been well written by Davison and Feis and others on the basis of firsthand accounts by some of

[1] Drew Middleton, *The New York Times*, February 7, 1971.

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the actors, even though no complete account based on all the documentary sources of history has yet been published.[2] The thread of the present narrative—which is frankly selective—leads through a labyrinth of negotiations within the government of the United States, with the British, the French and the Russians and principally in and out of a United Nations drama in which there were many actors.

In 1948 and 1949, the United States and its Western Allies were faced recurrently with the choice among several types of procedures for attempting to settle the controversies with the Soviet Union over its blockade of Berlin. There were throughout advocates of each procedure. General Clay recommended pushing through an armored column to Berlin. On the other hand, General Frank Howley, the equally forthright commandant of the American sector of Berlin during the blockade, later answered a question put to him by Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royal who asked: "What would have happened if we had brought an armored convoy into Berlin when the blockade started last June?" Howley records that he gave a straight answer: "We would have got our *derrières* shot off"—except, he writes, "I have never been known to use the word *derrière*."[3]

There were advocates of renewing negotiations with the Soviets; the British at times, and the French more often, advocated that course and had their American supporters in Washington—less so in Berlin. There were the pros and cons of reference of the blockade issue to the United Nations Security Council as a "threat to the peace" and subsequently of taking part in the mediatory efforts of the "neutrals" under the leadership of Bramuglia, Trygve Lie and Evatt.

Two points stand out in a detailed review of the experience of 1948–1949. One is the emphasis placed by the United States on the use of the United Nations, a course of action in which France and Great Britain grudgingly acquiesced. The second point is the widespread distrust by friends and allies of our motives—were they really peaceful?

The Russian blockade of Berlin began to creep around the city through restrictions on rail traffic as early as January 6, 1948, but March 1 is the date which subsequently was identified as the beginning of the full blockade. On June 25 and 26 the great airlift began despite doubts about its efficacy. The absence of an agreed plan to meet the emergency was remarkable. Even General Clay's staff in Berlin was divided; some thought the Russians were bluffing, others suggested the Allies should prepare to withdraw. Like uncertainty existed in Washington as Clay unswervingly argued for holding the line and for augmenting the airlift. The precise date is controverted but around the end of June, President Truman made one of his characteristic quick decisions—we were going to stay in Berlin; B-29 bombers were to be sent to Europe. The Berliners were magnificently courageous—they remained so, but no one at the end of June could be sure that the airlift would meet all the city's needs.

[2] W. Phillips Davison, "The Berlin Blockade—A Study in Cold War Politics." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958; and Herbert Feis, "From Trust to Terror—The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950." New York: Norton, 1970.

[3] Frank Howley, "Berlin Command." New York: Putnam, 1950, p. 235–236.

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Meanwhile on June 1, 1948, the Six-Power Conference (Benelux with France, Great Britain and the United States) reached agreement in London on the future of Germany in respect to the formation of a West German government and the control of the Ruhr without participation of the Soviet Union. Without asserting that the London agreements were inspired by the Berlin blockade, the latter was a major thrust in the cold war designed to oust the West; and the counterthrust of the West marked the beginning of a strategic advance which led to momentary tactical victory at Berlin.

I do not know who in Washington or London first became convinced that the Berlin blockade issue should be taken to the United Nations, but this course was a dominant theme in the tripartite diplomatic correspondence during the summer of 1948. At the outset, recourse to the United Nations was probably endorsed by some *faute de mieux,* since we were determined not to withdraw, not to fight (although the availability of the A-bombs was not ignored) and not to negotiate under duress. As early as April 14, 1948, Llewellyn Thompson, who was then Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs in the State Department, handed to Bérard, of the French Embassy, a draft of a statement which might be included in a note to the Soviet Union. The draft included a passage to the effect that unless traffic to Berlin were restored with adequate assurances, and "if the conditions for a discussion of the dispute under Article 33 of the Charter are not thereby fulfilled, the United States will, as the next obligatory step, submit the matter to the impartial judgment of the United Nations," reserving the right to take any measures necessary to safeguard its position in Berlin.[4]

The spring and early summer were rife with discussions between the Americans, the French and the British, and by July it was clear that the three governments were agreed that the first step was an approach to the top echelon in Moscow—to Stalin himself or at least to Molotov. The United States had no expectation that negotiations in Moscow would be productive but two factors induced agreement to that course of action. One was the need to meet the French and British insistence on that procedure. The other factor seems to have been to prepare for ultimate resort to the United Nations. Much of the tripartite discussion at first was concerned with the drafting of a note to the Soviets. Immediately after President Truman's decision our London Embassy was informed that we would keep world opinion alerted and that eventually we might resort to the United Nations. On June 30, 1948, Ambassador Lewis Douglas, a consistent advocate of resort to the United Nations, reported from London that Prime Minister Atlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin doubted the desirability of mentioning to the Soviets the possibility of a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers or of resort to the United Nations at that stage. The French also wanted to omit, in any note to Moscow, all mention of the possibility of such

[4] Article 33 of the Charter, which is often invoked in this period, provides: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

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resort. The State Department insisted that the omission would make the note sound like an ultimatum. They said that Congressional and public opinion in the United States would not understand a failure to make any reference to the possibility of utilizing the machinery of the highest international body if the deadlock between the four occupying Powers continued. (If this was true in 1948, why is it not true today?) The Department fell back on the position that the three governments' notes need not be "identical."

The Department had given a good deal of thought to the possibility of taking the case to the International Court of Justice but noted that, unlike a domestic court in comparable circumstances, the World Court could not enjoin the Soviet Union. Yet it might prove desirable to get the General Assembly to ask the Court for an advisory opinion. The "appropriate organ" of the United Nations might recommend that the blockade be lifted while the question of the right of access was being adjudicated. The Department further pointed out that any U.N. member or the Secretary-General could bring the Berlin case to the Security Council as a threat to the peace; Secretary-General Lie had offered to help but was told it was not necessary at that time.

On July 6 the three Powers sent their notes demanding that the blockade be lifted. Senator Vandenberg recorded in his diary that "on my own Corona one midnight" he drafted stiffer language in the United States note. The Soviets rejected the notes on July 14. On July 30, Ambassador Bedell Smith and his British and French colleagues in Moscow requested an appointment with Stalin; after some stalling they were given an interview with Stalin and Molotov on August 2. In this and in ensuing talks in the Soviet capital, the issue of the currency circulating in Berlin was of prime importance. Briefly, the question was whether the Soviet mark should be allowed to circulate as the sole currency in all Berlin which would mean the withdrawal of the more valuable Western "B" mark and whether the circulation would be under quadripartite control. Stalin seemed to be in a friendly and accommodating frame of mind. He was, of course, not unaware that the West's counterblockade was tightening and that 60 U.S. B-29 Superfortresses had arrived in England by July 17.

When the discussions moved to details in talks with Molotov, progress slowed to a halt. A further meeting with Stalin was arranged on August 23 and certain oral assurances were given by him. Without making it a condition, Stalin hammered away at the London agreements of June first about the formation of a West German government and indicated that the future status of Berlin depended on Four-Power agreement on German unity. Apparent understandings were reached in the so-called Directive of August 30 which left to the military commanders in Berlin detailed arrangements on the currency issue. This ambiguous paper disturbed General Clay in Berlin and the State Department in Washington. Marshal Sokolovsky soon revealed in the Berlin talks that Stalin's fair words were meaningless.

On September 2, as Marshal Sokolovsky in Berlin began sabotaging the August 30 Directive, Legal Adviser Ernest Gross sent a memorandum to "Chip" Bohlen, then Counselor of the Department, saying that we had weakened our position by agreeing to that Directive and "sooner or later

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we must face the possibility of international action, whether in the International Court or the United Nations." Douglas had already been instructed to urge resort to the Security Council and he kept pushing the British and French in the hope that tripartite action could be taken quickly when the break occurred. French Ambassador Massigli in London said the French government would not answer until told what course of action was contemplated after resort to the United Nations. Paris always suspected the United States of bellicosity. But Douglas asked Massigli what we would do if we did not go to the United Nations. This was a question often asked and never really answered, and Ambassador Bedell Smith in Moscow remarked to the Department that he had never been told what strategic plan was contemplated, aside from a reference to the United Nations. Actually no other plan had been adopted, though the Policy Planning Staff was studying the issue. George Kennan records his sense of frustration in his attempts to have the Policy Planning Staff fulfill its proper functions, and in general to have the Department deal wisely with the whole German problem.

On August 23, in a teletype conference with London in which the State Department assembled a "first team"—Lovett, Bohlen, Rusk, Reber, Bancroft, Beam, Gerhardt and Byroade—it had been argued that reference to the United Nations was an obligation under Article 37 of the Charter but did not preclude any other action which might be agreed upon. For French ears it was said that a reference to the Security Council would help to prevent armed action during consideration in the United Nations. It would be possible to take the case to the General Assembly after the Soviet veto in the Security Council. The French did not seem to realize, it was said, that the United Nations was about the only machinery by which we could avoid for a time the possibility of "a brutal choice between war or submission." Our "prestige and integrity of action" would be preserved by a U.N. discussion even while the blockade continued. The French had offered no alternative.

It was good news from Ambassador Caffery in Paris on September 7 that Robert Schuman had formed his new government and had agreed to tell the staff at the Quai d'Orsay that the Berlin case should be taken to the United Nations if there were a breakdown in the talks. The whole scene was shifting to Paris as the delegates began arriving there for the opening of the third regular session of the General Assembly.

In the week or so before Secretary of State Marshall arrived in Paris on September 19, the attempt to reach tripartite agreement continued full steam. On September 11, Bohlen suggested to Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington, that the Soviets might be planning to go into the U.N. General Assembly with a propaganda campaign of their own. Ambassador Bedell Smith thought the Soviets would be in a strong position in the General Assembly; even if the West secured a two-thirds vote, abstentions by Far Eastern and Near Eastern blocs and the Scandinavian states would prevent any resolution from appearing as a worldwide condemnation of the Soviet threat to the peace. Marshall told the Cabinet in Washington that Bevin had sent him a personal message hoping they would not have to break negotiations with the Russians and would not need to appeal to the

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United Nations. The Cabinet talked about the war-weariness of the British who hesitated to make crucial decisions because, as Forrestal records, "they were in the front line."

There was one further exchange of notes with the Soviets before the three Western Powers at last, on September 26, 1948, informed Moscow that the "illegal and coercive blockade" created a threat to peace and security which the Powers were obliged to refer to the Security Council. In identical letters to the Secretary-General on September 29 they asked for an early meeting of the Council.

The General Assembly opened its session on September 21, 1948, in the Palais de Chaillot where the French were still completing some hasty remodeling. The Security Council, whose sessions were soon to overlap and be interlarded with those of the Assembly's committees, met in the large auditorium which was also used for the plenary sessions of the Assembly. When we met as the Council, we sat on the stage as if in a play. During the debate on the Berlin blockade we had what the theatre world would call "a good house."

I was one of the five United States delegates to the Assembly, and as the Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations, was one of the four persons who under the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 were authorized by Congress to represent the United States in the Security Council; the other three were President Truman, Secretary Marshall and Ambassador Warren Austin. Secretary of State Marshall told me that I was to handle the Berlin case in the Security Council.

Although the proceedings in the Security Council were quite separate from the concurrent proceedings in the General Assembly, members of the United States delegation to the Assembly were bound to be questioned by other delegates about the Berlin crisis. The United States delegation therefore had to be briefed. On September 25, Dean Rusk, then the director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, explained the situation in detail, emphasizing that the Western Powers were resorting to the United Nations, not just to make a record but in the hope of getting a settlement. He stressed the point that a heavy responsibility was lodged on the nonpermanent members of the Security Council.

Secretary Marshall stayed at the Embassy residence which is located about halfway between the Place d'Iéna, where the delegation had its offices in a commandeered hotel, and the Palais de Chaillot, not more than a five-minute walk. He met with the delegation every morning and often summoned individual members to conferences at the residence.

On the day following Rusk's presentation, Ambassador Douglas, Rusk and I met with Secretary Marshall at the residence. Douglas said that he had noted among members of the United States delegation some uncertainty as to whether our appeal to the Security Council was merely designed to give us moral backing for any further steps we might find it necessary to take, including the use of force, or whether we were seeking help in getting a solution. I strongly agreed, noting that the same question arose in the minds of other delegations and that to be convincing we must have in mind that we would be prepared to carry out a solution proposed by the

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United Nations even if it were not just what we would desire. The Secretary said any statement I made on that subject must be carefully considered but that now we had decided to refer the matter to the United Nations we must be prepared to carry through. As the three of us discussed it together later, we felt the Secretary had given us the necessary indication of our general policy, and we followed it thereafter as time and again our motives were questioned or challenged. The day following this conversation, Secretary Marshall himself explained the developments to the delegation. On October 14, Bohlen and I went to the residence and outlined to Secretary Marshall our plan of action in the Security Council debates. He approved it and told me that he wanted me to understand that I was not operating on leading strings and that he would back me up on any action I took provided it was not appeasement.

On another occasion he told a number of us that he would shortly have to return to the United States for an operation and that he thought under the circumstances he would resign as Secretary of State. We remonstrated vehemently, emphasizing the enormous prestige he had and what an irreplaceable asset to the United States he was. The next day I had an appointment to see him alone. He expressed annoyance at what he considered the flattery of the remarks made to him the day before; he didn't like that kind of thing. I told him that I had no reason to curry his favor; by giving me the Berlin assignment he had done me the greatest favor he could grant and the only other thing I could ask of him was to accept my resignation after the end of the session since I had overstayed my leave of absence from Columbia University. Later he told me that when he returned to the United States, since Ambassador Austin was ill he was going to appoint me acting head of the delegation. I told him he could not do that. It was the deliberate policy of President Truman to appoint a leading Republican as chief representative to the United Nations to assure the bipartisan nature of our U.N. policy. It was essential that he designate John Foster Dulles who was a member of the delegation and presumptive heir to the State Department if Dewey won the election that fall. Secretary Marshall appointed Dulles.

On October 4, Secretary Marshall met with Bevin. They agreed that there should not be any meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers while the blockade was on but that we should state in the Security Council that we would be willing to have such a meeting as soon as the blockade was lifted. Schuman also agreed. Bohlen telegraphed Ambassador Robert Murphy in Berlin that there was some concern in Paris lest anything be done in Berlin to aggravate the situation while the case was before the Security Council. Only in a great emergency should anything be done without first notifying the Secretary in Paris.

George Kennan, then Director of the Policy Planning Staff, in a memorandum of October 5 to Bohlen advised that if the United Nations asked the Soviet Union to discuss a solution of the whole problem, and if it could provide that restrictions on access to Berlin would be terminated during the discussions, the United States should accept such a proposal. He pointed out that since we could not discuss under duress, we needed some mediatory

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agency, which could only be the United Nations. He concluded that if the Security Council did not succeed in inducing the Soviets to lift the blockade, our last chance was to take the case to the General Assembly. Since this seemed to him a likely outcome, he had drafted a statement which Secretary Marshall might read in the General Assembly. George Kennan's enthusiasm for the United Nations has been frequently under the strictest control but this was not the only time when he recognized one of its values.

Meanwhile the ground was being prepared as it always must be in a case before the United Nations. Answers to possible arguments of opponents must be drafted in advance. Friends must be informed, persuaded or encouraged. During sessions of the General Assembly, a work week of 80 to 90 hours was normal. By the evening of October first, all members of the Security Council, except the Soviet Union and the Ukraine, had been visited.

The proposal to put the Berlin question on the Security Council agenda was debated on October 4; Vishinsky argued that the Council was incompetent to consider the matter, but the item was inscribed on the agenda on October 5 by a vote of 9 to 2, the Ukrainian representative naturally joining the Soviet Union in the minority. Since this was a procedural question, it could not be vetoed. The case for the three Western Powers was presented to the Security Council in statements made on October 6. The activity then continued behind the scenes until October 15 when Bramuglia, the Argentine President of the Council, put a series of questions to the Four Powers. We three replied on October 19, and on the basis of the data thus furnished the six so-called Neutral Powers presented a draft resolution on the 22nd. Their resolution called for the immediate raising of all restrictions on traffic to Berlin, resumption of talks of the four military governors on the currency problem and a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the whole question of Germany.

We had received from the Canadian delegation an advance copy of the draft prepared by the Six and reported its substance to the State Department in a teletype conference on October 20. We did not think the draft was perfect but the Six had tried to meet our essential requirements and the British and French were ready to accept it. Bohlen reported that on the preceding evening in Montmartre cabarets, "a notoriously bullish environment, the betting was 8 to 1 against Soviet acceptance." The Department authorized us to accept. October 25 marked the climax of the debate, with the three Western Powers accepting the draft resolution in detailed statements which were followed by Vishinsky's veto.

The Security Council was stymied for the moment, but the Berlin item remained on its agenda and we were determined to keep it there. I summed up the situation in a memorandum to Secretary Marshall on October 26. Our consultative group in Paris, I wrote, had considered alternative courses of conduct. We now felt that the earlier idea of turning to the U.N. General Assembly was not desirable, since even though we could count on an overwhelming favorable vote, that would not influence the Soviets, or lift the blockade, or strengthen the United Nations. We also recommended against the immediate introduction of the Western "B" mark as the sole currency

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in the Western sectors of Berlin. We agreed with General Clay that it would be futile to present road, rail and barge traffic at the barriers to see if the Russians would now let them through. Bohlen added that to have a train turned back at the checkpoint would be humiliating. Our fourth and only affirmative recommendation was for adopting some form of the plan for setting up a neutral U.N. commission of experts to study the currency problem in Berlin and to make recommendations.

Back in September, Secretary Forrestal had made a comparable suggestion which the State Department telegraphed to Bohlen. Forrestal suggested a committee which might be composed of three impartial experts chosen from the central banks of Holland, Sweden and Switzerland. He thought such a proposal would show that we in good faith wanted a settlement. But Forrestal did not have in mind, as we did, a further use of the U.N. mechanism. At the end of October, Murphy informed Under Secretary of State Lovett that General Clay would not comment on this plan, but Murphy and the Office of Military Government for Germany thought it a sound idea although they doubted whether the Soviets would agree. Bohlen suggested that the President of the Security Council should ask Secretary-General Lie to arrange with the Four Powers to allow neutral financial experts to go to Berlin to study the currency question on the spot. It was this plan of Bohlen's which we recommended to Secretary Marshall although, contrary to Bohlen's idea, we suggested that the United States might make an advance commitment to accept whatever recommendation was made by the neutral experts. We thought such a gesture would have the advantage of keeping the good will of the Six Neutrals and demonstrating our reasonableness and desire for a settlement. Of course we would need to consult the British and French. Ambassadors Bedell Smith in Moscow and Douglas in London concurred in our recommendation.

On October 27, a joint statement was issued by the three foreign ministers of the Western Powers in which they reiterated that they accepted the Resolution of the Six which Vishinsky had vetoed and that they were ready "to carry it out loyally." They stood by "their expressed willingness to be guided by the principles embodied" in the Resolution. They added: "The question is still on the agenda of the Security Council. The three Governments are ready to continue to fulfill their obligations and to discharge their responsibilities as members of that body, which is still in a position to consider any development in the situation."

It is striking how often one person after another stressed the point that we must convince others that we really wanted a settlement. The suspicion of our motives did not seem to slacken. I had a rather startling example of this when I attended the annual reception given by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. The President was the acerb Herbert Evatt of Australia who was a frequent source of annoyance and embarrassment, especially to Bevin in view of the Commonwealth connection. At the reception there came a moment when I was standing next to Evatt and no others were close at hand. He turned to me and snarled: "So you want to start another war, do you? Well, we're not going to let you do it!" I told him he was quite mistaken but I did not bother to inquire how, if we had intended

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to start a war, he proposed to stop us. Perhaps he thought he could do this through the ill-advised letter addressed to the heads of the four governments, in which on November 13 he and Trygve Lie urged the resumption of peaceful negotiations.

Trygve Lie had been following the Berlin question intently and has described his activities in his own memoirs.[5] His plan was substantially the one which, entirely independently, we had recommended to Secretary Marshall, namely that an outside neutral source, *i.e.* the United Nations, should work out the solution of the currency problem and submit it to both sides.

On November 22, Secretary Marshall was in Washington and attended a Cabinet lunch with the President. Forrestal recorded:

> Marshall reported on our activities at U.N., from which it would appear that our situation vis-à-vis Berlin, and the Russian situation in general, is rapidly deteriorating. Evatt, who is President of the General Assembly, is an active source of both irritation and uncertainty. The result of his activities and, to a lesser extent, Bramuglia's . . . who is chairman of the Security Council, has been greatly to undermine the American position among the neutral nations. He has succeeded in giving the impression that, after all, the Russian demands are not so extreme and unmeetable.

Evatt was more influential than Bramuglia, but the General Assembly recessed on December 16 and the Security Council became preoccupied with the Indonesian question and renewed fighting in Palestine. The U.N. committee of experts continued its work in Geneva, finally reporting to the Security Council at Lake Success on February 11, 1949. They submitted a mass of material but had to say they were unable to recommend a plan acceptable to all Four Powers.

The Security Council never considered their report because it was overtaken by new events. Those events included the talks which I had in New York with Jacob Malik, the Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations—another use of that convenient international diplomatic mechanism. The story of those conversations (they were not "negotiations") is summarized by Dean Acheson,[6] who succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State on January 21, 1949. The finale of that chapter in the postwar history of Berlin came on May 4, 1949, when in the United States Mission to the United Nations, Malik and I and the Permanent Representatives of England and France signed an agreement to lift the blockade and to hold a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Nevertheless there is an additional fragment to be added to the story. In 1951 the three Western Powers asked the General Assembly to appoint an international commission to determine whether conditions would permit free elections as a step toward the reunification of Germany. The General Assembly on December 20 adopted a resolution to that effect by 48 votes to 6 with 8 abstentions. The Commission was composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Poland. Poland refused to serve and Soviet noncoöperation blocked the task of the Commission—just

[5] Trygve Lie, "In the Cause of Peace." New York: Macmillan, 1954. Chapter XII.
[6] Dean Acheson, "Present at the Creation." New York: Norton, 1969, p. 269–274.

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as in 1948 it had prevented the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea from carrying out its mandate to conduct free elections there.

III

The United States by its advance commitment, and by its very submission of the Berlin dispute to the United Nations in 1948, had taken a risk that it would have to submit to an unsatisfactory solution. It is true that we had reliable and influential friends in the United Nations, but even our British and French allies might have pushed us into an uncomfortable corner.

The Berlin dispute involved vital interests of the United States but there was no acceptable alternative to the United Nations. Advance submission to a U.N. decision does not mean that one relaxes into fatalistic inaction; one works literally day and night to inform and persuade. When we negotiated with our co-victors the Peace Treaty for Italy, agreement was reached in 1947 on a provision which bound the Powers in advance to accept any decision of the United Nations General Assembly on the future of the Italian colonies in Africa. The debates in the Assembly were long and arduous but the results were accepted by all concerned. The United States never did have a "mechanical majority" in the United Nations, but it often made proposals with which the requisite number of delegates or governments agreed. In the greatly enlarged United Nations of today the task of persuasion is much more difficult but it is not impossible—if we have a sound position. We would have been on firm ground five or ten years ago if instead of leading the fight against Peking we had announced that we would agree to any resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly concerning the seating of Peking's representatives in the Security Council and General Assembly, subject only to the condition that the fourteen millions of people on Taiwan were not exposed to massacre. It may well be true that the light we seek at the end of the bloody Vietnam tunnel could be turned on at the United Nations.

Apparently the "Nixon Doctrine" rests on the proposition that the role of the United States in world affairs is not that of the world's policeman. It would be equally true to say that we have no mandate to decide by ourselves how all the problems of the world are to be solved. The view of the majority of nations at times may be clearer than the view of one major nation. As George Kennan wrote in a letter printed in *The New York Times* on September 25, 1966, our nation "owes it to itself to show respect for the feelings of the world community and to make concessions to them even when it does not fully agree with them. Its long-term interests are not likely to be damaged by doing so." Power, to be sure, involves responsibility. The question is, responsibility for what and to whom? The responsibility of the world's most powerful nation may attach to an ever-changing series of international situations but it is always a responsibility to a constituency larger than its own people.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Lewis C. Austin, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. By Philip C. Jessup. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 82 p. $5.95.

The former United States Judge on the International Court of Justice has compressed much wisdom about the future of the rule of law into this slender volume. He also advances several constructive suggestions for strengthening the Court.

POLITICS AND THE STAGES OF GROWTH. By W. W. Rostow. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 410 p. $9.50 (Paper, $3.95).

The author suggests that the 1970s ought to be the Decade of Political Development in the sense that the 1960s was the Decade of Economic Development. His data, based on the experiences of eight countries, lead him to guardedly optimistic conclusions.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. By John King Fairbank. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 500 p. $9.95 (Paper, $2.45).

This book, completely revised since its last edition in 1958, still remains the most balanced, informative, wisest work on American relations with China.

NATIONS IN DARKNESS: CHINA, RUSSIA, AND AMERICA. By John G. Stoessinger. New York: Random House, 1971, 197 p. $6.95.

The author presents ten original case studies in Chinese-American and Russo-American relations which demonstrate how misperceptions of "the other side" have led to disaster in the recent past. A set of guidelines to statesmen who wish to avoid such pitfalls concludes the book. A timely and innovative work.

THE FIELD OF NATIONS. By Nigel Forward. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, 207 p. $5.95.

A British scholar surveys the leading game-theory and mathematical approaches to international politics, using the Cuban missile crisis as a model. The book cuts through a great deal of jargon with considerable insight and a welcome sense of humor.

COLD WAR CRITICS: ALTERNATIVES TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMAN YEARS. Edited by Thomas G. Paterson. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971, 313 p. $10.00 (Paper, $2.95).

A selection of revisionist historians writing on various aspects of the early cold-war period. All are highly critical of American policy toward the Soviet Union and eager for reconciliation between the superpowers.

NOTE—By special arrangement with UNA-USA World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain any book published in the United States (except paperbacks), at the publisher's regular list price. Prepaid orders over $10.00 postage free; under $10.00, add 25¢ for U.S.A., 75¢ outside U.S.A. Send orders with check or money order, to World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, 10017.

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DECOLONIZATION: THE ADMINISTRATION AND FUTURE OF THE COLONIES, 1919–1960. By Rudolf von Albertini. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 680 p. $12.95.

This treatment of the decolonization policies of the European imperial powers, especially those of Britain and France, is a first-rate piece of scholarship.

SELF-DETERMINATION AND HISTORY IN THE THIRD WORLD. By David C. Gordon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 219 p. $7.50.

In this scholarly study, the author shows how a number of new nations have used history for the purpose of strengthening national cohesion and how, in attempting to free themselves from colonial myths, national leaders often found it necessary to fashion counter-myths.

SOVIET AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A TWENTY-FIVE-YEAR PERSPECTIVE. Edited By Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburgs. New York: New York University Press, 1971, 211 p. $8.95.

A thoughtful assessment of superpower relations at the United Nations during the recent past, spiced with some provocative glimpses into the dynamics of the U.S.S.R.-U.S.-China *ménage à trois* in the possibly quite near future.

UNTANGLING THE COLD WAR: A STRATEGY FOR TESTING RIVAL THEORIES. By William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, 222 p. $6.95.

A rather ponderous attempt to develop a new "research strategy" for the cold war.

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 1941–1947. Edited by Walter LaFeber. New York: Wiley, 1971, 172 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

A balanced selection of documents and articles.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE SUBSTANCE, PROCESSES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR WORLD PEACE WITH JUSTICE. By Charles S. Rhyne. Washington: CLB Publishers, 1971, 656 p. $22.50.

A very comprehensive treatment of the subject including non-Western principles and experiences in international law.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS. By Frank Griffith Dawson and Ivan L. Head. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971, 334 p. $11.75.

Lawyers, laymen and corporations who venture abroad or who become involved in litigation abroad will find this study most valuable.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Edited by Leon Gordenker. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 241 p. $7.50.

Six first-rate essays by leading scholars on the United Nations, exploring the present and future role of the world organization in the international political system.

SPIEL DER KRÄFTE IN DER WELTPOLITIK. By Wilhelm G. Grewe. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1970, 668 p. DM. 48.

A thorough survey of modern international politics, by a leading German scholar-diplomat.

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CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS. Edited by Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz. Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1971, 474 p. $7.50 (Paper, $4.95).

An imaginatively compiled group of 22 articles analyzing types of conflict characteristic of the contemporary world.

BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Edited by Ian Brownlie. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 531 p. $11.25 (Paper, $5.75).

A convenient handbook of sources on human rights, with brief annotations by the editor.

THE ART AND PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY. By Robert B. Harmon. Metuchen (N.J.): Scarecrow Press, 1971, 355 p. $10.00.

A well-annotated bibliography of some 900 selected works.

THE COMMON SENSE OF POLITICS. By Mortimer J. Adler. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 265 p. $6.95.

This excursion into political philosophy includes a naïve plea for world government and some very ambitious suggestions for improving mankind's political institutions.

COUNTER-TRADITION. Edited by Sheila Delany. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 377 p. $10.00.

A fascinating anthology of radical writings from antiquity to the present.

SOCIAL PATTERNS AND POLITICAL HORIZONS. By Roy Wood Sellars. Nashville: Aurora Publishers, 1970, 408 p. $10.00.

A learned though rather diffuse *tour d'horizon* of the main political systems and their philosophical bases in Western history.

COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF POLITICS. By Ivo D. Duchacek. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 370 p. $3.95 (Paper).

A sophisticated treatment of the multifaceted relationship between geography and power in the modern world.

POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION. By Robert A. Dahl. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 257 p. $7.95.

A tightly woven exploration of the conditions under which cultures that do not tolerate political opposition may be transformed into societies that do. The author is at his empirical best in reaching his conclusions.

THE SILENCE OF PIUS XII. By Carlo Falconi. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 430 p. $10.00.

After having conducted original research in Jugoslavia and Poland, the author concludes that the Vatican was well aware of the Nazi atrocities in these two countries.

THE WORLD THIS YEAR: 1971 SUPPLEMENT TO THE POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia, with the Assistance of Sheila Low-Beer. New York: Simon and Schuster (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1971, 168 p. $9.95.

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Now in its forty-fifth year of publication, this authoritative reference work provides up-to-date details about the status, organization and current politics of 153 governments, as well as the membership, institutional structure and current activities of 52 major intergovernmental organizations and affiliated institutions. The political vignettes are classics of their kind, and are frequently entertaining as well as informative.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE POLITICS OF POLICY MAKING IN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By Roger Hilsman. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 198 p. $2.95 (Paper).

This book sheds light on the limitations on presidential policy-making through the bureaucracy and the Congress. It echoes, in many of its conclusions, the insights of Richard Neustadt in "Presidential Power."

THIS ENDANGERED PLANET. By Richard A. Falk. New York: Random House, 1971, 495 p. $8.95.

The distinctive feature of this thoughtful book is the development of the concept of ecological politics: the need to enlarge the political frame of reference everywhere to include environmental issues.

A SURVEY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. By John Cookson and Judith Nottingham. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971, 420 p. $9.75.

Two British scholars have undertaken a painstaking study of the manufacture, availability and use of CBW, particularly in the United States, Canada and Europe.

THE USE OF FORCE: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, 547 p. $5.95 (Paper).

A widely representative symposium on the uses of military power in world politics today.

DETENTE DIPLOMACY: UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE 1970's. By Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt. New York: Dunellen (for the Atlantic Council of the United States), 1970, 170 p. $6.95.

An historical analysis of the main problems confronting the architects of East-West détente in Europe.

RÜSTUNGSKONTROLLE: FRIEDENSSICHERUNG ZWISCHEN ABSCHRECKUNG UND ABRÜSTUNG. By Erhard Forndran. Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1970, 272 p. DM. 42.

A wise assessment of American deterrence and arms-control policies during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

SECOND IN COMMAND. By Edward R. Murphy, Jr. with Curt Gentry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 452 p. $8.95.

The former Executive Officer of the *Pueblo* at the time of its capture charges that the incident "need never have happened" and places responsibility for the ship's seizure squarely on Commander Lloyd M. Bucher.

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THE PEOPLE PROBLEM. By Dean Fraser. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971, 248 p. $6.95.

One of the most impressive of the numerous neo-Malthusian analyses currently available.

EINSTEIN: THE LIFE AND TIMES. By Ronald W. Clark. New York: World Publishing Co., 1971, 718 p. $15.00.

A comprehensive and well-written biography. The author emphasizes Einstein's youth in the context of the rise of modern Germany, his middle years in the pursuit of the relativity theory and the dilemma of nuclear weapons, and his last years devoted to the cause of Zionism.

SOLDIERS, SCHOLARS, AND SOCIETY. By Edward Bernard Glick. Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1971, 144 p. $6.95.

A set of common-sense recommendations aimed at easing the tensions that exist between the military and the nonmilitary.

THE BALANCE OF TERROR: A GUIDE TO THE ARMS RACE. By Edgar M. Bottome. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, 215 p. $6.95.

One of the best succinct treatments currently available on the history of nuclear diplomacy during the past 25 years.

SCIENCE, SCIENTISTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Dean Schooler, Jr. New York: Free Press, 1971, 338 p. $6.95.

A broadly conceived survey of the present state of knowledge that scholars possess about scientists and public policy.

HITLER'S LAST OFFENSIVE. By Peter Elstob. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 413 p. $9.95.

A British tank commander during the Battle of the Bulge has rendered a fascinating account of that epic encounter in the Ardennes. The author demonstrates that the battle was lost for Hitler after the first three days and that the ironic end result was that the Russians, rather than the Americans, captured Berlin.

THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR 1941–45. By Albert Seaton. New York: Praeger, 1971, 628 p. $15.00.

This is one of the most thorough histories currently available. The author's conclusions are not startling: Hitler was solely responsible for the outbreak of the war and for the disaster at Stalingrad.

SOUTH TO BATAAN: NORTH TO MUKDEN. Edited by D. Clayton James. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971, 207 p. $10.00.

A terse but revealing diary by a high-ranking American prisoner of war, Brigadier General W. E. Brougher, all of it written while in Japanese prison camps from 1942 to 1945.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND WAR BETWEEN STATES: THREE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By Kjell Goldmann. Stockholm: Läromedelsförlagen, 1971, 368 p.

A somewhat labored effort to quantify political decision-making in the international system, by a Swedish scholar. (Sponsored by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.)

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DISARMAMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF EFFORT. By William Epstein. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1971, 97 p. $3.00 (Paper).

A succinct and useful survey of recent progress in arms control, with emphasis on the constructive role of the United Nations.

General: Economic and Social

THE CRUEL CHOICE: A NEW CONCEPT IN THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. By Denis Goulet. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 362 p. $12.50.

"The subordination of goods to the good" is one of the themes running through this rich and suggestive discussion of the ethics of development. Others concern power, participation, the exposure of societies to forces they cannot control and the inherent tendency of the rich to "domesticate" the development of the poor. Readers may disagree with much that Mr. Goulet says but they will have to think about it.

THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: THE TWILIGHT OF THE GATT? By John W. Evans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 383 p. $13.95.

A major addition to the literature of American foreign trade policy by a man who has had many years of experience as an official and negotiator. Although the focus is on the Kennedy Round, the book provides an informed analysis of the main features of American policy throughout the postwar period (and, indeed, since 1934). Well and clearly written. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.)

ASPIRATIONS AND AFFLUENCE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE. By George Katona and others. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971, 239 p. $12.95.

Does increasing affluence make Europeans more like Americans? Sometimes yes and sometimes no and it depends in part on where you live, according to this interesting book which looks at the attitudes of consumers as well as their economic behavior.

JAPAN AND A PACIFIC FREE TRADE AREA. By Kiyoshi Kojima. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 195 p. $10.00.

Though the prospects of a Pacific Free Trade Area are remote, consideration of the problems it would raise is a good vehicle for examining a number of aspects of Japan's place in the world economy. Professor Kojima, a leading authority, devotes several interesting papers to Japan's relations with the less developed countries.

WAGE RESTRAINT: A STUDY OF INCOMES POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Lloyd Ulman and Robert J. Flanagan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 257 p. $7.50.

An intelligent, subtle and clearly written analysis of the largely unsatisfactory European experience. Commissioned (but not controlled) by the Council of Economic Advisers.

CAPITAL TRANSFERS AND ECONOMIC POLICY: CANADA, 1951–1962. By Richard E. Caves and Grant L. Reuber with others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 432 p. $10.00.

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Necessarily technical, this study is important for an understanding of the Canadian economy, with implications for broader questions of international economics as well.

NORTH AMERICAN AND WESTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC POLICIES. Edited by Charles P. Kindleberger and Andrew Shonfield. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 551 p. $17.50.

Good papers and excellent discussion skillfully edited to bring out salient issues about the economic relations among the industrialized countries and, not least, the substantial differences between "European regionalists and American cosmopolitans."

THE WIDENING GAP: DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970's. Edited by Barbara Ward and others. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 372 p. $10.00 (Paper, $3.95).

Out of a mountain of paper generated for a major conference, the editors have fashioned a readable book in which a number of authorities are permitted to delineate the major issues and often their conflicting views on what should be done.

GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Gustav Ranis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 567 p. $17.50.

The experience of many countries is used to throw light on a key controversy: the proper role of government in development.

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. Edited by Hans W. J. Bosman and Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau. Leyden: Sijthoff; Lexington (Mass.): Heath Lexington Books, 1970, 180 p. $9.50.

In addition to good papers by leading authorities on familiar topics, this book contains an unusual one by two Czech economists on possible future relations between the Comecon countries and the international monetary system.

GATT, EWG UND EFTA. By Franz Jaeger. Bern: Stämpfli, 1970, 399 p. Swiss Fr. 56.

A careful attempt, going beyond purely formal legal reasoning, to demonstrate the compatibility of the European Community and EFTA with GATT on all but a few points.

COMMONWEALTH POLICY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT. Edited by Paul Streeten and Hugh Corbet. London: Frank Cass, 1971, 232 p. £3.25; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, $11.50.

Explorations of the extent to which the Commonwealth continues to provide a useful framework for coöperation.

DIE ATLANTISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSZUSAMMENARBEIT. By Rudolf Strauch. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1970, 331 p. Swiss Fr. 34.

A useful if rather elaborately organized account of private efforts and public accomplishments in "Atlantic" coöperation.

The United States

CONDEMNED TO FREEDOM. By William Pfaff. New York: Random House, 1971, 210 p. $6.95.

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The New Left, the Right backlash and the New Populism, the author asserts, are all symptoms of the despair of liberalism. He argues forcefully that liberalism, to survive, must embrace radical change.

THE POLITICS OF DISORDER. By Theodore J. Lowi. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 193 p. $6.95.

In a well-written polemic, the author argues that major changes in the American system have often come about by going outside traditional institutions. What we need, the author claims, is not law and order, but law and disorder.

McNAMARA. By Henry L. Trewhitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 307 p. $7.95.

The former Defense Secretary is given high marks for rationality in his nuclear policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. As far as Vietnam is concerned, note the clue to the Pentagon papers on the last page of the book.

THE NIGHTMARE DECADE. By Fred J. Cook. New York: Random House, 1971, 626 p. $10.00.

The fifties and the omnipresent figure of Joseph McCarthy, as seen through the eyes of a first-rate reporter. The entire story of the late Senator is extremely well told, from his first ominous "I have here in my hand" speech in 1950 to his death in 1957. Absorbing though melancholy reading.

THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. McCARTHY AND THE SENATE. By Robert Griffith. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1971, 362 p. $8.50.

An excellent scholarly study in which the author concludes that McCarthy's power "was the consequence of Republican partisanship and, after 1950, of Democratic acquiescence."

REMAKING CHINA POLICY: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONMAKING. By Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 136 p. $5.95.

A realistic and tersely argued plan of action for a new Asian—not just China—policy. The authors recommend specific policy and organizational proposals as well as research and intelligence studies. Timely reading for statesmen and laymen alike.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. Edited by M. Donald Hancock and Dankwart A. Rustow. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971, 375 p. $9.95 (Paper, $5.50).

The editors have put together an above-average symposium by leading scholars in the field.

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN THE IMAGE OF PEER GYNT. By E. A. J. Johnson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971, 352 p. $12.75.

This is a very human memoir by a liberal scholar-bureaucrat with a literary flair and with a considerable reservoir of political experience.

PROPHET IN POLITICS: HENRY A. WALLACE AND THE WAR YEARS, 1940–1965. By Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1971, 268 p. $8.95.

This is a worshipful account of Henry Wallace's political career during the war and cold-war years. The authors make much of his internationalist ideals, but what often comes across is his crusading righteousness and his lack of political realism.

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THE NEW EXILES. By Roger Neville Williams. New York: Liveright, 1971, 401 p. $7.95.

A moving report on self-exiled American war resisters in Canada, all of whom, the author asserts, have the inalienable right to return.

THE HIGHER REALISM OF WOODROW WILSON AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Arthur S. Link. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971, 425 p. $12.95.

Twenty-four previously published essays on Wilson, by the leading authority on the twenty-eighth President of the United States.

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE FACTORY. By John Franklin Campbell. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 292 p. $6.95.

This is a trenchant critique of the bureaucratic dimension of American foreign policy.

A MOMENT IN HISTORY. By Brent Ashabranner. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 392 p. $7.95.

A constructively critical account of the first ten years of the Peace Corps. One poignant observation: "It is impossible to imagine the Peace Corps being born in today's America, but fortunately it already exists."

THE REUTHER-MEANY FOREIGN POLICY DISPUTE: UNION LEADERS AND MEMBERS VIEW WORLD AFFAIRS. By Alfred O. Hero, Jr. and Emil Starr. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1970, 228 p. $15.00.

An empirical study of the foreign policy postures of the AFL and the CIO before and after their merger. The study also includes valuable information on other important labor unions, such as the UAW.

WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE. Edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 208 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Proceedings of the Congressional Conference on War and National Responsibility that was convened in Washington in 1970.

THE ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE REASONS WHY. By Albert H. Newman. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1970, 622 p. $10.00.

This excellent, thorough and searching inquiry confirms most of the basic conclusions of the Warren Commission and gives the lie to numerous more sensationalist accounts.

THE REVOLT AGAINST THE MASSES. By Aaron Wildavsky. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 498 p. $12.50.

Twenty-six essays on aspects of public policy, most of them published before, but their excellence unimpaired by time.

The Western Hemisphere

CUBA: THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM. By Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 1,696 p. $20.00.

A majestic contribution, born a classic. Cuban history is reviewed and analyzed in elaborate detail from 1762, with somewhat lesser (but nevertheless ample) stress upon the period since 1960. Extensive tables and appendices round out the book's usefulness.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GUERRILLAS IN POWER: THE COURSE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION. By K. S. Karol. New York: Hill and Wang, 1970, 624 p. $12.50.

A notable contribution to the history of the Revolution, blending love of its lost possibilities with rancorous dislike and distrust of Russia. The result: strong criticism, uttered sorrowfully and with an extreme pro-Maoist bias.

GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Richard Gott. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 626 p. $10.00.

A long and uncritical panegyric extolling violent revolution.

FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO: THE HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN, 1492–1969. By Eric Williams. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 576 p. $10.95.

The first Caribbean-wide history in English. The treatment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and of the Commonwealth areas, is first rate. The Hispanic areas receive less attention, however, and the last three decades are slighted.

THE GROWTH AND CULTURE OF LATIN AMERICA. By Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 1,146 p. $20.00.

A massive and judicious recital of political and social developments in the Hemisphere from earliest times. (A second edition of a work first appearing in 1956.)

LATIN AMERICA: TODAY AND TOMORROW. By Galo Plaza. Washington: Acropolis Books, 1971, 229 p. $6.95.

A distinguished statesman speaks out for democratic processes and for a liberal, evolutionary approach to political, social and economic problems.

CULTIVATING REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA. By James F. Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr. New York: Random House, 1971, 469 p. $10.00.

Analysis of agricultural reform in Chile, Peru and Cuba, with the conclusion that only the revolutionary approach to tenure problems will prove adequate.

FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO. By Harry K. Wright. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971, 425 p. $15.00.

A broad inquiry into legal, institutional and social factors that constitute the environment for investment in Mexico.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF BRAZIL. By Ronald M. Schneider. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 431 p. $13.50.

A searching investigation, on a scholarly plane, into the evolution of authoritarian military régimes in Brazil since 1964.

THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZIL. By G. Edward Schuh in collaboration with Eliseu Roberto Alves. New York: Praeger, 1970, 456 p. $18.50.

A thorough and detailed analysis of agriculture and its relationship to economic development. For the specialist.

Western Europe

GAULLISM: THE RISE AND FALL OF A POLITICAL MOVEMENT. By Anthony Hartley. New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1971, 373 p. $10.00.

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This readable, thorough study of an endlessly fascinating subject is a feat of intelligent compression by an experienced British journalist and editor.

UN AUTRE DE GAULLE: JOURNAL 1944–1954. By Claude Mauriac. Paris: Hachette, 1971, 408 p. Fr. 26.

Appointed to de Gaulle's secretariat in 1944, the young Mauriac had ample chance to observe him and converse with him. Mauriac's journal makes clear that he took full advantage of his opportunities. An extraordinary source.

LA FRANCE EN GUERRE ET LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES, 1939–1945. By Victor-Yves Ghéball. The Hague: Mouton, 1969, 273 p. Gldrs. 20.

A scholarly study of Vichy's and de Gaulle's wartime relations with the League of Nations in neutral Switzerland. Not surprisingly, Vichy broke with the League and the Free French sought to coöperate with it.

ANDRÉ MALRAUX ET LE GAULLISME. By Janine Mossuz. Paris: Colin, 1970, 312 p. Fr. 35.

A doctoral thesis on Malraux's relations with de Gaulle, concerned particularly with the question of whether Malraux had betrayed his prewar ideals in embracing the General's politics. The answer is no—on the basis of minute, even pedantic, work, as also witnessed by an exhaustive bibliography.

THE RADICAL ALTERNATIVE. By Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and Michel Albert. New York: Norton, 1971, 204 p. $6.95.

This catalogue of social ills and new prescriptions is a breathless manifesto rather than a reasoned analysis of what is to be done.

MÉMOIRES: FIN D'UN EMPIRE. By Raoul Salan. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1970, 442 p. Fr. 30.10.

The first volume of Salan's memoirs, dwelling on his several long missions in Indochina, before and after the Second World War. By a leading soldier whose career ended in jail after his participation in the Algerian uprising of 1961.

REVOLUTIONARY SYNDICALISM IN FRANCE: THE DIRECT ACTION OF ITS TIME. By F. F. Ridley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 279 p. $13.00.

A fine study of an important subject. A British scholar sets syndicalism in the broadest cultural and political context and emphasizes the present-day echoes of the earlier mood and movement.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY FROM PEEL TO CHURCHILL. By Robert Blake. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 305 p. $12.50.

A portrait of a party, by a fine historian, author of the well-known "Disraeli." A pleasure to read and ponder.

THE CHAMBERLAIN CABINET. By Ian Colvin. New York: Taplinger, 1971, 286 p. $7.50.

On the basis of newly opened Cabinet papers, Colvin adds important details to the familiar picture of the appeasement years. Chamberlain imposed his own policy, based on his stubborn misreading of Hitler's intentions. His half-brother, Austen Chamberlain, once remarked, "Of course, Neville, you know nothing about foreign affairs." The record bore him out.

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THE ANTI-APPEASERS: CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION TO APPEASEMENT IN THE 1930s. By Neville Thompson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 256 p. $7.25.

The widely held view that a few conservatives were consistent anti-appeasers is scrutinized and adjudged to have been "rather like a mirage."

POLITICIANS AT WAR: JULY 1914 TO MAY 1915. A PROLOGUE TO THE TRIUMPH OF LLOYD GEORGE. By Cameron Hazlehurst. New York: Knopf, 1971, 346 p. $8.95.

On the basis of carefully assembled new sources, a young English historian presents an intimate picture of how the cabinet entered the war in August 1914 and waged it.

EAMON DE VALERA. By The Earl of Longford and Thomas P. O'Neill. Boston: Houghton, 1971, 499 p. $12.50.

An authorized and authoritative biography of Ireland's master statesman, affording a sweeping portrait of Irish politics as well.

THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: ITS GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. By Morley Ayearst. New York: New York University Press, 1970, 241 p. $6.95.

An introductory treatise, with some attention to Irish history and society.

BARRICADES IN BELFAST: THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. By Max Hastings. New York: Taplinger, 1970, 211 p. $5.95.

A young British journalist gives a good example of instant history, drawing on his own reporting from Ulster in 1969.

BELGIUM. By Margot Lyon. New York: Walker, 1971, 204 p. $7.50.

A highly readable account of the problems of Belgium, past and present, by a seasoned British journalist.

DIE POLITISCHE ELITE IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND. By Klaus von Beyme. Munich: Piper, 1971, 240 p. DM. 16.80.

The sociology of the political élite in the Federal Republic. A useful survey, by a young German sociologist.

THE SECRET CONFERENCES OF DR. GOEBBELS: THE NAZI PROPAGANDA WAR 1939–43. Selected and edited by Willi A. Boelcke. New York: Dutton, 1970, 364 p. $12.50.

A condensed English version of the published records of Goebbels' wartime conferences. Perhaps the best picture we have of the workings of Goebbels' mind.

MEINE ERINNERUNGEN AN KONRAD ADENAUER. By Anneliese Poppinga. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970, 353 p. DM. 24.

Adenauer's secretary recalls his life in retirement and his conversations about all aspects of his career and his thoughts. A pleasant, unpretentious addition to Adenauer's "Memoirs."

HITLERS AUSSENPOLITISCHES PROGRAMM: ENTSTEHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG 1919–1939. By Axel Kuhn. Stuttgart: Klett, 1970, 286 p. DM. 24.

A book in two parts: a short survey of Hitler's views on foreign policy before 1933 and an account of his policies toward England thereafter. Some new material is included, but much of it is fairly familiar.

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CARL VITAL MOOR, 1852–1932: EIN LEBEN FÜR MARX UND LENIN. By Leonhard Haas. Zurich: Benziger, 1970, 372 p.

The carefully researched biography of a tempestuous Swiss socialist who was a helper of Lenin's and an occasional agent of the Germans in their dealings with the Bolsheviks. A fascinating footnote to history.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

POLITICS AND HISTORY IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Nancy Whittier Heer. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 319 p. $12.50.

An interesting study of the peculiar role of historiography in the Soviet Union, with particular attention to the vicissitudes of party history in the decade following Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin.

GRUNDFRAGEN SOWJETISCHER AUSSENPOLITIK. Edited by Boris Meissner and Gotthold Rhode. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970, 175 p. DM. 16.80.

Essays by a group of German scholars on "continuity and change" in Russian and Soviet policy toward such neighbors as Poland, Germany and China.

ISTORIIA VNESHNEI POLITIKI SSSR 1945–1970 gg. Edited by B. N. Ponomarev, A. A. Gromyko and V. M. Khvostov. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1971, 519 p. Rubles 2.41.

Written by several leading Soviet historians and diplomats, this book presents an authoritative Soviet view of postwar foreign policy and international relations. It is based on hitherto unpublished documents from the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1930 TO 1945. By Anthony C. Sutton. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, 401 p. $12.50.

This second in a three-volume series explores the transfer of skills and technology to the Soviet Union during the years of the five-year plans and the war. The conclusions point toward this factor as a prime element in Soviet economic growth.

THE MAKING OF THE SOVIET STATE APPARATUS. By Olga A. Narkiewicz. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970, 238 p. £3. (New York: Humanities Press, $9.00.)

A monograph reëxamining the NEP period: social and economic conditions in town and countryside, and the vacillating efforts of the young communist régime to come to grips with them. Some debatable conclusions, but fresh material.

ALIENATION AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY. By Paul Craig Roberts. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971, 121 p. $6.00.

An effort "to explain the operation of the Soviet economy in terms of its organizational principles and Marxian aspirations."

ZWISCHEN MOSKAU UND JAKUTSK. By Ulrich Schiller. Hamburg: Wegner, 1970, 212 p. DM. 22.

A German correspondent's report on recent, contradictory trends and impulses in Soviet life.

KRIEG UND FRIEDEN. By F. A. Krummacher and Helmut Lange. Munich: Bechtle, 1970, 564 p. DM. 48.

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A substantial review, though not a major scholarly study, of German-Soviet relations from "Brest-Litovsk to Operation Barbarossa."

DE LÉNINE À STALINE. By Jules Humbert-Droz. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1971, 507 p. Swiss Fr. 39.

In this second volume of memoirs (Volume I appeared in 1969), the author covers the decade of his activities in the Comintern from 1921 to 1931.

RUSSIA ENTERS THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1894–1917. Edited by Erwin Oberländer and others. New York: Schocken Books, 1971, 352 p. $12.00.

The principal intent of these essays by an able group of scholars is to counteract the tendency to view these years as mere prelude to revolution.

UKRAINE: A CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA: VOLUME II. Edited by Volodymyr Kubijovyč. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (for the Ukrainian National Association), 1971, 1,394 p. $60.00.

This second and concluding volume of a comprehensive encyclopedia (Volume I appeared in 1963), covers the fields of law, church, scholarship and education, publishing, the arts, economy, health and medicine, armed forces, and Ukrainians abroad.

FINNLANDS KOMMUNISTEN. By Ulrich Wagner. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971, 198 p. DM. 17.80.

A welcome study of the recent history of the Finnish Communist Party and the effort to recreate, in the second half of the 1960s, a popular front.

DAS UNTERDRÜCKTE DOSSIER. Edited by Jiři Pelikán. Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1970, 442 p.

A German translation of a report commissioned by the Control Committee of the Czech Communist Party in 1968, and dealing with various delicate political issues, including the question of rehabilitation, in the years after 1948.

OSTBLOCK INTERN. By Erwin Weit. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1970, 273 p. DM. 20.

Memoirs of an instantaneous translator for the Polish régime from 1956 to 1969, dealing particularly with Polish-East German meetings and conversations.

DUBCEK. By William Shawcross. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, 317 p. $7.95.

An English journalist's reconstruction of the political career of Alexander Dubček.

THE CZECHS UNDER NAZI RULE. By Vojtech Mastny. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 274 p. $10.00.

An able monograph on Czech efforts at resistance under German occupation from 1939 till 1942 and the repressions following the assassination of Heydrich.

TITO: DER WEG DES JOSIP BROZ. By Vilko Vinterhalter. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1969, 363 p. Swiss Fr. 28.

A translation of a Slovenian historian's analysis of Tito's political evolution over his long career.

YUGOSLAV COMMUNISM AND THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION. By Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1971, 247 p. $10.00.

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An historical study of Jugoslav communist policy in and concerning Macedonia between the wars, during World War II and in the Tito era. The authors see the area as still a potential point of conflict.

The Middle East and North Africa

BRITAIN, INDIA, AND THE ARABS, 1914–1921. By Briton Cooper Busch. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 522 p. $14.50.

Many scholars of late have been flocking to the archives to unravel the complicated skein of Britain's Middle East policy in the World War I era. This monograph, a first-rate job, highlights the problems arising from the various foreign policies emanating from the Foreign Office.

PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT IN LIBYA: THE EXCEPTIONAL ECONOMY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. By Rawle Farley. New York: Praeger, 1971, 349 p. $18.50.

An economist's treatise on development that fits no other country. While the effects of the oil expansion get something less than their due, it is clear that a capital surplus is no panacea for problems of underdevelopment.

DAVID'S SLING. By Shimon Peres. New York: Random House, 1971, 322 p. $8.95.

New light on Israel's negotiations for arms abroad and build-up of an arms industry at home by one who was an architect of both endeavors.

EMBASSIES IN CRISIS: DIPLOMATS AND DEMAGOGUES BEHIND THE SIX-DAY WAR. By Michael Bar-Zohar. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971, 279 p. $8.95.

Politics and diplomacy of the period before and during the June war described by a talented Israeli journalist and biographer. The reader has to take his say-so for much of it, but if not "definitive" (will this crisis ever find its definitive historian?) it is most absorbing.

THE ISRAELIS: FOUNDERS AND SONS. By Amos Elon. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 359 p. $10.00.

Not a book on Israeli politics or international relations, but the fascinating discussion of the attitudes and psychology of Israel's new generation throws considerable light on both.

THE WAR IN THE YEMEN. By Edgar O'Ballance. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1971, 218 p. $7.00.

Another in the author's series on the little and middle-sized wars which have taken place since World War II. He does not spare criticism of all parties to the conflict—royalist, republican and Egyptian alike.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO TURKISH NATIONALISM AND REFORM, 1914–1939. By Roger R. Trask. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971, 280 p. $11.50.

A detailed treatment from the American side of many aspects of Turkish-American relations, consequential and inconsequential.

South and Southeast Asia

AGGRESSION: OUR ASIAN DISASTER. By William L. Standard. New York: Random House, 1971, 228 p. $6.95.

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The author, chairman of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam, presents an impassioned brief arguing that U.S. conduct of the Vietnam war violates the SEATO treaty, the U.N. Charter, the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, the "Nuremberg Principles" and the U.S. Constitution.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROGNOSIS. By John Badgley. New York: Free Press, 1971, 210 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Most Asian peoples live in societies where the idea of the nation has no organic meaning, political authority generally lacks legitimacy and conflict is a continuing probability. This gloomy analysis leads the author to two heterodox conclusions: U.S. involvement with Asia should increase, not decline; and effective "development" is more likely through local and parochial loyalties and community development than on the national scale.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS: A STUDY IN INDIA. By Ashok Kapoor. New York: New York University Press, 1970, 361 p. $12.50.

A thoroughly researched case study in the dynamics of the negotiation process between an international consortium and the Government of India over the establishment of a large new industrial project. Subjective expectations, personality conflicts and political considerations were the crucial factors that led to the proposal's ultimate rejection.

THE ORDEAL OF NATIONHOOD: A SOCIAL STUDY OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE, 1947–1970. By Krishan Bhatia. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 390 p. $10.00.

The Washington correspondent of *The Hindustan Times* has written a vivid, swift-moving account of India's tortuous struggle to create itself as a modern state. In the never-ending battle with political disintegration and economic impoverishment, with endemic corruption, inefficiency and selfishness, only the development of a widely shared national consciousness and commitment will avail. The outcome, to the author, seems still uncertain.

NEPAL: STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL. By Leo E. Rose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 310 p. $10.00.

How does a small state—"a root between two stones"—survive? The author presents an object lesson in the politics of buffermanship, and demonstrates that in the Nepali case the tactics of continued existence have remained remarkably constant for two centuries.

VIET CONG REPRESSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. By Stephen T. Hosmer. Lexington (Mass.): Heath Lexington Books, 1970, 176 p. $8.50.

Working from captured papers, the author describes the Vietcong policy of assassination and abduction. His evidence suggests that this strategy is basic to the Vietnamese communists' struggle for power, that its use is increasing dramatically, and that it is likely to play a major role in the post-ceasefire period.

INDONESIA: THE POSSIBLE DREAM. By Howard Palfrey Jones. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (for the Hoover Institution), 1971, 473 p. $12.95.

The American Ambassador to Indonesia, 1958–1965, here records his fascination with a complex society and its even more complex leader, Sukarno. The principal lessons of his tenure are the immense strength of nationalism and the limits of U.S. power to affect the forms it takes.

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A STUDY IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE. By Stephen Sloan. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971, 107 p. $3.50 (Paper).

The bloody coup that overturned the Indonesian political structure in 1965 is here utilized as a case study of the role of violence in the political process. The author sees violence as an integral part of politics, an ever-present irrational solution to the problem of handling situations that frustrate rationality.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

CHINA AND RUSSIA: THE "GREAT GAME." By O. Edmund Clubb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 578 p. $12.95.

A sweepingly panoramic view of the 800-year history of Sino-Soviet relations, this careful and readable survey suggests that while sources of conflict will continue to bedevil both giant neighbors, the odds, after Mao's passing, are in favor of cautious coöperation with U.S. power.

THE AMERASIA PAPERS: SOME PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF US-CHINA RELATIONS. By John S. Service. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1971, 220 p. $4.00 (Paper).

The publication in 1970 by the Internal Security Subcommittee of "The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China" seemed to reopen in rather puzzling fashion the hoary controversy over who "lost China." In this monograph Mr. Service, who was discharged from the Foreign Service in 1951, offers a welcome clarification of a record that appears discreditable not to him but to his government.

STURM ÜBER EURASIEN. By Botho Kirsch. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970, 286 p. DM. 22.

The ex-foreign editor of *Der Spiegel* argues that Bonn's policy of accommodation with Moscow is tragically mistaken. The conflict between China and Russia is irreconcilable and détente in the West only opens the way for Russian aggression in the East. A hard line toward the Soviet Union, on the other hand, would not only preserve the balance necessary for world peace but might even offer hope of German reunification and the "neutralization" of Eastern Europe.

CHINA'S WORLD: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A DEVELOPING STATE. By J. D. Simmonds. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 260 p. $10.00.

The author, of the Australian Defence Department, sees Chinese policy as dictated mainly by the need for an external enemy to spur domestic effort.

THE CHINESE ROAD TO SOCIALISM: ECONOMICS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By E. L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, 256 p. $7.50.

The authors are fascinated by the Maoist experiment in substituting morale for material and have written a panegyric to the Chinese use of meta-economic considerations rather than classical economic indices of productivity in thinking about "development."

MAO PAPERS: ANTHOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Edited by Jerome Ch'en. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 221 p. $10.00.

This collection of Mao's hitherto untranslated writings affords an invaluable glimpse into the mind of an extraordinary man. Like the rest of Ch'en's work, the scholarship is scrupulous and the commentary enlightening.

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LA RÉPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DE CHINE: DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS. By Tsien Tche-Hao. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1970, 646 p. Fr. 92.40.

Description and analysis (both rather formalistic) are not kept scrupulously separate from evaluation, but the author's emphatically Maoist sympathies do not mar the usefulness of the book.

CHINA: MANAGEMENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY. Edited by John M. H. Lindbeck. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971, 391 p. $12.50 (Paper, $4.95).

This collection of ten papers produced for the 1969 Cuernavaca conference of China scholars covers the usual academic spectrum from pedestrian fact-catching to brilliant if tenuous speculation.

LA CHINE ET LE TIERS MONDE (1949–1969). By Philippe Richer. Paris: Payot, 1971, 444 p. Fr. 44.60.

An encyclopedic summation of data on Chinese relations with the less developed countries, Richer's volume draws some interesting conclusions—that Chinese diplomacy's successes have lain in getting the most mileage out of limited resources (primarily the fascination of ideology), and that—still not a great power—it can hope only for the same sort of successes in the near future.

JAPANESE SOCIETY. By Takeshi Ishida. New York: Random House, 1971, 145 p. $2.95 (Paper).

A distinguished Japanese sociologist considers, with insight and empathy, the range of problems, from conformism to the search for national goals, which Japan faces, not uniquely but perhaps more intensely than some other states.

THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY. By Kenneth K. Kurihara. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, 148 p. $7.50.

Professor Kurihara sees the reasons for Japan's leadership in the growth rate competition (a secular rate of growth of national income of 42.3 percent over the last century, highest in the world), in the coupling of a "delicate and intricate tradition of state paternalism" with an urgently felt and universally shared need to "catch up."

LE JAPON: MONSTRE OU MODÈLE? By Jean-François Delassus. Paris: Hachette, 1970, 318 p. Fr. 25.

A sensitive and unfriendly observer paints in these pages a vision of Japan as prototype of a dehumanized and overcrowded future.

THE KOREA-JAPAN TREATY CRISIS AND THE INSTABILITY OF THE KOREAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. By Kwan Bong Kim. New York: Praeger, 1971, 350 p. $18.50.

Professor Kim argues in this valuable study that the persistence of an authoritarian culture, personalism and endemic factionalism in political parties, plus the lack of institutionalized forms for mass political participation, has created a basically unstable and dangerously explosive governmental structure in Korea.

Africa

LE POUVOIR AFRICAIN. By Jean Ziégler. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1971, 227 p. Fr. 20.

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A fascinating discussion of African concepts of time and history as compared with those of industrialized societies. By a professor of sociology at the African Institute in Geneva.

L'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST BLOQUÉE: L'ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE DE LA COLONISATION, 1880–1970. By Samir Amin. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1971, 322 p. Fr. 30.

Though colonial development is treated in this volume, the emphasis is on the analysis of the economic development of the French-speaking states of West Africa plus Ghana and the Gambia.

THE NIGERIAN ARMY 1956–1966. By N. J. Miners. London: Methuen, 1971, 290 p. £2.25 (New York: Barnes and Noble, $7.25; Paper, $5.00).

The transfer of the colonial forces to the new Nigerian government, the "Nigerianization" of these forces, and then their use in the Congo, Tanganyika and elsewhere are described. But the army's increasing involvement in politics, culminating in the coups of 1966, is the major focus of this work by a political scientist who spent nine years at King's College, Lagos.

NIGERIA: THE SEEDS OF DISASTER. By John Hatch. Chicago: Regnery, 1970, 313 p. $6.95.

The Commonwealth correspondent for the *New Statesman* has written a general history of West Africa, with stress on the area encompassed by present-day Nigeria.

THE WAR OF NIGERIAN UNITY 1967–1970. By Sir Rex Niven. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman and Littlefield, 1971, 175 p. $5.00.

A brief and quite general analysis of the administrative and political sources of the civil war by a distinguished former member of the Colonial Service.

REFLECTIONS ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR: FACING THE FUTURE. By Raph Uwechue. New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1971, 206 p. $8.95.

These reflections were written largely during the hostilities, though there are two epilogues written afterwards. The author, an Ibo, describes the origins of the civil war, his own reasons for supporting the secession, and then his gradual alienation from Ojukwu's leadership. A thoughtful, fair-minded book.

THE AFRICAN VOICE IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1898–1930. By T. O. Ranger. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, 252 p. $7.25.

Politics among the indigenous inhabitants in the period between the consolidation of colonial power and the emergence of the nationalist movement is the subject of this work by the well-known Rhodesian historian.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN UNKNOWN SOUTH AFRICAN. By Naboth Mokgatle. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 349 p. $7.95.

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By Donald Wasson

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